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ABSTRACT
Euro-dollars are dollar denominated bank deposits 
in non-U.S. banks. These deposits are located primarily 
in European commercial banks and are owned by a wide 
variety of individuals, corporations, and governmental 
bodies. A Euro-dollar deposit comes into existence when 
a holder of dollars exchanges them for a Euro-dollar 
deposit. The issuing bank then becomes the owner of the 
dollars which normally take the form of claims on U.S. 
bank demand deposits.
This dissertaion is concerned with this process 
of conversion from dollars to Euro-dollars and with the 
effects the existence of Euro-dollars may have on domestic 
monetary policies and on international financial relations. 
It is especially concenned with the practice of U.S. banks 
of borrowing Euro-dollars during times of tight money in 
the United States and the effects such borrowings have on 
the efficiency and impact of U.S. monetary policy.
The dissertation describes the development and 
mechanisms of the Euro-dollar monetary system. It shows 
that Euro-dollars are money and that this money may be 
created by the Eurobanks. Further, it presents estimates 
of the amount of money that has been created. A money 
multiplier is developed and illustrations of its operation
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are given. Of greatest importance to the operation of 
this multiplier is the existence of large leakages out of 
the Euro-dollar system.
One of the major leakages, and that with which this 
study primarily deals, occurs when U.S. banks borrow Euro­
dollars from the Eurobanks. The decline in Euro-dollar 
system reserves that results from this U.S. bank borrowing 
restricts credit creation in the Euro-dollar system. 
Further, the claims on U.S. banks that U.S. Euro-dollar 
borrowers obtain allows the borrowing banks to increase 
their reserves and thus their lending. It also allows the 
entire U.S. banking system to increase loans outstanding. 
The money supply and total reserves, however, remain 
generally unaffected by Euro-dollar borrowing. Thus, 
while deposit levels remain constant, total assets and 
liabilities of the U.S. banking system increase.
The increase in loans (or the lack of decline in 
loans) is a leakage in the efficiency of U.S. monetary 
policy to the extent that one of the Federal Reserve's 
goals during tight money periods is a reduction in lending 
by the commercial banks. Further, Euro-dollar borrowing 
has added an additional destabilizing factor that com­
plicates monetary policy. It increases the variability 
of impact of a given policy action and makes more difficult 
precise monetary adjustments. The imposition of reserve 
requirements on Euro-dollar borrowings has reduced this 
uncertainty and loss of efficiency.
The study also analyzes the effects of European 
central bank interference in the Euro-dollar system, 
concluding that the recycling of dollars obtained in 
foreign exchange operations back into the Euro-dollar 
system drastically reduced the leakages from the system 
and increased the credit creating abilities of the system. 
It is noted that a form of open market operation could 
be undertaken by these central banks to control the 
amount of Euro-dollars in existence. This may be desirable 
in order to reduce the impact of the system on interest 
rate levels and liquidity in the various domestic monetary 
systems.
The dissertation concludes that, with the present 
reserve requirements on Euro-dollar borrowing in the U.S., 
such borrowing should not greatly influence the efficiency 
of U.S. monetary policy in the future. However, it can 
still abet currency speculation and can influence liquidity 
levels in various European countries. Thus, unless it is 
controlled, the Euro-dollar system will continue to present 
a destabilizing influence in European money markets.
EURO-DOLLARS AND U.S. MONETARY POLICY
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OP THE STUDY
I . Introduction
Euro-dollars are dollar deposits in European banks.
To persons unfamiliar with the areas of monetary economics 
and international finance, these deposits may not seem 
particularly exceptional. However, as will be shown in 
this dissertation, the existence of such deposits is 
indeed an unusual situation. It derives, generally, from 
the world-wide acceptability of the dollar (its vehicle 
currency status, in technical terms).
To illustrate the exceptional nature of such deposits, 
it is only necessary to draw a parallel to this type of 
deposit in an American bank. That is, it would be a strange 
phenomenon to the average American to be offered the 
opportunity of having his checking account denominated in 
Dutch Guilders or Italian Lira. Further, to borrow such
Actually, dollar deposits in any non-American bank 
are termed Euro-dollars. However, the bulk of such deposits 
are in Western European banks.
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funds and have them credited to his account in terms of 
Guilders or Lira and to then be able to write checks 
acceptable to another American in Lira would be a radical 
change from the norm. Thus, this simple idea, dollar de­
nominated deposits in European banks owned by Europeans 
(or anyone else, for that matter), contains within it 
some rather unusual consequences and some challenges to 
both domestic and international monetary authorities.
Euro-dollar deposits are not only accepted by 
Eurobanks, so called, but are also created by such banks in 
a manner quite similar to the creation of dollar deposits 
by U.S. banks. The point is, the Eurobanks are creating 
dollar deposits, not their home currency deposits. The 
reserves for these deposits are kept in U.S. banks.
Indeed, the reserves are Eurobank demand deposits in U.S. 
commercial banks. Again, this is analogous to a U.S. bank 
creating Lira deposits and keeping reserves on these de­
posits in Italian commercial banks.
To conclude this catalog of unusual situations, it 
must be noted that U.S. banks have borrowed Euro-dollars 
from the Eurobanks. That is, they have borrowed dollars 
owned by the Eurobanks and kept as reserves on dollar 
denominated deposits owned by Europeans. These reserves 
are demand deposits in U.S. banks. U.S. banks therefore 
borrow ownership of other U.S. bank demand deposits from 
European banks. Of course, if these Eurobanks do not have
3
sufficient dollar demand deposits to lend, they may 
borrow them from other Eurobanks who do or from private 
citizens and corporations. They may also take domestic 
currency assets and convert them into dollars in the 
foreign exchange markets in their countries. This brings 
into the picture the various central banks of these 
countries.
As may be obvious from the foregoing, the study of 
Euro-dollars involves accepting a state of affairs somewhat 
different from that which normally exists in the realm of 
monetary and international economics. Further, it involves 
the analysis of what is an entirely new monetary system, 
one that is supranational in scope and based on one 
country's currency. The data available for the study is 
not particularly voluminous nor is it organized in any 
systematic fashion. Further, many previous Euro-dollar 
studies have been heavily institutional in nature. These 
have lacked much real analysis of the ramifications of the 
existence of the Euro-dollar system.-*
Quantitative Framework for the Euro-Dollar System, 
Princeton Studies in International Finance No. 26.
(Princeton: International Finance Section, 1970) , p. 1.
3As Fred Hirsh is reported to have said in "The Money- 
Machine Magic of Eurodollars," Business Week, No. 2112 
(February 21, 1970), p. 114, ". ... interpretations of the 
Eurodollar market have become almost de rigueur for monetary 
economists. If one common thread can be found in their 
varied offerings it would be: 'In the Eurodollar market,
things are not what they seem' ; to which is often added the
4
II. Purpose of the Study
The limitations of previous Euro-dollar studies 
noted above have left a fertile area of investigation with 
which this dissertation proposes to deal. That is, a de­
tailed analysis of the effects the existence of the Euro­
dollar market has had upon the implementation and effi­
ciency of U.S. nuonetary policy is the main purpose of this 
study. Further, to the extent that the creation of Euro­
dollars by Eurobanks may occur and influence U.S. monetary 
aggregates, an analysis of the possibility of such creation 
and its impact on U.S. monetary policy will be undertaken. 
Since U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing has played such an 
important role in these banks1 attempts to evade Federal 
Reserve tight money policies in the past decade, these 
activities and their resultant influences upon U.S. 
monetary policy will comprise a major portion of the study.
A second purpose of this dissertation is to show 
quantitatively, through the use of regression analysis, 
the various relationships that exist between U.S. bank 
Euro-dollar borrowing and domestic monetary aggregates.
The monetary statistics now available for the latter half
addendum: 'Nor as they are written in articles preceding
this one.'" This dissertation may be de rigueur but it is 
not intended as a castigation of others' writings. The 
concern here is with areas of analysis generally overlooked 
by other writers rather than with the correction of 
possible errors in previous writers' analyses.
of the 1960's make possible a quantitative explanation of 
U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing and the effect such 
borrowing had on the U.S. monetary system.
Third, since Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks 
has aided the transmission of U.S. monetary policy in­
fluences to European money markets and has, it is postu­
lated, affected the uniformity and speed with which U.S. 
monetary policy affects the U.S. banking system, an 
analysis of the expected and actual impact of Euro­
dollar borrowing on these factors wili be presented.
The Euro-dollar market may also be responsible for 
a heightened competition between U.S. banks and European 
banks and between various European banks themselves. This 
possibility will be explored in some detail, as will the 
effects the existence of the Euro-dollar market have had 
upon the vehicle currency role of the dollar.
Finally, it is the general purpose of this study to 
add to the understanding of the operation of the Euro­
dollar system. To this end, the basic mechanisms and 
structure of the system will be presented in detail.
CHAPTER II
DEVELOPMENT AND MECHANISMS OF THE EURO-DOLLAR SYSTEM
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly describe 
the development of the Euro-dollar system and to outline 
the basic mechanics of the system's operation. In 
addition, a short preliminary discussion defining several 
of the more important concepts pertaining to the Euro­
dollar system will be presented.
II. Definitions and Distinctions
A. Deposit Characteristics
Euro-dollars are dollar denominated deposits in 
foreign commercial banks.^ These deposits may be owned by
Non-U.S. domiciled banks that accept dollar de­
nominated deposits are today located not only in Europe 
but in many other parts of the world as well. Originally, 
only a few European banks accepted such deposits but as 
the market for such funds developed, major banks through­
out the world (including branches of U.S. bank? abroad) 
began to accept and relend dollar denominated deposits. 
Fritz Machlup, in a recent article, "The Magicians and 
Their Rabbits," Morgan Guaranty Survey (May, 1971), p.
4n, insists that only dollar denominated deposits in 
European banks should be called Euro-dollars. Similarly 
denominated deposits in banks in other parts of the 
world outside the U.S. should not, according to Machlup,
6
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foreign or U.S. citizens and corporations. The distinctive 
characteristic of these Euro-dollar deposits is their 
location in banks outside the United States. Further, 
these deposits, like dollar deposits in the U.S., are the
be called Euro-dollars. Call them " . . .  external dollars, 
gypsy dollars, or expatriate dollars, but not Euro-dollars 
except if they are Euro-dollars." (p. 4n) In spite of 
Machlup, who is being perhaps a bit too semantic, all 
dollar denominated deposits in foreign banks will here be 
called Euro-dollars both for convenience and because it 
serves no particularly useful purpose to draw such a 
sharp distinction between European based Euro-dollars and 
non-European based Euro-dollars. They are all part of the 
same system and should all be called the same thing.
Recently, for instance, an Asia-dollar market 
located in Singapore has developed. This is a market in 
dollar-denominated deposits in Singapore banks and 
foreign branches located there. As will be evident from 
later chapters, these deposits are exactly the same as 
Euro-dollar deposits except that they are located in Asia 
rather than in Europe. See S.A. Pandit, "The Asian Dollar 
and Free Gold Markets in Singapore, " International Mone­
tary Fund Finance and Development, Vol. 8 , No. 2 (June, 
1971), pp. 32-36.
Finally, recent discussion concerning controls on 
the Euro-dollar market to be instituted by European central 
banks has brought the comment that, "If they start regu­
lating the Euro-dollar market, we'll just open a branch in 
Kinshasa and call them Congo dollars." 'Central Banks 
Ponder Measures to Restrain Eurodollar Activities," Wall 
Street Journal (June 11, 1971), pp. 1, 13.
All this indicates that the subject is not European 
dollar deposits as Machlup would insist, but rather, dollar 
deposits located anywhere in the world. Perhaps another 
name is required, but it is an international money that is 
the concern, not a specifically located deposit. The 
only requirements are location outside the U.S. and no 
exchange controls to hinder the movement o*f this money.
Far the purposes of this paper, Euro-dollars and Europe
/
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primary money of a distinct monetary s y s t e m .  ̂ However, 
unlike the system prevailing in the United States, Euro­
dollar deposits do not have as their basis reserves at an 
official institution. Rather, Euro-dollar issuing banks 
maintain reserves at U.S. commercial banks in the form of 
dollar deposits (either demand or time). Euro-dollar 
deposits, therefore, are "backed" not by reserve balances 
at the central bank within the monetary system, but rather 
are "backed" by balances kept at commercial banks of an­
other monetary system.^ The amount and proportion of 
reserves held are determined by the commercial bank 
issuing the Euro-dollar liability.
will be used for convenience but Euro-dollars are all 
such deposits located anywhere outside the United States.
^As will be detailed below, the Euro-dollar system 
appears to be a separate monetary system, external to that 
of the U.S. or to that of any European country. It may be 
argued, however, that the Euro-dollar deposit is merely a 
further manifestation of the adaptability of the U.S. 
monetary system and is, therefore, merely an extension of 
the U.S. system.
^There is a similarity between this situation and 
the international monetary system in which some countries 
maintain their currencies' reserves in the currency of 
another country. The difference, however, is that the 
Euro-dollar system is composed of commercial banks within 
certain countries. They have no national sovereignty.
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Since the Euro-dollar deposit reserves are composed of 
U.S. commercial bank deposits and are held at the discretion 
of the Euro-dollar issuing bank, the creation of additional 
Euro-dollar deposits by these Eurobanks is both possible 
and highly likely. The multiple expansion of deposit 
liabilities with little control by the Eurobanks' host 
countries may have far reaching implications for the 
efficiency of European monetary policy. Further, U.S. bank 
borrowing of Euro-dollar deposits may have pronounced effects 
on the impact of U.S. monetary policy. These questions are 
the primary concern of this dissertation and will be dealt 
with in detail in Chapters 5 and 6 .
Finally, the uses to which Euro-dollar deposits are 
put are somewhat different or, at least, more restricted 
than those to which domestic currencies are put. While 
national currencies are used in all types of transactions, 
Euro-dollar deposits are used primarily for the payment of 
large international debts. Since they serve principally 
as a payments medium for trade, speculation, and financial 
transactions, the possibility of the conversion of the 
Euro-dollar deposit into another currency is always present. 
This introduces into the Euro-dollar system an element of 
instability, that is not present, for the most part, in the
10
U.S. system. The leakages that conversion causes have a 
major impact on the multiple expansion of Euro-dollar 
deposits and, ceterus paribus, will tend to inhibit the 
growth of Euro-dollar system liabilities.
B . Moneyness
The basic function of any money is its acceptance and 
use as a medium of exchange. Some types of money are not 
completely acceptable as payment of a debt (checks drawn on 
out-of-state banks, for example), but if a substantial 
segment of a society accepts a particular vehicle as a 
medium of exchange, that vehicle may be said to be money. 
While Euro-dollars are not used in most ordinary transactions 
they may still be considered money. They are accepted by 
sellers and borrowers in payment of debts in much of the 
world, especially by international traders, financial 
institutions, and the like. In addition, Euro-dollars are 
borrowed by numerous groups for use in payment for goods and 
services. Therefore, while Euro-dollars are not an 
acceptable medium of exchange in every instance, they serve 
that function in a sufficient number of cases to be called 
money.
C. Monetary and Payments Systems
The moneyness of Euro-dollars may also be illustrated 
by distinguishing between monetary and payments systems.
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A monetary system may be defined as a system made up of 
institutions that create a unique money, usually within 
given political boundaries. The dollar monetary system, 
for instance, consists of those financial institutions in 
the United States that create dollars, either in the form 
of currency or deposits. A payments system, on the other 
hand, is composed of the users of a certain money (or 
monies). It may be coincident in coverage with a monetary 
system or it may be broader in coverage than a monetary 
system. Thus, all the users of U.S. dollars, including 
financial institutions both within and without the U.S., 
comprise the dollar payments system. This system is broader 
in extent than the dollar monetary system since it in­
cludes transactors who do not live under the dollar monetary 
system or institutions that can not create the currency of 
the system. A monetary system implies money creation; a 
payments system, money usage.
None of the institutions that utilize dollars but 
exist outside the United States may create U.S. dollars 
(i.e., they do not belong to the U.S. monetary system). 
However, some of these institutions have developed a sub­
stitute for the dollar that they can create. The return of 
convertibility to the major European currencies in 1958 
and the reduction of most barriers to the movement of
12
money between countries allowed these banks (Eurobanks) 
to develop a monetary system based on the dollar and de­
nominated in dollar units. The Euro-dollar deposits that 
the banks create may be used in place of U.S. dollar demand 
deposits within the dollar payments system, broadly defined. 
Since they are "backed" by U.S. dollars, the Euro-dollars 
are acceptable substitutes for U.S. dollars and may be used 
interchangeably with dollars outside the U.S.
The Eurobanks are members of more than one monetary 
system and create, for instance, both pounds and Euro-dollars. 
Their participation in more than one monetary system means 
that they may be able to avoid, at least partly, the con­
trol of the domestic monetary authorities. Further, they 
tend to transmit to their domestic money markets influences 
felt in the Euro-dollar market. As will be shown in later 
chapters, the Euro-dollar monetary system has become a 
mechanism for the transmission of assorted monetary pressures 
between national systems, and, indeed, a bypass of the 
various national monetary and capital restrictions imposed 
by these systems.
To conclude, Euro-dollars are created in the Euro­
dollar monetary system. This system is supranational and 
controllable only with some difficulty since the basis of 
the credit creation is to be found in the money of another
monetary system over which the various national authorities 
have little power. The Euro-dollar payment system is also 
supranational in scope. However, while the Euro-dollar 
monetary system is unique in that it is the only supra­
national system that can create money,^ the scope of the 
Euro-dollar payment system is not unique. Rather, the 
Euro-dollar payments system may be viewed either as a 
part of the dollar payments system or as one of several 
payments systems that are international in scope.
D. Euro-dollar Money and Credit
Fritz Machlup has approached the problem of the 
moneyness of Euro-dollars in a fashion somewhat similar to 
that above.5 After drawing a distinction between loans and 
money, Machlup sets the criterion of moneyness as "immediate 
availability without loss for use in (the) discharge of 
debt."6 Euro-dollar deposits meet this criterion for in­
dividuals and nonbank corporations. The transactions de­
mand for these balances derives from the need to undertake
4The only apparent exception is the IMF's creation of 
Special Drawing Rights.
5Fritz Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation: A Mystery
Story," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly, Review. No. 94 
(September, 1970), pp. 219-260.
gIbid., p. 225. The following derives from Ibid., pp. 224-227.
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payments in dollars, the asset demand derives from the 
level of interest paid on these deposits, and the specu­
lative demand arises from diverse elements including 
especially exchange rate fluctuations. The demand for 
Euro-dollar deposits is a demand for money to hold and
nnot, as some have implied, a supply of Euro-dollar loans. 
That is, individuals and nonbank corporations do not lend 
dollars to banks but rather purchase or convert these 
dollars into Euro-dollar deposit money. This process 
parallels that which occurs in the United States. 
Individuals do not lend dollars to a bank but rather con­
vert them into deposits.
Some Euro-dollar deposits may merely evidence inter­
bank transactions, however, and as such are considered 
loans. These are the deposits that result when banks with­
in the system lend Euro-dollar funds to each other and . 
record the transaction as a Euro-dollar deposit. These
7Paul Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, 4th ed. 
(London: Macmillan and Company, 1970), p. 11; E. Wayne
Clendenning, The Euro-Dollar Market (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1970), pp. 8-9 both imply that this demand is in 
reality Euro-dollar lending. Deposits are seen by them 
as merely evidences of debt rather than money per se.
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interbank deposits are netted out of the total Euro-dollars 
outstanding so that an overstatement of the Euro-dollar 
money supply does not occur.
E. Euro-dollars and Dollar Denominated Deposits
Dollar denominated deposits in foreign banks is the
standard definition of Euro-dollars. However, the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) and several writers have
8added qualifications to this definition. For them, a 
dollar deposit becomes a Euro-dollar only when the pro­
ceeds of such a deposit (a claim on U.S. bank deposit) are 
used either as reserves subject to relending or as a basis 
for (Euro-) dollar deposit creation.
This distinction is drawn so that account may be taken 
of dollar denominated deposits that existed prior to the 
1958 return to convertibility by the major European coun­
tries. Many U.S. firms and others kept dollar deposits in 
foreign banks for various purposes. The dollar claims 
gained by the foreign banks were generally used to purchase
8 39th Annual Report (Basle: Bank for International
Settlements, June, 1969), p. 148; Clendenning, op. cit., pp. 
21-22; Ira Scott, The Euro-Dollar Market and Its Public 
Policy Implications, Economic Policies and Practises, Pa­
per No. 12, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Com­
mittee Print, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970, p. 3; and 
Einzig.op. cit., p. 4.
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money market instruments in the U.S. or were held for 
working balances purposes by these banks.9
So long as the deposit holders viewed their deposit 
as a non-money asset similar to a Treasury Bill and the 
foreign banks employed the proceeds in the U.S., these 
writers have felt that true Euro-dollars did not exist. 
However, once the dollar denominated deposits became 
acceptable as a means of payment and once the banks began 
to view the U.S. bank deposits they gained as reserves 
(upon which they could build additional deposit liabilities 
or which they could lend to other banks), then the Euro­
dollar money supply and a Euro-dollar monetary system 
became reasonable concepts.
For these reasons the BIS measures the net size of
i
the Euro-dollar market by deducting from gross dollar de­
posit liabilities of non-U.S. banks both interbank trans­
actions and an estimate of the magnitude of these dollar 
denominated deposits that were held as non-monetary assets.
9 39th Annual Report, loc. cit.; Scott, o£. cit., 
pp. 6-7.
1 9 39th Annual Report, loc. cit. The logic behind the 
distinction between dollar denominated deposits and Euro­
dollar deposits is not completely sound. Nor is the pro­
cedure by which the BIS measures the size of the Euro-dollar 
money supply.
When the Euro-dollar system was beginning to
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F. Systems and Markets
The prevailing designation of the activities 
associated with Euro-dollars is the Euro-dollar market. As 
Fritz Machlup has noted, "A market is a meeting (not 
necessarily physical) of people who offer something for sale, 
hire, or rent, with people who are interested in buying.
develop and Euro-dollar investment vehicles were not 
numerous, certainly many of the dollar funds gained by the 
Eurobanks when they accepted dollar deposits were used in 
the U.S. money market. However, to assume that the port­
folio choices made by the banks have remained at the same 
level to the present day, with the proliferation of European 
uses of these dollar funds and instruments to convey them, 
is a tenuous reed upon which to base the deduction of 
certain amounts from Euro-dollar deposits outstanding.
Further, the effects of the banks' using the funds 
gained to purchase assets in the U.S. money market and of 
lending to U.S. bank branches are the same. That is, an 
outflow of reserves of the Euro-dollar system results in 
either case. To treat the former use as a deduction from 
the total deposits in the Euro-dollar system and include 
the latter as part of the total is inconsistent. There is 
no reason why the dollar deposit that is finally lent to a 
U.S. bank should be treated any differently from the dollar 
deposit that is used as purchasing power in the U.S. money 
market.
Distinguishing between uses of dollar reserves gained 
when Eurobanks accept dollar denominated deposits would be 
valuable, certainly, in determining leakages from the 
system, but such distinctions are difficult to verify and 
are no more logical in determining the stock of money in 
the Euro-dollar system than excluding hand-to-hand currency 
in the U.S. from the U.S. money supply on the grounds that 
it is not used to purchase U.S. financial assets.
Finally, excluding a flat amount as an estimate of 
the funds used in the U.S. money markets is simplistic to say 
the least. For these reasons, there appears to be little 
value in adjusting the deposits in the Euro-dollar system 
for this supposed difference between Euro-dollar deposits 
and dollar deposits.
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hiring, or r e n t i n g . H o w e v e r ,  while this type of activity 
does occur in Euro-dollars, there is much more to the Euro­
dollar system than a market per se. There exists, parallel 
to the money market in the U.S., a market in Europe for 
loans denominated in Euro-dollars. This credit market 
function is only part of the total activity referred to as 
the Euro-dollar market, however. In addition, there are 
loans outstanding, assets held, deposit liabilities, the 
creation, velocity, conversion and destruction of this 
money, various demands for this money and innumerable other
things that have little to do with markets as such.
Therefore, measurements of the net size of the Euro­
dollar market are highly misleading since in many cases 
these measurements refer to the stock of or the outstanding 
amount of Euro-dollar deposit liabilities as of a certain 
date, exclusive of interbank transactions. As Machlup 
notes, "Would anybody use the total value of shares of 
stock held . . .  as a measure of the size of the stock 
market . . . (or) use the sum of deposit claims against 
American banks as (a measure of) the size of the American
^Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation...," op. cit., 
p. 221. The following two paragraphs derive~"from this 
essay, pp. 221-223.
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money market?"-1-2 This illustrates the inconsistency in 
using the term "market" to denote the various activities 
associated with Euro-dollars. One refers to the American 
monetary (i.e., U.S. dollar) system, not the U.S. dollar 
market when reference is made to the complex of activities 
involved with dollar deposit creation, loans, and the like. 
In the same way, a less misleading way of referring to the 
complex of activities involving Euro-dollars is to use 
the term "Euro-dollar system."
While there are constant reminders that there is a 
market aspect to the Euro-dollar system, usage of market 
to refer to the entire Euro-dollar structure is misleading. 
There is much more than the operation of a market inherent 
in the Euro-dollar phenomena.
III. Development of the System
A. Origins
Several excellent delineations of the development and 
growth of the Euro-dollar system have been published. The 
institutional aspects of the system are probably best
1 2 Ibid., pp. 2 2 1-2 2 2 .
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understood and thus their documentation has been a rela­
tively straight-forward affair. a  comparatively brief 
survey of the development of the system will be under­
taken in this section in order to provide the background 
necessary to an understanding of the credit creation 
possibilities and monetary policy problems discussed later.
European banks have accepted foreign currency de­
posits for many years. Prior to World War II, for instance, 
British pound balances were commonly held in European banks 
for the purpose of facilitating international trade trans­
actions which were then undertaken primarily in terms of 
pounds. After World War II, the dollar became the main 
international currency. However, due to rather strict 
exchange controls instituted by the majority of European 
countries, few dollar balances were held in European banks. 
Nonetheless, some dollar deposits were made primarily by 
communist bloc countries. These countries wished to hold
1 O See, for instance, Einzig, op. cit., pp. 1-17; Clen- 
denning, op. cit., pp. 5-35 especially; Scott, op. cit., pp. 
3-4; Eric Williams, The Eurodollar Market, Economic Papers 
(Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, June, 1970),
pp. 8-12; Joseph Kvasnicka, "Eurodollars-An Important Source 
of Funds for American Banks," Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago Business Conditions (June, 1969), pp. 10-13; Jane 
Little, "The Euro-Dollar Market: Its Nature and Impact,"
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dollar balances for a variety of reasons but feared that 
should these balances be held in the U.S. they might be 
attached by the U.S. government in retaliation for the 
expropriation of American-owned property in these 
countries. For this reason, they deposited their dollar 
balances in Western European banks.1 4
The term Euro-dollar is said to be directly derived 
from the placement of these funds with European banks.
The branch of the Soviet state bank in Paris was quite 
active in placing these dollar deposits. Its cable code 
name was Eurobank and cable drafts on this bank bore the 
bank code name. Thus, dollar drafts on Eurobank came to 
be called Euro(bank)-dollars. Even after other suppliers 
of such funds entered the market and displaced this bank as
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston New England Economic Review 
(May/June, 1969), pp. 2-7? Oscar Altman, "Euro-Dollars:
Some Further Comments," International Monetary Fund Staff 
Papers, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March, 1965), pp. 1-16? Philip 
Saunders, "American Banks in Londons Eurodollar Market," 
National Banking Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (September, 1966), 
pp. 21-25.
14See Einzig, op. cit., pp. 30-31. This is probably 
the primary source for subsequent writers, all of whom re­
port the same origins of the system. Werner Makowski,
"Tflie Euro-Dollar Market: Methods and Prospects,” The
Challenge of International Finance, Guenter Reimann and 
Edwin Wiggles, eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966) ,
pp. 165-167 also contains a good review of the early Soviet 
influences on the system.
J
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the primary source of funds, this appellation remained. 
Whether this is merely a folk tale or has some basis in 
fact is now probably impossible to determine. Certainly, 
the term is sufficiently descriptive of the situation and 
the explanation of its derivation is logical enough. No 
matter what its derivation, the term "Euro-dollar" is well 
suited to describe the funds under discussion. They are, 
in the main, Euro(pean) dollars and make up the deposits 
of a monetary system based primarily in Europe.
B. Growth Factors
While supply considerations were the main deter­
minants of the original development of the system, changes 
in the foreign exchange structure in Europe and market 
interferences in the United States in 1957 and 1958 gave 
major impetus to the growth of the system. In 1957, the com­
bination of Regulation Q ceilings of 1% on time certificates 
of less than 90 days maturity-1-*’ and the sterling crisis of
ISReported by Kvasnicka, 0£. cit., p. 10 and subse­
quently rereported, based on this article, by Williams, op. 
cit., p. 9 and by others as well.
IGciendenning, oj>. cit., p. 23 and his Appendix A, 
pp. 186-187. The following four paragraphs rely primarily 
on Clendennings's account of the developments that affected 
the growth of the system, as given on pp. 22-24 and upon 
Kvasnicka, loc. cit. It was not until the end of 1964 that 
Regulation Q restrictions were modified to allow higher 
payments on short-term time deposits in U.S. banks.
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the same year (which brought about restrictions on the use 
of sterling in foreign trade financing) generated an in­
creased demand and supply for Euro-dollar deposits and 
loans. British banks attempted to circumvent the re­
strictions on the use of pounds in trade financing by 
utilizing U.S. dollars as an alternative currency. The com­
bination of low interest yields in the U.S. and an 
awakened demand for dollar deposits in Europe brought 
about a rapid growth in the system.
In addition, the general return to convertibility in 
1958 augmented the supply of dollars flowing into the mar­
ket. As exchange controls were relaxed, European dollar 
holders retained dollar balances which they had previously 
been required to sell upon receipt to their central bank. 
These retained balances found an investment outlet or a 
temporary repository in interest earning dollar denominated 
deposits issued by many European banks. Also, the return 
to convertibility allowed banks and others to move out of 
their own currencies and into dollars and, in opposite 
fashion, gain dollar loans for conversion into their re­
spective currencies. Thus, the increased supply and demand 
worked together to bring about the development of the system.
Among the other factors that may be cited as giving
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impetus to the growth of the market for dollar deposits is 
the variance in the economic growth rates of the United 
States and Europe in the 1950's. While the U.S. stagnated 
economically, Europe experienced an economic boom. High 
interest rates reflected the great demand for funds in 
Europe and dollars flowed to Europe in large quantities. 
Some of these dollars eventually wound up in dollar denom­
inated bank deposits.
Another factor impelling the development of the 
system was the poorly developed European money markets and 
lack of investment instruments that were liquid, riskless, 
and produced a respectable yield. The Euro-dollar instru­
ment met many European investors' requirements as had no 
other instrument. Finally, Euro-dollar loans met the need 
for short-term trade financing.
By the early 1960's, a fairly well developed market 
for dollar denominated deposits existed. It should be 
noted however, that the intermediary aspects of the Euro­
dollar system developed before, and gave impetus to, the 
growth of the whole complex of activities that may more 
properly be called the Euro-dollar monetary system. Euro­
banks first served as conduits for dollar funds rather than 
as creators of such funds. Their actions may be compared 
to those of savings and loan associations in the United
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States. When the Euro-dollar system was small, leakages 
from it were of such magnitude that money creation by the 
Eurobanks was not possible. These leakages derived both 
from the uses the Eurobanks made of the funds gained and, 
when lent rather than invested, the uses the borrowers 
made of the funds. Both the banks and the borrowers viewed 
the claims on U.S. banks that they obtained as usable 
primarily in the United States or as liquidity that could 
be converted into domestic currency. It was the reserves 
or backing of the Euro-dollar deposits that the banks and 
borrowers used in purchasing goods or assets. The deposit 
itself was viewed merely as a means to an end.
Eurobanks tended to use the dollar deposits they 
gained to purchase assets in the United States. Borrowers 
of Euro-dollars converted them into domestic or third 
currencies or used the U.S. dollars that the Euro-dollar 
deposits represented. When central banks gained title to 
these Euro-dollar funds as a result of their operations 
in the exchange markets, they frequently utilized the dollar 
deposits they represented in the United States. Only in 
later years did the central banks begin to recycle within 
the Euro-dollar system the funds obtained, thereby reducing 
one of the leakages from the system that had previously 
halted money creation.
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C. U.S. Banks in the System
In the early 1960's American bank branches in Europe 
began to accept dollar denominated deposits in some volume 
and entered into the market for redeposits from other banks. 
But generally these branches were not a significant factor 
in the market because they could not or would not operate 
on the thin interest differentials that satisfied the 
European banks. There were, however, some depositors in 
this period who utilized American bank branches for the 
deposit of dollars. This business was generated in spite 
of the generally lower rates paid by these branches. The 
reason for the apparent irrational behavior of these de­
positors (i.e., non-profit maximizing) may be found in their 
attitude that the American banks were both safer reposito­
ries of dollar funds and the logical place for such 
deposits (since dollars were the business of U.S. banks) 7 
In any case, the dollar deposits at branches of U.S. banks 
were less than $2 billion at the beginning of 1964, less 
than 25% of the total of such deposits in Europe, as reported
I Qby the BIS.
17Saunders, op. cit., p. 22.
1839th Annual Report, op. cit., p. 141.
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Tight money in the U.S. in 1966 and again in 1969 and 
the discovery by U.S. banks that the Euro-dollar market was 
an excellent source of supplemental funds with which some 
of the reserve stringencies instituted by the Federal 
Reserve could be offset, brought about a dramatic increase 
in outstanding Euro-dollar deposits. This occurred because 
American banks were willing to pay high interest rates in 
order to gain access to dollar funds. They instructed 
their branches to bid aggressively for Euro-dollar deposits 
(which the branches had previously not done) and transfer to 
the home office these claims on other U.S. banks. The real 
value of these funds and the source of the banks' willingness 
to pay high interest rates, was that there were no reserve 
requirements on these resulting liabilities to foreign 
branches. Further, these funds were valuable because they 
allowed increased lending and offset, to some extent, the 
higher average required reserve levels induced by 
Federal Reserve actions. The development and growth of the 
market in the mid-1960's is, therefore, largely attributable 
to U.S. bank activities which were, in large measure, 
responses to governmental and Federal Reserve money market
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interventions.1 9 Their demand for funds caused interest 
rates to rise, pulled additional funds into the system and 
sparked a phenomenal growth in outstanding Euro-dollar 
deposits.
Additional factors that may be cited as providing 
impetus to the development of the system include the 
increased use made of the Euro-dollar market by multi­
national corporations based in the United States. These 
firms entered the market in response to balance of payments 
restrictions imposed by the U.S. government in the 1960's. 
These restrictions forced the firms to borrow in non-U.S. 
money markets, among them the Euro-dollar market.2 0
Finally, the Viet Nam war and the consequent aggre- 
vation of the U.S. balance of payments deficit pumped
l^This view is widespread and may be found in, among 
others, "Euro-dollars: A Changing Market," Federal Reserve
Bulletin, Vol. 55, No. 10 (October, 1969), pp. 765-766; 
Kvasnicka, op,. cit., pp. 10-13; and Williams, op. cit., pp. 
8-13.
20The restrictions do not appear to have hampered the 
growth of the multinational firms. Servan-Schreiber has 
noted in The American Challenge (New York: Avon Books, 1969), 
p. 43, that the restrictions merely rechanneled the borrowing 
of U.S. corporations. Americans borrowed funds from Euro­
peans (including Euro-dollars) in order to purchase European 
firms. As he says, "We pay them to buy us .11 (p. 43, emphasis
in original text. Nine-tenths of American investment in 
Europe in 1965 was financed by European sources (pp. 42-43).
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additional funds into the market. The uncertain status of 
the international monetary system and the questionable par 
values of several European countries also had an effect on 
the size of the Euro-dollar system. Movement into Euro­
dollar deposits was encouraged by these uncertainties and 
central bank practices of recycling dollar funds gained in 
foreign exchange dealings resulted in further growth of the 
system. Nonetheless, it was American bank demand for these 
funds that was the primary inducement to the growth of the 
market.
D. Recent Developments
In 1970-1971, as U.S. monetary policy became less re­
strictive, U.S. banks repaid much of their massive borrowings 
of Euro-dollars. They undertook this action in spite of
Federal Reserve attempts to slow these reflows of funds to
\
Europe. Euro-dollars had become a very expensive method of 
obtaining funds for U.S. banks and they therefore paid at 
maturity great amounts of these borrowings. (The amount of 
borrowings outstanding declined from about $14 billion in 
late 1969 to about $3 billion in May, 1971.2*) Interest rates 
on Euro-dollar instruments fell drastically as demand
2-L,,Recent Monetary and Bank Credit Developments," 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Monthly Review, Vol. 53, 
No. 5 (May, 1971), pp. 101-102.
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collapsed and supply expanded. The decline in rates tended 
to pull down other European money market rates as well.
These rate declines occurred despite efforts by several 
European central banks to maintain higher interest rate 
levels. Speculative flights from the dollar in the spring 
of 1971 further expanded the supply of Euro-dollars. Some 
offset to this did occur, however, since demand for Euro­
dollar loans increased at the same time. This demand was, 
in reality, for loans of any kind and the funds gained were 
immediately converted into "stronger11 European c u r r e n c i e s . ^2 
Restrictive actions of various kinds were taken or 
considered by the European central banks. These actions 
were designed to moderate Euro-dollar flows, thereby 
reducing the system's effect on domestic monetary structures.
22Various articles in current periodicals such as the 
Wall Street Journal and Business Week have chronicled these 
developments. See for instance, "A Step to Slow Eurodollar 
Flows," Business Week, No. 2175 (May 15, 1971), pp. 110-114; 
"The Future of the Dollar," First National City Bank 
Monthly Economic Letter (November, 1970), pp. 125-126; "The 
Uneven Retreat in World Interest Rates," First National City 
Bank Monthly Economic Letter (March, 1971), pp. 12-15; 
"Eurodollar Banking: Entering a New Phase?" First National
City Bank Monthly Economic Letter (July, 1971), pp. 11-15.
31
Various monetary control procedures similar to open market 
operations were instituted.23 By mid-1971, the Euro-dollar 
system had a much reduced stock of dollar denominated de­
posits to work with and had to contend with a reduced will­
ingness by investors to remain in dollars. The value 
of the dollar as a vehicle currency was thus at least tem­
porarily reduced as confidence in its stability declined.24
23see, for instance, "Drive for Eurodollar Curbs 
Aided, Split on Rates Widened at Munich Parley," Wall Street 
Journal (June 1, 1971), p. 6 ; "European Bankers Planning to 
Manipulate Dollar Supplies; Washington Seen Uneasy," Wall 
Street Journal (April 7, 1971), p. 4; "Continuing Payments 
Deficits Could Stir Dollar Troubles, New York Reserve Warns," 
Wall Street Journal (March 1, 1971), p. 5. See also Chapters 
5 & 6 ; "Eurodollar Banking:...?" loc. cit.; "Central Banks 
Ponder...," loc. cit.; "Common Market Panel Adopts Plan to 
Control Plow of Eurodollars," Wall Street Journal (June 25, 
1971), p. 12; "Europe's Central Banks Agree to Withdraw 
Funds in Bid to Control Eurodollar Market," Wall Street 
Journal (June 15, 1971), p. 5.
2^see Swoboda, op,, cit., pp. 5-11, 15-19, and 23-29 
for an especially lucid and theoretically rigorous explan­
ation of vehicle currencies in general and the effects of 
the use of the dollar as such a currency in particular. A 
recent Bank for International Settlements Annual Report 
notes, as reported in "Eurodollar Banking:...?" op. cit., 
pp. 1 1 -1 2 , that one of the most striking features of the 
Euro-dollar market today is the slowdown in its growth.
A second feature is that Euro-dollar demand again primarily 
originates in Europe rather than, as in the last several 
years, in the U.S. Further, " . . .  the demand for Euro­
dollars in Europe has been so strong that the market has 
not only found outlets for the funds returned to it from 
the United States but has actually increased its total 
lending substantially." (emphasis added) (p. 1 2 )
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In summary, the development and growth of the Euro­
dollar system derives from several factors. These include 
the Cold War and Soviet bloc attempts to protect its dollar 
assets, the growth of international trade, the return to 
convertibility and the dismantling of exchange controls in 
Europe, money market interferences by the Federal Reserve, 
tight money in the U.S., the discovery and subsequent heavy 
usage of the system by U.S. banks, exchange rate speculation 
and disequilibriums, and money market imperfections in 
Europe.
IV. Mechanisms of the System
A. Introduction
This section contains a fairly concise explanation of 
the basic mechanics of the Euro-dollar system. The working 
of the transfer of funds among banks and individuals will be 
discussed, the reserve basis of the resultant deposits noted, 
and the dependence of the system on fixed exchange rates, 
convertibility and foreign exchange markets reviewed. The 
mechanics of credit creation in the Euro-dollar system and 
the effects of U.S. bank borrowing on this creation will be 
outlined. Finally, a comparison to the U.S. monetary system 
will be included.
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B. The Origination of Euro-dollar Deposits25
The simplest transaction that gives rise to the 
creation of a Euro-dollar deposit is the payment of a debt 
by a U.S. citizen or corporation to a European citizen or 
corporation. The payment of this debt can be undertaken 
in a number of ways. For instance, the U.S. debtor can 
purchase foreign exchange and pay in this form, he can 
borrow the foreign currency and then transfer the funds, - 
or he can pay in dollars. It is the payment of dollars that
25As might be expected several publications explain 
these transactions. Among the best are: Ernest Bloch,
"Eurodollars: An Emerging International Money Market,"
C. J. Devine Institute of Finance, New York University 
The Bulletin, No. 39 (April, 1966), pp. 6-19; Little, op. 
cit., pp. 12-18; Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation...," op. 
cit., pp. 234-242; Machlup, "The Magicians...," op. cit., 
pp. 3-9; Scott, op,. cit.. pp. 7-12; Williams, op. cit., pp. 
13-18; Clendenning, op,, cit.. pp. 8-20; Fred Klopstock, 
"Money Creation in the Euro-Dollar Market - A Note On Pro­
fessor Friedman's Views," Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Monthly Review. Vol. 52, No. 1 (January, 1970), pp. 12-15; 
Milton Friedman, "The Euro-Dollar Market: Some First
Principles," Morgan Guaranty Survey (October, 1969), pp. 
4-9; John Leimone, "The Euro-Dollar Market: An Element in
Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Monthly 
Review. Vol. 53, No. 8 (August, 1968), pp. 2-3; Kvasnicka, 
op. cit., pp. 11-15; Swoboda, op. cit.. pp. 30-34.
makes possible the creation of Euro-dollars. However, only 
if the creditor deposits the dollar check he receives into 
a dollar denominated account in a European bank (for reasons 
of risk minimization, transactions requirements, locational 
advantages, or interest return) does the deposit of the 
claim on a U„S. bank result in the creation of Euro-dollars.2^ 
Conversion or redeposit in a U.S. account forestalls this 
Euro-dollar creation.
No matter what the receiving bank subsequently does 
with the asset gained by this transaction, a Euro-dollar 
deposit now exists. Future use of the deposit by its owner 
may lead to the extinguishing of the Euro-dollars, but at 
this stage the Euro-dollars created by the transaction form
a net addition to the total Euro-dollar supply outstanding.
27The T-account in Figure 1 traces this transaction. Note 
that the only change in the U.S. is the transfer of owner­
ship of the U.S. bank deposit. However, in Europe both an
26This ignores the BIS qualifications discussed above.
27Only those entries which change are included in the 
T-accounts.
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asset and a liability have been created by the deposit of 
the dollars.
Thus, one way that a Euro-dollar can come into 
existence is through the deposit of U.S. funds by a foreign 
receiver in a dollar denominated deposit in a European bank. 
Generally, any owner or receiver of dollar funds may deposit 
dollar claims on U.S. banks into dollar denominated deposits 
in banks in Europe. Central banks, for example, may transfer 
their deposits with U.S. banks to European banks. This 
action may be taken to gain a higher return on the banks' 
reserve balances, to assist domestic commercial bank earnings, 
or to influence the foreign exchange market. The Euro-dollar
Figure 1. Euro-dollar Creation





deposits created will remain in existence until such time as 
the owner withdraws it or uses it to pay a debt of some kind. 
Upon withdrawal or use, the funds may leak out of the Euro­
dollar system or they may remain in it. Figure 2 illustrates 
the T-accounts for a transaction by a central bank.
+Demand +Euro-dollar
Deposit in Deposit 
U.S. bank
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Figure 2. Central Bank Generated Euro-dollar Deposit
U. S. Banking System_______________________Eurobank
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C. Pyramiding or the Intermediary Function
The receiving banks in Europe are willing to pay 
interest on Euro-dollar deposits because they can lend the 
funds obtained to others, either banks or final users. 
Eurobanks accept dollar denominated deposits from non-bank 
depositors even when they have no immediate need for the 
funds. They do this in order to maintain their competitive 
position in the market and for interest arbitrage gains.
The funds gained may be lent to a second bank at a 
slightly higher rate of interest. This interest differential 
may arise from the added risk a second bank faces due to its 
smaller resources, the relative weakness of the local
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currency, or because the second bank has a more profitable 
use for the resources than does the first. Whatever the 
reason, interbank transactions of this type occur in very 
great numbers.2 8
The lending and relending of dollar claims on U.S. 
banks by Eurobanks has come to be called pyramiding. This 
is an unfortunate term since pyramiding normally refers to 
the erecting or creation of more and more deposits upon a 
given reserve base as money is lent out and redeposited 
within the banking system.29 pyramiding, then, refers to 
building more deposit layers (always smaller, since on each
2 8Scott, oj>. cit.. pp. 8-9. While Euro-dollar trans­
actions between banks occur for reasons similar to those 
that motivate the lending and borrowing of Federal Funds in 
the United States, most Euro-dollar transfers are usually 
undertaken for a considerably longer period of time than the 
one day which is common in the Federal Funds market. These 
transfers more closely resemble short-term loans between 
banks or correspondent balances than they resemble overnight 
reserve lending.
29Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation...," oj5. cit., pp. 229- 
230y Leland Yeager, International Monetary Relations 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 470 outlines pyramiding
on an international scale.
round some funds are sterilized in reserves) on a given 
base. This is not the case with interbank lending in the 
Euro-dollar system. Rather, like the Federal Funds market 
or U.S. savings and loan associations, these interbank 
activities are really nothing but intermediary activities. 
Funds are gained from a depositor and channeled through 
various institutions to a final borrower. There is no money 
creation here, merely an exchanging of one type of asset for 
another. Indeed, these are the transactions netted out 
by the BIS when it measures the stock of deposit liabilities 
of the Euro-dollar system.
To illustrate this process, Figure 3 indicates a
30chain of intermediation. Funds originating in the U.S. 
(for example) are deposited in Eurobank A by a European 
creditor of the U.S. Eurobank A then lends to Eurobank B 
who relends to Eurobank C. Eurobank C creates a deposit 
based on these funds, lending to a final user. These 
activities typically take place with little or no reserves 
held back and at slightly higher rates at each stage.
As the consolidated balance sheets in Figure 3 show, 
the chain of intermediation among the Eurobanks was made 
possible by the initial dollar deposit in Europe. Depending
3°Little, o£. cit., p. 13 forms the basis of this ex
ample.
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Figure 3. Euro-dollar Intermediation9 
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Figure 3 - continued
_________Final User_______________
+E$ Deposit +E$ Loan Due Euro- 
at Eurobank bank C 
C
a) Assumes no reserves maintained by intermediaries A and B.
b) Ownership of the U.S. deposit may remain in Eurobank A.
In this case the entry on the asset side of the balance 
sheet will be Euro-dollars due from Eurobank A.
c) These deposits cancel out:
upon the use of the loan proceeds, either all but the orig­
inal Euro-dollar deposit will be cancelled (should the 
borrower demand U.S. dollars or in other ways convert the 
Euro-dollars into U.S. dollars) or the basis for credit 
creation will be laid (should the borrower use the Euro­
dollar deposit to pay a creditor and the deposit be re­
deposited) . Each Eurobank receiving title to the demand 
deposit in the U.S. has merely transformed the asset into a 
different kind of asset, i.e., a Euro-dol3ar deposit at 
(loan to) another Eurobank. These assets and liabilities 
cancel out when the balance sheets are combined. Thus, a 
Euro-dollar deposit asset of A at B is cancelled by the 
Euro-dollar deposit liability of B to A. Note, nonetheless, 
that the original Euro-dollar deposit does remain in
existence and is offset by the loan extended by Eurobank C 
to the final user. When the final borrower utilizes his 
loan funds, the demand deposit at U.S. bank asset and the 
Euro-dollar deposit of final borrower liability will also be 
cancelled, unless the funds are redeposited into the Euro­
dollar system. The intermediation process has thus trans­
ferred the purchasing power held by the European creditor 
to a final user.
Theoretically, the intermediation chain could be 
extended infinitely. However, since small reserves are often 
held at each stage such a result could not occur. While the 
banks in the Euro-dollar system attempt to maintain a close 
correspondence between the maturities of their liabilities 
and their assets, those most active in the market do carry 
small balances with U.S. banks primarily to compensate the 
U.S. bank for the costs of clearing the many deposit trans­
fers arising from their activities-**- and also to maintain 
their credit should they need immediate dollar loans in the 
face of sudden and unexpected withdrawals.
^Scott, o£. cit.,. p. 9.
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Secondly, the required higher interest rate at each 
subsequent transaction works to limit the number of times 
the title to the claim on a U.S. bank can be transferred.
The limit here is the rate at which the final borrower 
could alternatively obtain funds.
Pyramiding in the Euro-dollar system, then, does not 
refer to credit creation as such.-*2 Rather, it refers to 
the intermediation activities of the Eurobanks that make 
up the system. However, when the final user of the funds 
utilizes the demand deposit created by his borrowing, the 
possibility for credit creation does arise. It is at this 
point that major difficulties for European monetary policy 
may occur, although intermediation may present some less 
serious problems.
D. U.S. Bank Borrowing
Euro-dollar deposits also form the basis for loans 
by the Eurobanks to U.S. banks. American banks may obtain 
loanable funds by borrowing Euro-dollars deposited in their 
European branches. They may also instruct their branches to 
borrow Euro-dollars from the Eurobanks and then lend them
32This is a source of confusion for many writers, in­
cluding Scott, op. cit., pp. 9-10. The Wall Street Journal 
writers also make this error, speaking of the "multiplier 
effect" and illustrating it with an example of interbank 
transactions. See "Central Banks Ponder...,"op. cit. p. 1.
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to the home office.
As noted earlier, the advantages of borrowing these 
funds arose primarily from their availability and reserve- 
free nature. While Euro-dollars were relatively expensive 
to borrow, they provided a source of loanable funds in 1966 
and 1969 when other sources were limited by restrictive 
Federal Reserve monetary policies. For instance, the Federal 
Reserve imposed relatively low interest rate ceilings on 
certificates of deposit in these years. By so doing, and 
with similar money market instruments yielding high rates, 
a substantial run-off of CD's occurred as they matured.
33U.S. banks without branches abroad may, of course, 
obtain dollar loans directly from foreign banks and these 
loans are also exempt from reserve requirements. However, 
branch borrowing allows a broader access to the market, is 
more convenient, and is perhaps cheaper in the long run. 
Also, ". . .it allows access to a much larger volume of funds 
than most banks can or would wish to secure through 
borrowings abroad. And only the larger banks in the U.S. 
have the credit standing that would enable them to obtain 
sizable balances from foreign banks." These are the very 
banks who have branches in Europe already. Fred Klopstock, 
"Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity and Reserve Management of 
United States Banks," in Essays in Domestic and Inter­
national Finance (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, 1969), p. 80.
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The banks, faced with a decline in outstanding time 
deposits and increased required reserves (as time deposits 
were transformed into demand deposits), turned to their 
European branches in an attempt to mitigate the 
contractionary effects of these changes.
The banks first used the Euro-dollar market as a 
substantial source of funds in the 1966 tight money period. 
However, the length of this period was so short that 
borrowing rose to only a bit more than $4 billion. In 
contrast, in 1969, liabilities to foreign branches reached 
almost $15 billion as CD's outstanding declined drastically.34
As noted above, the value of Euro-dollars to U.S. banks 
derived partly from the fact that they did not require the 
maintenance of reserves. Rather than being classified as 
deposits, the funds obtained from foreign branches and banks
34See "Liabilities of U.S. Banks to Their Foreign 
Branches," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 54, No. 5 (May, 
1968), p. A-104 and "Assets and Liabilities of Large 
Commercial Banks, 1969," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 56, 
No. 3 (March, 1970), p. A-102.
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were classified as non-deposit liabilities. No reserves 
were required on these liabilities until September,1969. 
After this, first a 10% and then a 20% reserve was required 
on borrowings above a base amount.35 The 10% marginal 
reserve requirement was successful in tempering the 
borrowing by U.S. banks of Euro-dollars. However, the 
easing of money in 1970 and the consequent decline in 
domestic interest rates were probably more important 
determinants of the reduction in Euro-dollar liabilities 
outstanding at U.S. banks.3 5 Indeed, the increase to 20% in
35See Andrew Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows and the 
Efficiency of U.S. Monetary Policy, paper presented before 
a Conference on Wall Street and the Economy '69 at the New 
School for Social Research, March 8 , 1969, pp. 15-17, for 
an insight into his thinking prior to the imposition of the 
marginal reserve requirements.
An excellent review of these developments from the 
standpoint of U.S. banks may be found in "Eurodollar 
Banking Today," First National City Bank Monthly Economic 
Letter (July, 1970), pp. 78-81.
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the marginal reserve requirements (in December, 1970) was 
undertaken in an attempt to moderate the return flows of 
dollars to Europe. The repayment of Euro-dollar liabilities 
by U.S. banks had begun to have serious effects on the U.S. 
balance of payments. By increasing the reserve requirements, 
the Federal Reserve was attempting to make more attractive 
the maintenance of a large reserve-free borrowing base. The 
base declines as Euro-dollar loans are repaid. By en­
couraging the banks to maintain their Euro-dollar borrowing 
levels, the Federal Reserve hoped to moderate the outflow 
of dollars from the United States and thus moderate the 
effects of such outflows on the balance of payments.37
37 "Reserve Reduces Discount Rate to 5*f/o from 5 3/4%; 
Moves to Slow Banks' Repayment of Eurodollar Loans," Wall 
Street Journal (December 1, 1970), p. 3; Tilford Gaines,
"The Dollar?" Manufacturers Hanover Trust Economic Report 
(December, 1970), p. 1.
The logic of this action is somewhat obscure. The 10% 
marginal reserve requirement was instituted to reduce Euro­
dollar borrowings, yet the higher 2 0% requirement was in­
stituted to encourage the maintenance of these borrowings. 
While the base declines as Euro-dollar borrowings are repaid, 
the cost of maintaining the base was such that there was 
little incentive to retain high base levels. Further, added 
borrowing above the base would be subject to the reserve re­
quirements. Thus, no matter what Euro-dollar borrowing 
level was maintained, additional borrowing would generally be 
subject to reserve requirements. This explains the failure 
of this Federal Reserve policy and also points out the diffi­
culties inherent in attempting to use one policy tool to 
solve two different problems. The 10% reserve requirement 
was aimed at solving a domestic monetary policy leakage and
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The mechanics of U.S. bank borrowing may be illus- 
38trated as follows. A U.S. bank, desiring loanable funds, 
instructs its London branch to bid for a certain amount of 
Euro-dollars. While these funds may be gained directly 
from depositors, the amounts desired may be so large and so 
immediately required that the branch must enter the inter­
bank Euro-dollar-market. Amounts transferred in the market 
are quite sizeable/usually in $ 1 million blocks.^9
The U.S. branch, then, bids in the market for a 
certain amount of Euro-dollars, frequently through an agent 
so that the U.S. bank will not get a claim on its own 
demand d e p o s i t s . G a i n i n g  such a deposit would reduce
the 2 0% rate was aimed at solving a conflicting foreign 
monetary policy goal. If the reserve requirement was 
successful in solving the domestic problem it certainly 
couldn't be strengthened and be expected to generate the 
opposite results.
3 8A particularly comprehensive exposition on U.S. 
bank borrowing of Euro-dollars may be found in Klopstock, 
"Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...," oj£. cit., pp. 72-80.
3^Clendenning, oja. cit., p. 9.
40Bloch, 0£. cit., p. 21n.
considerably the value of the loan since only the 
reserves previously held on the demand deposit would then 
become available to the bank. Paying 10% interest to obtain 
$ 1 0 0 of loanable funds, for example, is, in the context of 
money market rates in the 1960's, an expensive price to 
pay for funds. To pay this rate on the amount borrowed and 
obtain the use of only $17.50 (the amount of reserves freed) 
would approximate a 60% rate of interest and be, to say the 
least, a rather expensive source on which to rely.
Once title to the funds is obtained, the branch 
transfers it to the head office in the United States. The 
draft is placed in the clearing system and the reserves of 
the bank borrowing the funds are increased by the amount of 
the loan. The reserves of the bank on which the draft was 
drawn are reduced by the same amount. The losing bank finds 
its deposits and reserves reduced by a certain amount and 
the gaining bank experiences an increase in its total 
reserves in that amount. The decline in required reserves 
of the losing bank is not immediately offset by an in­
crease in the required reserves of the gaining bank. In­
stead, reserve balances that were previously required 
because of deposits outstanding have become, temporarily, 
excess reserves. The deposit on which the reserves were 
kept has been extinguished, replaced by a liability to a
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foreign branch that does not require reserves. Euro-dollar 
borrowing by large U.S. banks does not increase the total 
amount of reserves in the U.S. monetary system nor does 
it generally increase the total money supply. As will be 
noted later, the borrowing does, however, allow an ex­
pansion of the loan portfolio of the borrowing bank by 
amounts larger than the loans recalled by the losing bank. 
Euro-dollar borrowing, then, redistributes reserves and 
loan assets away from those U.S. banks who do not use the 
market due to cost or information considerations and to 
banks that do use the market.41-
Borrowing by U.S. banks reduces the amount of 
possible credit creation in the Euro-dollar system. This 
occurs because such borrowing represents a leakage of 
reserves out of the system. The greater is U.S. bank
borrowing, the greater the leakage and the lower the possible
42money multiplier in the Euro-dollar system. Euro-dollar
41Brimmer, ojo. cit., pp. 4-6; Leimone, o£. cit., p. 4; 
Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...," op. cit., pp. 
79-80. Also see note 33.
42See Chapter 3 for an explanation of the leakages that 
affect the Euro-dollar system's ability to create money. The 
money equation taking into account the various leakages is 
presented-there.
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borrowing by U.S. banks, then,has a contractionary effect 
on the Euro-dollar system. However, the rise in yields 
associated with the increased demand for Euro-dollars by 
U.S. banks has brought out greatly increased supplies of 
dollars and appears to indicate that Euro-dollar supply is 
fairly price elastic.43 This means that the contractionary 
effect of U.S. borrowing may be offset by additional flows 
of funds into the Euro-dollar system.
Figure 4 illustrates the borrowing of Euro-dollars by 
Bank A in the United States. In step 1, the Eurobanks 
accept a dollar deposit and gain a claim on U.S. Bank B.
The Eurobanks relend the claim on Bank B to U.S. Bank A's 
London branch, transforming their asset into a claim on 
U.S. Bank A's London branch. In step 2, U.S. Bank A's 
branch lists the Euro-dollar deposit of the Eurobanks as a 
liability and the claim on U.S. Bank B as an asset. The
4 3Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...," op. 
cit., p. 73. Swap arrangements between U.S. banks, which 
will be detailed in later chapters, had the effect of in­
creasing both demand and supply. In these cases, both the 
demand for Euro-dollar funds and the supply of such funds 
was artificially inflated. In this sense it can be said 
that U.S. banks were responsible for the growth in both 
supply and demand in the Euro-dollar markets. More basi­
cally, U.S. bank demand drew additional funds into the 
system and thus fostered its development.
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Figure 4. U.S. Bank Branch Borrowing3
1. Eurobanks_________________ 2. U.S. Bank A London Branch
+ Deposit at +E$ Deposit +Deposit at +E$ Deposit
U.S. Bank B U.S. Bank B of Euro­
banks
which becomes which becomes
+E$ Deposit +Due from




3. U.S. Bank A 4. U.S. Bank E
+Deposit at tLiability to Reserves and Deposit due/
Bank B Foreign Assets first Euro­
Branch pean, then
which becomes which becomes Eurobanks,
then Bank A's
+Temporary -Reserves branch, then







a) Prior to reserve requirements or within the 
reserve-free base.
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claim on Bank B is transferred to the home office and its 
asset is transformed into a loan to home office. In step 3, 
U.S. Bank A, having obtained title to the claim on Bank B, 
records the transfer from its branch as a non-deposit 
liability to its foreign branch. The claim on Bank B is 
placed in the clearing mechanism and Bank A is credited 
with the amount of the draft. The reserves gained by this 
action are initially excess reservebecause Bank A need 
hold no reserves on its liabilities to foreign branches.
The net result of these transactions is that the 
reserves previously held by Bank B are now held by Bank A. 
At this point the money supply has contracted by the amount 
of the Euro-dollar borrowing. However, Bank A may be 
expected to transform its excess reserves into loans and 
create a demand deposit. This deposit will be equal to 
the deposit destroyed at Bank B.
The entire banking system is affected in a somewhat 
different way. Basically, when the lending bank loses re­
serves and sells assets to replenish these balances 
(assuming no excess reserves), it causes a multiple con­
traction in the amount of deposits outstanding in the 
banking system. However, the borrowing bank offsets this 
contraction by lending out the amount of its excess 
reserves, generating a multiple expansion of deposits in
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the system. The net effect on the money supply is zero.
The non-deposit liability that is created by the Euro-dollar 
borrowing adds to the entries on the liabilities side of 
the ledger. Offsetting this is a net increase in loans 
outstanding. While loans contract due to Bank B's actions, 
they expand due to Bank A's actions. As shown in Figure 5, 
a net increase in loans equal to the amount of the Euro­
dollar borrowing has occurred. These loans are balanced 
by increased non-deposit (non-money) liabilities on the 
liability side of the bank statement. Thus, Euro-dollar 
borrowing does not affect the money supply but it does 
affect the magnitude of loans that the banking system can 
extend. This result has important implications for credit 
policy and will be analyzed in later chapters.
Figure 5. U.S. Bank Euro-dollar Borrowing-System Effects 
_________Source Bank___________  Receiving Banks____
- 1 0 0 Reserves - 1 0 0 Dem. Dep. + 1 0 0 Reserves +100 Non-Dep.
-400 Loans -400 Dem. Dep. +500 Loans Liability-E$s 
+500 Dem. Deps.
r = 20% Net Increase in Loans = 100 
Net Change in Dem. Deps. = 0
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E. Money Creation and Leakages from the System
Basic to money creation in the United States is the 
existence of a fractional reserve system and the redeposit 
of funds lent out by the banks. The greater the leakages 
from the system (into hand-to-hand currency, for instance) 
and the higher the required reserve ratio, the less credit 
creation can occur. In the Euro-dollar system, credit 
creation may result if the final borrower (omitting inter­
mediation) uses his funds to pay debts to those who re­
deposit the funds into the Euro-dollar system. The 
possibility of payments to those outside the system (i.e., 
to U.S. creditors or to creditors who convert the funds 
into domestic currency derived from a central bank that does 
not return the funds to the Euro-dollar system), means that 
leakages from the system can occur and credit creation will 
be halted.
In the U.S. system, leakages are small and, for the 
most part, identifiable. In the Euro-dollar system, on the 
other hand, leakages frequently occur on a large scale and 
are not as. easily predicted. In the past, this was due to 
the fact that the market existed primarily to supply funds 
to debtors of U.S. creditors or to supply a currency that 
could be readily converted into the domestic currency re­
quired by the borrower. As the system developed, however,
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the currency of the system came to be accepted for itself 
rather than as a vehicle convertible into domestic currency 
or usable only to pay U.S. debts. Further, as European 
central banks reached the point where they considered their 
dollar reserves adequate, these banks followed the policy 
of returning (or recycling) to the Euro-dollar market dollars 
gained in foreign exchange market stabilization operations.^4 
Payments have come to be made more and more in Euro­
dollars and redeposited as is by receivers. Leakages 
formerly arising from central bank reserve accumulation 
have also been reduced drastically. Finally, purchasers 
of dollars on the foreign exchange markets have frequently 
placed their funds in Euro-dollar accounts. Thus, while a 
closed system similar to the U.S. monetary system has not 
been created, there has certainly developed one where fewer 
leakages occur.
44The policy of recycling and its effects will be dealt 
with in later chapters. An indication of the dawning reali­
zation that such recycling has expanded Euro-dollar deposits 
may be found in "European Bankers Planning to Manipulate 
Dollar Supplies: Washington Seen Uneasy," Wall Street Journal 
(April 7, 1971), p. 4; "Europe's Central Banks Agree to 
Withdraw Funds in Bid to Control Eurodollar Market," Wall 
Street Journal (June 15, 1971), p. 5; "Reserve Board Isn't 
Studying Added Control Over Eurodollar Market, Daane Asserts," 
Wall Street Journal (May 27, 1971), p. 7.
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Leakages may also be caused by the maintenance of 
reserves by the Eurobanks. However, since there are few 
regulations requiring reserves on Euro-dollar deposits, 
only small levels of reserves for working balances and 
safety purposes are kept.45 The existence of foreign 
exchange markets j.n which dollars can be obtained with, 
little difficulty obviates the need for the maintenance of 
reserves (of dollars) in any real amounts. This does not 
mean, necessarily, that no reserves of any kind are kept 
but rather that specific dollar reserves are not required 
for safety.
The process of money creation may be illustrated with
a table similar to those used in explaining the credit
creation process in the U.S. monetary system. Assume an
exporter to the U.S. deposits into a dollar denominated
account a claim on a deposit in a U.S. bank. This primary 
46deposit adds to the Eurobank's dollar reserves. The
45Williams, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
46A primary deposit is one that increases total deposit 
liabilities and total cash reserves of the monetary system.
A derivative deposit is one that derives from the extension 
of credit by the banks of the system and increases only total 
deposit liabilities, not cash reserves. Thus, a primary de­
posit represents an infusion of reserves into the system, 
and a derivative deposit evidence of the relending of funds 
within a fractional reserve system. The distinction, while
Eurobank then creates and lends to a non-bank borrower a 
Euro-dollar demand deposit equal to 90% of the funds ob­
tained. The bank retains a 10% working and precautionary 
reserve. The borrower pays a debt to another European by 
drawing a check on or similarly transferring ownership of 
the Euro-dollar deposit lent to him. The receiver rede­
posits the funds in a dollar account, allowing his Eurobank 
to relend 90% of these funds to another borrower. Thus, 
credit creation has occurred and, as long as the Euro­
dollars are not used to pay a creditor outside the Euro­
dollar system, the credit creation chain continues. Even 
if they do find their way out of the system after three or 
four circuits, there has still been an expansion in the 
total supply of Euro-dollars.
As Figure 6 indicates, a primary deposit of $1,000 
results in an addition to the stock of Euro-dollar deposits 
of E$3,439, of which E$1,000 is the original deposit and
theoretically sound, is empirically extremely difficult to 
observe. This is one reason why the preponderance of 
international bankers have been loath to accept the possi­
bility of credit creation in the Euro-dollar market. To 
them, there are no derivative deposits and evidence to the 
contrary is not readily available. See Machlup, "Euro- 
Dollar Creation...," 0£. cit., p. 237, and Klopstock, "Money 
Creation in .. ., " loc. cit.
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*primary Deposit. All further deposits are derivative 
deposits.
E$2,439 the new money created based upon the new reserves 
gained with the initial (primary) deposit. The loan made 
by Eurobank D is used to pay a debt to the U.S. and thus 
$656 of reserves leak out of the system. This halts 
further Euro-dollar creation. Had there been no payment 
to receivers outside the system, the money multiplier of 10 
would have been operational and for every $1 , 0 0 0 deposited 
a total of E$10,000 of new deposits (E$9,000 derivative, 
E$1,000 original) would have resulted. As it is, the 
multiplier here is about 3.4. Generally, as long as there 
is. at least one redeposit into the system, a positive amount 
of Euro-dollars can be created.
Theoretically, the Euro-dollar money multiplier could 
be infinite, for there are often no official reserve re­
quirements on Euro-dollar deposits in the European
countries. However, it is unrealistic to postulate such
a situation because banks will, in prudence, maintain some 
47reserves. Further, substantial leakages out of the 
system and into other domestic systems will normally occur, 
reducing the possible multiplier.
Finally, U.S„ bank borrowing from the Euro-dollar 
system generates a leakage from the system. This occurs 
because funds are taken out of the system for use in another 
system rather than redeposited within the Euro-dollar 
system. However, as the demand for Euro-dollars expands 
(shifts out) due to the added demanders in the market, the 
resulting increased price (interest rate) induces Euro­
banks and others to transform some of their European 
domestic currency assets into dollar assets via the foreign 
exchange market. Thus, the European central bank concerned 
will be required to supply dollars to the system out of 
their reserves. Taken together, these responses appear to 
indicate that the Euro-dollar supply curve is fairly price 
elastic.^®
47Williams, loc. cit.
48Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...,” 
loc. cit.
To the extent that the central banks find it necessary 
to utilize their dollar reserves to fund these asset 
transformations, the leakage deriving from U.S. bank 
borrowing is offset by what are essentially new primary 
deposits from the central banks. U.S. bank Euro-dollar 
borrowing thus sometimes forces central banks to take 
actions which they may have preferred not to.
There is little difference between U.S. bank 
borrowing of Euro-dollars and U.S. bank borrowing of U.S. 
demand deposits held by European banks. In both instances 
what is borrowed is European banks' claims on U.S. demand 
deposits. The difference is the origin of these claims and 
how they are viewed by the holding bank. Dollar denominated 
deposits are issued to individuals and non-bank corporations 
by European banks in exchange for claims on demand deposits 
of U.S. banks. These deposits in European banks are Euro­
dollars and are liabilities of the Eurobanks, the reserves 
of which are the demand deposits in U.S. banks. When Euro­
dollars are then borrowed by U.S. banks, what is really 
borrowed are the reserves of the Euro-dollar system or the 
assets obtained in return for the Euro-dollar liability
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issued to the depositor.4 9  When U.S. bank deposits held 
by European banks are borrowed by U.S. banks, it is not 
Eurobank reserves that are borrowed but rather a different 
category of asset. U.S. banks are borrowing what to them 
are the same thing but are to the European banks different 
things. In one case, it is a reserve asset that is 
borrowed. In the other, it is an investment, working 
balance asset, or recently transformed U.S. money market 
asset (Treasury Bills for example) that is borrowed.
To summarize, U.S. bank borrowing of funds in Europe 
constitutes a leakage from the Euro-dollar system, either 
actual or potential, and as such, reduces the money 
creation possibilities in the system. Nonetheless, offsets 
to this borrowing occur both in the form of direct foreign 
central bank infusions into the system or indirect central 
bank infusions through the financing of the conversion of 
European domestic currency assets into Euro-dollar deposits.
49This situation has caused many to draw a parallel 
between the Euro-dollar system and the Federal Funds market 
in the United States. The comparison is questionable. See 
Scott, op,, cit., pp. 7-9. Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation 
... o£. cit., pp. 231-234 refutes the comparison.
I
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Other leakages result from the interconnectedness of the 
Euro-dollar system with domestic monetary systems. Even 
with the leakages, however, Euro-dollar credit creation 
can occur.
The creation of Euro-dollars in Europe has no effect 
on the U.S. monetary system except to the extent that 
foreign central bank dollar reserves may be pulled into 
the U.S. monetary system, expanding the reserve base in 
the United States and, potentially, the money supply. In 
the U.S. system, the Eurobanks serve only as intermediaries 
between borrowing American banks and (reluctant) lending 
American banks. There is no creation by the Eurobanks of 
U.S. deposits. U.S. banks borrow Eurobanks' reserves (assets) 
while Europeans and others borrow Eurobank liabilities. 
Eurobanks can create their liabilities but they can not 
create their reserve assets. In the same way, U.S. banks 
can create their liabilities but not their reserves. The 
Eurobanks can borrow their reserves from their reserve 
creator (U.S. banks) or from other Eurobanks. They can also 
convert their assets into these reserves (through the for- 
e ign exchange market).
Generally, then, the primary consequences of the 
existence and operation of the system influence Europe, 
not the United States, and make much more difficult the





The purpose of this chapter is to indicate the major 
theoretical determinants of the demand for and supply of 
Euro-dollars. Primary emphasis will be placed on the 
factors that have influenced U.S. bank demand for Euro­
dollars but an outline of the major sources of demand in 
general will also be included. Likewise, the main concern 
with Euro-dollar supply is the sources of the funds that 
are lent to U.S. banks. However, a brief discussion of 
the factors influencing the supply of funds generally will 
also be undertaken.
Section II discusses the Euro-dollar market and 
delineates the various factors that influence the demand 
for Euro-dollars generally and the determinants of U.S. 
bank demand specifically. Section III presents the 
determinants of the supply of funds to the Euro-dollar 
market and concludes with a recapitulation of the main 
points of the analysis.
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II. Demand in the Euro-dollar Market
A. The Euro-dollar Market
As detailed in Chapter 2, there is a significant 
difference between the concept of a market and of a 
system. A market, recall, is a meeting between those who 
wish to lend, sell, or otherwise dispose of their goods or 
purchasing power and those who wish to borrow, buy, or 
otherwise gain control over goods or purchasing power. A 
market reflects the supply and demand influences that are 
manifested in the quotation of prices (including interest 
rates) and involves measurements of the amount of the good 
traded over a certain period of time. A system, on the 
other hand, involves a much broader range of activities 
and measurements than the trading of goods or purchasing 
power. As such, it includes, but is not limited to, 
market activities.
The Euro-dollar system contains within it a market 
where the money produced by the system and the reserves it 
utilizes are exchanged.^ This market for funds plays the
^-This market has no physical setting as such. Rather, 
it is made up of numerous geographically separated suppliers 
and demanders and their agents who, via various tele­
communication devices, remain in constant contact with one 
another. In the same say, the U.S. money market has no 
physical trading floor as do the various U.S. stock 
exchanges, for example. It may be noted that as New York
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same role in the Euro-dollar system that the U.S. money 
market plays in the U.S. monetary system. The Euro-dollar 
market reflects the various monetary pressures that occur 
throughout both the Euro-dollar system and many national 
systems in the same way that pressures arising within the 
U.S. monetary system are reflected in the U.S. money 
market. The strong and complex pressures that occur in a 
multitude of national monetary systems and in the inter­
national exchange markets pyramid to and are concentrated 
in the Euro-dollar market, generating wide fluctuations in 
the interest rates prevailing there.
The Euro-dollar market has, until recently, been 
remarkably free of direct governmental interferences. 
However, governmental intervention and structural rigidi­
ties in both national money markets and the international 
payments system have been responsible for a substantial 
portion of the increased activity in the market. Thus, 
while the market itself has been generally free of inter­
ferences, governmental intervention in other markets 
has been felt in this market. The link between national
is the primary center of the U.S. money market, so is 
London the main location of the agents through which Euro­
dollar funds are channelled. See, among others, Saunders, 
op. cit., pp. 21-24; Scott, op. cit., p. 3; Clendenning, 
op. cit., pp. 5-8.
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systems that the present exchange rate system provides has 
facilitated the transmission of demand and supply pres­
sures in one market to the Euro-dollar market and through 
the Euro-dollar market to other national money markets and 
systems.^
Supply and demand factors operating within the 
Euro-dollar market are definable and of substantial im­
portance, but the pressures arising outside the system 
also play a significant role in the operation of the 
market. One of the external factors that has greatly in­
fluenced the Euro-dollar market, both with regard to 
interest rates and with regard to the amount of activity, 
has been U.S. bank borrowing and subsequent repayment of 
dollar balances. Indeed, the entry into the Euro-dollar 
market by U.S. banks as large scale demanders and their 
later exit as they undertook massive repayments had pro­
found effects on the market. These effects are delineated 
below.
2as will be detailed later, it may be said that the 
Euro-dollar system and the market through which it works 
have formed a bridge over the barriers that were erected 
between national systems in order that external occur­
rences would not influence domestic economies. In other 
words, the system of fixed exchange rates and the ancil- 
liary institutions that were set up after World War II and 
which were to act as a barrier to the export of recession, 
for instance, has been overruled by the Euro-dollar system. 
The operation of the Euro-dollar system, although quite dif­
ferent, has had many of the same effects as those which were 
associated with the operation of the gold standard in the 
last century.
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To conclude, the Euro-dollar market is unusual in that 
it is pressures and interferences originating outside the 
Euro-dollar system that have the most powerful effects on 
the operation of the market. These factors have, in 
essence, generated both an increased demand for and an in­
creased supply of loanable funds in the market.
B. General Demand Considerations
The demand for any good, including money, is based 
upon the expected utility to be gained from the possession 
and use of the good. Given the expected utility, a 
rational purchaser or borrower determines the quantity of 
the good he will purchase or borrow based upon the price 
of the good, the price of complementary and substitutable 
goods, expectations about future prices, and a host of 
other considerations. The borrower of Euro-dollars is not 
particularly distinguishable from the borrower of any other 
currency or good, as such. He desires to obtain purchasing 
power and is motivated by the same considerations as other 
borrowers. Indeed, the Euro-dollar borrower is not concerned 
with the form that the borrowed purchasing power takes be­
cause he may convert the funds obtained in the foreign ex­
change markets, should he so wish. If this is necessary, 
transactions costs will be incurred. These costs are then 
added to the other factors the borrower must take into con­
sideration. The Euro-dollar borrower compares the costs
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and benefits associated with borrowing purchasing power 
in this market with those costs and benefits associated 
with borrowing in other markets and determines the amount 
he wishes to demand. He is no different than any other 
borrower of loanable funds although some of the con­
siderations he must weigh may be.
Euro-dollar borrowing occurs in a market that is
generally free of rigidities and imperfections. The
market has been available to all entrants (of sufficient
3credit worthiness ) and has been fiercely competitive. It 
has provided an outlet for demanders whose motivations 
have ranged from a desire to overcome a scarcity of funds 
in the domestic country, to bypass the oligopolistic banks 
of a particular country, or to obtain a supposedly 
superior form of transactions currency. It would be a 
mistake to dismiss the market as one that feeds funds to 
borrowers only when all other sources have vanished. It is 
not generally a last resort source of funds any more than 
the commercial paper market in the United States, for 
example, is a last resort for large U.S. businesses.
3There has been some controversy surrounding the 
criteria utilized for determining the credit worthiness of 
Euro-dollar borrowers. See "Easing of Criteria in Inter­
national Lending Hit by Bankers at Foreign Trade Meeting," 
Wall Street Journal (April 27, 1971), p. 9; "Eurodollar 
Banking: ...?" op. cit., pp. 14-15.
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Rather, the Euro-dollar market is an alternative source of 
funds for borrowers. A borrower will consider the Euro­
dollar market as one of many possible sources of pur­
chasing power.
C. Market Participants and Their Motives
The specific demanders who have entered the Euro­
dollar market include large non-financial corporations, 
both with and without operations in other countries,- private 
financial institutions, including commercial banks both in 
the United States and abroad, importers and exporters in 
foreign countries, official and international financial 
institutions, speculators, and securities brokers and 
dealers. All of these demanders normally have access to 
various alternative sources of funds and their demand for 
Euro-dollar balances is influenced by the alternative 
costs of these different sources and by their concern for 
the maintenance of these sources.4
^This concern was, of course, behind the imposition 
of marginal reserve requirements on Euro-dollar borrowings 
by the U.S. banks from their branches (10%) instituted by 
the Federal Reserve. By creating a base above which 
reserves were required, the Federal Reserve increased the 
cost of further borrowings by the banks. At the same time 
the base acted as a floor, below which the banks would 
theoretically not want to go since, should they do so, 
their reserve-free base would dealine. However, experience 
in 1970 and 1971 would seem to indicate that the desire 
to maintain the base was not as strong an incentive to hold 
Euro-dollar borrowings as the higher cost associated with 
maintaining these borrowings was a detriment. Even the 
imposition of higher marginal reserve requirements (2 0 %)
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The primary concern in this study is with the 
borrowing of Euro-dollars by U.S. banks. This particular 
group of borrowers entered the Euro-dollar market in the 
1960's both because of the limited availability and con­
sequent high cost of funds in the United States at certain 
stages of the business cycle and because of the technical 
advantages that such entry (and borrowing) involved for 
reserve computation.^
Limited availability of funds has arisen in boom 
periods, when the Federal Reserve has attempted through 
tight money policies to restrict the availability of re­
serves and deposits to the banks. In these situations and 
with businesses and others demanding large amount of funds
in late 1970, and changes in the computation of the base 
did not halt the rapid decline (pay-off) in Euro-dollar 
borrowings outstanding. Indeed, the Export-Import Bank 
and the Treasury were forced in 1971 to issue debt securi­
ties to soak up the flow of returning (to Europe) Euro­
dollars since this flow was severely affecting the balance 
of payments. These securities, besides paying an interest 
return, can be used to satisfy the marginal reserve require­
ments on Euro-dollar borrowings above the base and, thus, 
effectively reduce the cost of maintaining a given level 
of borrowings. See, on this subject, Chapter 6 and 
"Treasury Slates Offering...," loc. cit.; "The Money and 
Bond Markets in January," Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Monthly Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (February, 1971), p. 33; 
"Change in Discount Rate," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 56, 
No. 12 (December, 1970), p. 963; Coombs, "Treasury and 
Federal Reserve Operations," oj>. cit., p. 47; "The Uneven 
Retreat in World Interest Rates," First National City Bank 
Monthly Economic Letter (March, 1971), p. 15; and "Reserve... 
Moves to Slow Banks' Repayment of Euro-dollar Loans," Wall 
Street Journal (December 1, 1970), p. 3.
5Williams, 0£. cit., pp. 25-29 includes a comprehen­
sive calculation of the costs of Euro-dollar borrowing by
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due to the boom conditions, U.S. banks have looked to non- 
U.S. sources of loanable funds to offset the reserve 
stringencies imposed by the Federal Reserve. These 
sources, of which the Euro-dollar market has been of 
primary importance, were generally utilized only when 
U.S. funds were scarce. Only the scarcity of funds and 
consequent high cost of such funds made it economic for 
U.S. banks to tap the Euro-dollar market for funds. The 
Euro-dollar market provides large quantities of loanable 
funds but only at rather high interest rates, by U.S. 
standards. Thus, the Euro-dollar market generally becomes 
a feasible alternative as a source of funds only when 
rates in the U.S. rise to high levels.
Additional incentives to borrow in the Euro-dollar 
market also existed prior to August, 1969. While the 
nominal cost of such funds was high, technical considera­
tions increased the value of borrowing such funds. These 
factors included the reserve free nature of borrowings 
from foreign branches and the opportunity afforded by such 
borrowing to reduce required reserves through increases 
in cash items in process of collection, a deductable item 
when computing required reserves. Both these factors
U.S. banks and non-bank businesses. As will be detailed 
later, Euro-dollar borrowing reduced required reserves of 
the borrowing bank because these cash items in process 
of collection were deductable from required reserves prior 
to August, 1969. This advantage is different from that 
gained by borrowing funds from foreign branches and trans­
forming that deposit into a non-reserve liability to foreign 
branch, again, non-reserve prior to August, 1969.
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increased the value of Euro-dollar borrowings and lowered 
the level to which U.S. rates had to rise before Euro­
dollar borrowing became profitable. Indeed, through the 
judicious use of swap arrangements with other large U.S. 
banks, a constant reduction in reserve requirements could 
be obtained at almost no cost to either bank.
The Euro-dollar system provides an escape valve 
through which U.S. banks have been able to avoid some 
of the reserve stringencies imposed on them by the 
Federal Reserve. In these times, Euro-dollar borrowing 
increased by substantial amounts. The banks have thus 
been able to maintain or expand their loan portfolios 
during tight money periods. Banks without access to the 
Euro-dollar market, of course, have not been as readily 
able to avoid the effects of tight money.
In addition to the availability and reserves benefits 
derived from Euro-dollar borrowing, a third motive has 
impelled U.S. banks to enter the market. They have done 
so in order to defend themselves from reserve losses to 
other banks who are borrowing Euro-dollars.® Thus, for 
defensive as well as for simple source reasons numerous
£1A redistribution of reserves between U.S. banks with 
access to the Euro-dollar market and those without such 
access may have occurred, with effects on the impact of 
monetary policy within the U.S. and competitive conditions 
in the financial sector. These effects will be discussed 
in Chapter 6 .
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banks have found it necessary and desirable to establish 
branches in Europe and elsewhere (or to borrow directly 
from European banks). 7 Table 1 indicates the growth in 
the number of branches these banks maintain there and 
the rise in the number of banks having branches.
As more banks have entered the market, demand for 
Euro-dollars has increased, but much of this increased 
demand has caused nothing but additional churning of the 
market with little or no real change in the distribution 
of bank reserves, at least among large U.S. banks with 
branches. The result of such defensive borrowings by 
U.S. banks may then be higher Euro-dollar interest rates 
due to the increased demand but no real change in the 
distribution of available reserves in the U.S.8 There 
may be, of course, a redistribution of reserves between 
the large banks with branches and banks that do not have 
branches or direct foreign lending sources.
The demand for Euro-dollars arising from borrowers
7John Leimone, "The Euro-Dollar Market: An Element
in Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
Monthly Review, Vol. 53, No. 8 (August, 1968), pp. 1-2.
8This is not the view taken in many Euro*-dollar 
analyses but appears to contain at least a measure of 
realism. Brimmer, "Euro-Dollar Flows...," o£. cit., 
pp. 3-6 has maintained that this borrowing has caused a 
redistribution of reserves among U.S. banks. Both 
possibilities will be explored in Chapter 6 .
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TABLE I
FOREIGN BRANCHES OF U.S. FEDERAL RESERVE MEMBER BANKS
End of Number of Year to Number of Number of
Year U.S. Banks Year Per­ Branches Countries
with centage in which
Foreign Increase Branches
Branches Occur
1960 8 - 124 33
1961 8 0 135 35
1962 10 25 145 39
1963 10 0 160 42
1964 11 10 180 45
1965 13 18 2 1 1 50
1966 13 0 244 53
1967 15 15 295 54
1968 26 73 373 57
1969 53 96 459 60
1970 79 50 532 66
Source : Annual Report (Washington: Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 1960 -1970), cited in
Williams, 0£. cit., p. 11.
other than U.S. banks certainly has significance, for 
fluctuations in their demand have a good deal to do with 
the rate that is quoted on these funds. However, for the 
most part, U.S. bank demand for Euro-dollars has been the 
overriding factor in the market, at least in the years 
from 1966 to 1970.9
9Scott, o£. cit., p. 7; Williams, ojd .  cit. , pp. 10-11; 
"Euro-Dollars: A Changing Market," o£. cit., pp. 771-775;
and "The Money Machine Magic of Eurocfollars, Business Week, 
No. 2112 (February 21, 1970) , p. 114. "Eurodollar Banking: 
...?" 0£. cit., p. 12 has noted that the demand for Euro­
dollars now comes from Europe. These European demanders
4
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The net amount of Euro-dollar deposits outstanding 
(exclusive of interbank transactions) was estimated to be 
$37.5 billion at the end of 1969 and U.S. bank borrowings 
to be $13.5 billion at the same point in time. Over a 
third of all Euro-dollar balances at the end of 1969, then, 
were on loan to U.S. banks. (See Table 2.) As was noted 
in Chapter 2, Euro-dollar loans to U.S. banks are a leakage 
out of the Euro-dollar system. Since one third of all 
Euro-dollar deposits outstanding were lent to U.S. banks, 
more than one third of the Euro-dollar system's reserves 
were lent to U.S. banks. If there is credit creation in 
the Euro-dollar system, the remaining deposits are not 
backed 100% by reserves. In all likelihood, 50% or more 
of the system's reserves were on loan to U.S. banks, 
assuming a money multiplier of only 2 . 10
Subsequent to the surge in borrowing by U.S. banks 
in 1969, Euro-dollar borrowings by these banks declined 
drastically. This decline was due primarily to the
have replaced the withdrawing U.S. banks, who previously 
constituted the major source of demand in the market.
•^Assume E$100 deposits outstanding. If $33 are 
lent to U.S. banks, that represents a loss of $33 in re­
serves to the Euro-dollar system. With $ 6 6 in deposits 
remaining in the Euro-dollar system and assuming a money 
multiplier of 2, this requires $33 in reserves. There­
fore, U.S. banks have borrowed half of the Euro-dollar 
system's reserves ($33 U.S. loans + $33 reserves on other 
deposits = Total Reserves).
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TABLE II
EURO-DOLLAR DEPOSITS OUTSTANDING (NET) AND COMPARISON 
WITH U.S. BANK LIABILITIES TO THEIR BRANCHES5
Cumulative sources 
and uses of Euro­
dollars by area




Canada® 1.5 1.3 1.7 2.6 4.5 6.7 4.2
Japan • • • • • • • • • • • • .1 .4
Eastern Europe .3 .3 .4 .5 .6 1 .0 2 0 . 8
Other 2.8 3.3 4.0 4.8 6.6 1 0 . 6 ’
Total 4.6 4.9 6 . 1 7.9 1 1 . 8 18.7 25.0
Inside area
Nonbanks 1.8 2. 2 2.8 3.9 5.2 9.4 9.7
Banks5 2.6 4.4 5.6 5.7 8.0 9.2 11.3





9.0 11.5 14.5 17.5 25.0 37.5 46.0
Canada6 2.2 2.7 5.0 5.8 1 0 . 2 17.8 12.7
Japan .4 . 5 .6 1.0 1.7 1.5 •
Eastern Europe .5 .5 .7 .8 .9 1.0 15.9
Other .9 1.5 1*9 3.0 4.2 5.5 -
Total 4.0 5.2 8.2 1 0 . 6 17.0 25.8 28.6
Inside Area
Nonbanks 2.3 3.3 3.7 4.1 4.7 5.6 1 0 . 1
Banks5 2.7 3.0 2.6 2 . 8 3.3 6 . 1 7.3
Total 5.0 6.3 6.3 6.9 8 . 0 11.7 17.4
Total 9.0 11.5 14.5 17.5 25.0 37. 5 46.0
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TABLE II (continued)
Liabilities of U.S. 
banks to Their
Foreign Branches 1.2 1.3 4.0 4.2 6.1 13.54 7.7
Liabilities as per
cent of net Size 13.3 11.3 27.6 24.0 24.4 36.0 16.7
1-Banks and nonbanks in all countries except Belgium- 
Luxembourg, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and Great Britain.
2Amounts converted from other currencies and used 
for Euro-dollar-type lending, as estimated by BIS; also 
includes liabilities to central banks and BIS.
3Amounts converted to other currencies, as estimated 
by BIS, excluding Italian banks' conversions to third 
currencies for relending to nonbank residents (included in 
nonbank uses).
4Peak borrowings were $14.8 billion at the end of 
November, 1969.
^Estimated, end of year, in billions of U.S. dollar
units.
f
^For 1970, U.S. only. Canada included in all other.
Source: 40th Annual Report (Basle: Bank for Interna­
tional Settlements, 1970), p. 158; 41st Annual Report 
(Basle: Bank for International Settlements, 1971), p. 164;
Federal Reserve Bulletin (May, 1968; May, 1969; May, 1970; 
May, 1971), pp. A 104, A 102, A 102, and A 86 respectively.
imposition of marginal reserve requirements, restrictions 
on what items might be deducted from required reserves, 
relatively higher rates of interest in the Euro-dollar 
market as opposed to the U.S. money market, and the 
rapidly easing monetary situation in the United States.
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Indeed, by mid-1971, Euro-dollar borrowings of U.S. 
banks had been reduced to less than $3 billion.
This rapid reduction had serious repercussions on 
the U.S. balance of payments and caused the Federal 
Reserve to increase the marginal reserve requirements 
on Euro-dollar borrowings by U.S. banks in an attempt to 
slow the banks' net repayment of loans. This action may 
be viewed as a contribution to the banks' demand for 
Euro-dollars since its desired effect was to encourage U.S. 
banks to maintain their Euro-dollar borrowings.12 Further,
^Coombs, 0£. cit., p. 47; Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
Vol. 57, No. 5 (May, 1971), p. A30; Salomon Brothers Bond 
Market Roundup (June 18, 1971), p. 2. The equations for­
mulated in the’ next chapter do not predict this decline 
particularly well. This may be explained by the changed 
structure prevailing in 1971 and the exchange rate in­
stability that has distorted the market.
■^This policy did not work because cost considera­
tions swamped any attraction the maintenance of a larger 
base might have had. Given the marginal nature of the Euro 
dollar market to U.S.banks, they could not be expected to 
retain high levels of Euro-dollar borrowings in the face 
of major interest rate declines and increased money avail­
ability in the U.S. The value of the Euro-dollar market 
to the banks lay in the availability of funds in time of 
need, not as a general source of funds. It was a temporary 
alternative when U.S. generated funds were unavailable.
The maintenance of a reserve free base would not 
allow the banks to increase their borrowings when the need 
arose. See Andrew Brimmer, "Euro-Dollar Flows...," op. 
cit., pp. 17-21 and Williams, op. cit., pp. 26-28 for an 
analysis of the costs associated with Euro-dollar borrowing 
before and after the reserve requirements were instituted. 
Tilford Gaines has also discussed the entire concept of 
marginal reserve requirements in "Public Policy Issues," 
op. cit., pp. 3-4 and in "The Dollar?" 0£. cit., p. 1.
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the Treasury and the Export-Import Bank acted to soak up 
some of these returning flows through issuance of several
billion dollars of securities, usable by the U.S. branches
. . . im  meeting their reserve requirements. J
In addition to the demand originating from U.S. 
banks, other participants such as multinational and national 
corporations, importers and exporters, and speculators, 
foreign central banks, and governments have often 
entered the market on the demand side as their need for 
funds or policy requirements dictated. For instance, 
central banks have purchased Euro-dollars from time to 
time in order to stabilize the foreign exchange markets.14 
The Swiss and German central banks especially have found 
this action necessary at the end of each quarter and at the 
end of the year in order to offset the effects of window 
dressing operations undertaken by commercial banks under 
their jurisdiction. Frequently, some type of swap
See note 5, this chapter. Recently, to soak up 
excess dollar funds that are not now being placed or re­
cycled in the Euro-dollar market, the U.S. Treasury 
issued more non-marketable notes to the German Bundesbank. 
While this note issuance has occurred intermittently over 
the last decade, these notes were specifically designed to 
absorb funds that otherwise would have been invested in the 
Euro-dollar system or redeemed for marks or gold. See 
"Bundesbank Will Buy U.S. Notes as Treasury Bids to Ab­
sorb More Dollars," Wall Street Journal (June 29, 1971), 
p. 2; "Europe's Central Banks Agree to Withdraw Funds...," 
loc. cit.
•^"Euro-dollars: A Changing Market," 0£. cit.,
pp. 767-768, 771.
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arrangement is entered into, with the transaction being 
reversed shortly after the statement date passes.15
Also, central banks have on occasion entered the 
market as demanders when they have found it necessary to 
add dollar balances to their reserves. The first 
operation (maintaining orderly markets) is an accomo- 
dative one while the latter is undertaken because the 
bank itself needs dollar balances. However, the avail­
ability of credit via swap lines with other central banks,
IMF drawings, and the like, make it rare for central banks
16to enter the market to obtain foreign currency reserves.
Governments of various countries have also at 
times been demanders in the Euro-dollar market due to such 
factors as advantageous costs (the case of U.K. local au­
thorities) , rigid limits on central bank deficit financing 
(the case of Belgium), state import needs (Eastern Euro­
pean case), 1^ or for monetary policy reason (the Italian 
case).1 ®
l^Coombs, o£. cit., pp. 51, 54, and earlier reports; 
Williams, 0£. cit., pp. 10, 31-32; Ibid., pp. 778-779. The 
BIS also frequently enters the market for purposes of 
stabilization.
^Clendenning, 0£. cit., pp. 52-53; Williams, 0£. cit.,
pp. 1 0-1 1 .
l^Clendenning, o£. cit., p. 52; Scott, Q£. cit., p. 5.
18Oscar Altman, "Euro-Dollars: Some Further Comments,"
Inter-National Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 12, No. 1 
(March, 1965), pp. 2-3.
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Thus, the participants in the market are many and
varied. The motives behind the demand of each of these
participants may also be different. Nonetheless,
basically all are motivated, by considerations of cost or
availability. In this respect, Euro-dollar demanders are
no different from demanders in any other market.
D. Institutional Constraints
Certain institutional constraints have also affected
the Euro-dollar market on the demand side. The various
investment controls instituted by the Treasury have
forced many U.S. corporations into the Euro-dollar market
1 Qm  their quest for financing. Also, foreigners 
accustomed to borrowing purchasing power in the United 
States have, since the imposition of the interest 
equalization tax and other capital export restrictions in 
the U.S., resorted to the Euro-dollar market for short- 
dated funds. This occurred whether their needs were for 
dollars, third currencies, or even for their own currency. 
Upon obtaining claims on these funds, they may be used as 
is or converted through the foreign exchange market into 
any currency required.
The Financing of Business with Euro-dollars (New 
York: Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 1969), p. 4; Williams,
op. cit., p. 12; Clendenning, o£. cit., pp. 10-11.
^Businesses in countries whose money and capital 
markets are notoriously thin have utilized the market on 
numerous occasions. Clendenning, 0£. cit., p. 54; 
Williams, 0£. cit., p. 25.
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Demand has been reduced by various Federal Reserve 
restrictions on U.S. banks. Regulations that require 
the treatment of overnight balances due branches as 
deposits (and therefore subject to reserve requirements) 
and the imposition of marginal reserve requirements on 
liabilities to branches beyond some base level have tended 
to raise the cost of these funds and to decrease the 
amounts demanded.21 in addition, restrictions on the 
treatment of certain cash items in process of collection 
have been instituted. Prior to September, 1969, banks 
borrowing Euro-dollars were allowed to deduct from their 
required reserves these borrowings since the draft on the 
U.S. bank giving up the reserves (lending the dollars) was 
treated as a cash item in process of collection. Thus, 
for one day the Euro-dollar borrowing reduced the reserves 
required of the borrowing bank. A good deal of overnight 
Euro-dollar borrowing that occurred prior to August 1969 
was motivated entirely by the technical advantages in­
volved. Indeed, it appears that many banks entered into 
swap agreements whereby each borrowed, via the Euro-dollar 
market, funds from the other. Both then were able to
2 ;1-Gaines, "The Dollar?" o£. cit., p. 1. See 
Bloch, op. cit., pp. 15-22 for an exposition of the over­
night borrowing technique and its benefits, prior to 
Federal Reserve restrictions. This shift may be viewed 
either as a movement up along the demand line as real costs 
rise or as a shift to the left of the line, implying a 
reduced demand at every price.
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reduce their required reserves by the amount borrowed 
(and since both paid interest on the borrowing to the 
other, there was no cost to the transaction). On the 
following day, further operations of the same sort were 
undertaken. The constant reborrowing or rolling over of 
these Euro-dollar "borrowings" provided the participants 
with costless excess reserves. This particular game was 
halted when the Federal Reserve amended Regulation D.^2 
Prior to the amendment of Regulation D, however, large 
amounts of these swaps may have inflated demand figures 
substantially.
Finally, the political realities involved in re­
strictive monetary policy within the U.S. almost guaranteed 
that the demand for Euro-dollar balances deriving from 
U.S. banks would be of a temporary nature and, with the
new reserve requirements on Euro-dollar borrowings,
2 3perhaps permanently reduced. This may well cause an
^This technique employed to reduce required re­
serves has not been documented publicly. However, certain 
discussions undertaken within the Federal Reserve and the 
discussion of the changes instituted in Regulation D in 
"Amendment To Regulation D," Federal Reserve Builetin,
Vol. 55, No. 7 (August, 1969), p. 656 and in "Revision of 
Money Supply Series," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 55,
No. 10 (October, 1969), pp. 788-78d imply that this 
activity did occur.
23That is, restriction of reserve availability appears 
to be politically possible only over a short time period. 
Thus, the demand for Euro-dollars by banks attempting to 
moderate stringent monetary policy will tend to be of short 
duration. Evidence of this probability may be seen in the
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increase in Euro-dollar deposits outstanding, in the
long run, since U.S. bank borrowing has acted as a
leakage from the system. As the leakage is reduced, a
larger money multiplier may operate.
To conclude, the demand for Euro-dollar balances
derives from many different sources. One source that has
been of prime importance is the demand arising from U.S.
banks during times of tight money in the United States.
With the. reduction in reserves supplied by the central bank
and with the imposition of effective limits on interest
24rate payments on time deposits, U.S. banks have turned 
to the Euro-dollar market in force. Availability, de­
fense, and alternative cost considerations have motivated 
U.S. bank borrowing. In general, the demand for Euro­
dollars has arisen both from market imperfections and 
distortions within countries and from alternative cost 
and benefit considerations by borrowers.
sharp decline in outstanding U.S. bank liabilities to their 
branches in 1970-71 even in the face of various incentives 
initiated by the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and Export- 
Import Bank aimed at moderating this return flow. See 
note 4, this chapter.
24These limits are contained in Regulation Q and 
reduce the ability of banks to sell certificates of 
deposit and other time deposit instruments when other 
money market rates rise above the ceiling.
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III. Sources of Supply
A. General Supply Considerations
In the same way that demanders of goods or money 
weigh the alternative costs of obtaining the good and, 
ceterus paribus, choose that which satisfies their demand 
at the lowest price, so also do suppliers of goods or 
funds weigh the alternative prices or yields that dif- 
ferent markets and investment vehicles provide, choosing 
that which best meets their requirements. Suppliers of 
loanable funds generally wish to obtain the highest yield 
consistent with the level of risk they are willing to 
bear. Other factors which influence their choice of 
vehicle and market include the availability of the in­
vestment vehicle, the accessability of the market, the 
depth of the resale market for these particular debt 
instruments, the transactions costs that must be incurred, 
and expectations of future exchange rate values and 
interest rate levels.
It is not necessary that the supplier's assets be 
denominated in a particular currency. With fixed exchange 
rates and convertibility, an investor may choose almost 
any market in which to place his purchasing power. Ig­
noring transactions costs, the present exchange rate system 
allows an investor to transfer his assets to the market 
with the highest expected yields, after risk differentials
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are considered. So-called "hot" money flows are the 
result of investors moving into and out of various 
investment vehicles in different currency markets in 
response to interest differentials or expectations of 
exchange rate changes. The ownership of purchasing power, 
not the form in which the purchasing power is denominated, 
is the determining factor in the supply of funds to any 
money market.
An asset owner whose calculations of net return after 
transactions costs indicate that the Euro-dollar market 
provides the most profitable investment alternative must 
take into account the existence of certain risks, some of 
which are unique to the Euro-dollar market and some of 
which are more general in application. First, the investor 
with non-dollar denominated assets who converts his funds 
into Euro-dollars may frequently wish to reconvert the 
asset and the earned interest into his own currency. The 
possibility that exchange rates may be altered between the 
time he makes the investment and the maturity of the in­
vestment must be considered. To reduce the risk, the 
investor may purchase forward cover. This involves the 
forward sale of dollars for his own currency, timed to 
coincide with the maturity of his investment. Any non­
domestic currency investment involves this risk, unless 
the investor intends to utilize the non-domestic currency 
in some further way upon maturity. Of course, should the 
purchasing power owner expect exchange rates to change in
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a way that would make his dollar asset plus interest 
return worth more in terms of foreign currencies, he 
might wish to take an uncovered (unprotected) position, 
waiting until maturity to enter the exchange markets to 
reconvert his purchasing power.2^
A second risk that the investor faces, and one that 
is unique to the Euro-dollar market, is that the Euro­
dollar system does not contain an official lender of last 
resort.26 This means that a bank which has issued dollar 
liabilities may not be able to meet its repayment commit­
ments, should it encounter difficulties. This problem, 
of course, is not as serious as it may seem since the 
foreign exchange market and other Eurobanks are pre­
sumably available to the bank should a shortage of dollar 
funds occur.^7
25This and the following paragraphs rely heavily on 
Williams, 0£. cit., pp. 23-29 and Clendenning, o£. cit., 
pp. 43-51, 57-62.
^williams, oja. cit., pp. 28-29. The BIS has tended 
towards taking on this function in an indirect way. In the 
past, it has undertaken operations aimed at stabilizing the 
market, especially at quarterly and year-end window 
dressing dates. Thus, to a certain extent, the BIS does 
act as a lender of last resort but does so through the 
market rather than directly to"the banks who make up the 
market. See Scott, o|>. cit., p. 4; Williams, 0£. cit., p.10? 
and Clendenning, op. cit., pp. 61, 162-168.
2 ^Provided, of course, that the bank has domestic 
funds that it can utilize and convert, and provided its 
access to the foreign exchange market is unimpeded.
89
Finally, with reference to general supply considera­
tions > the source of funds to the Euro-dollar market must 
take into account the fact that the reserves of the Euro­
dollar system are dollar deposits in the United States. 
Strictly speaking, the supply of Euro-dollars refers to 
the supply of these Euro-dollar deposits to borrowers. In 
a broader sense, however, the supply of Euro-dollars re­
fers to the supply of the reserves to the system. Thus, 
the supply of dollars to Eurobanks may be considered as 
an integral part of the analysis of Euro-dollar supply. 
While Eurobanks create all the Euro-dollars subsequently 
supplied by the deposit owners to Euro-dollar borrowers, 
the source of the dollars that allow the Eurobanks to 
create Euro-dollars must be identified and investigated.
In the same way that a discussion of the supply-of dollar 
funds to the U.S. money markets must include Federal 
Reserve actions, so also must the discussion of Euro­
dollar supply include the actions of the Euro-dollar 
system reserve suppliers for it is upon these reserves that 
the Eurobanks base and create the Euro-dollar currency. 
Euro-dollar supply therefore involves both the lending of 
dollar denominated deposits in Eurobanks by asset owners 
(including the Eurobanks as deposit owners and creators) 
and the original lending or deposit of dollars by asset 
holders.
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B. Market Participants and Their Motives
A Euro-dollar supplier must hold a claim on a 
Eurobank in order to enter the Euro-dollar market as a 
supplier. But, any owner of dollar denominated deposits 
in Eurobanks or any owner of dollars themselves who 
supplies them to the Eurobanks (by depositing them in a 
dollar denominated account) may be considered a Euro­
dollar supplier.
The sources of Euro-dollar deposits and of the 
dollars that form the basis of these deposits are extremely 
varied. Eurobanks are large scale suppliers of Euro­
dollar deposits to borrowers. They utilize the dollars 
they obtain from depositors to support a multiple ex­
pansion of Euro-dollar deposits. Exporters and importers, 
U.S. and foreign corporations, U.S. and foreign commercial 
banks with and without branches, foreign central banks 
and international financial institutions, and wealthy in­
dividuals and speculators supply both reserves and Euro­
dollar deposits to the market.28
Each of the participants in the market supplies funds 
for his own particular reasons. As noted above, U.S. 
corporations, because of U.S. balance of payments re­
straints that limit the amount of capital they can send 
abroad, have offered long-term securities in Europe
28Clendenning, o£. cit., pp. 43-51.
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denominated in dollars. The proceeds of these issues 
are frequently placed temporarily in dollar denominated 
deposit accounts in European banks until they are needed 
for corporate purposes.29 Also, many corporations, both 
domestic and foreign, maintain dollar balances in these 
banks for various purposes. Indeed, the custom of keeping 
such balances in these banks existed long before any 
active market for them existed.30
In addition, U.S. corporations and individual in­
vestors enter the market in order to take advantage of the 
(relatively) higher rates of return offered and the high 
degree of liquidity available. An additional impetus to 
their conversion of. assets into Euro-dollars is the payment 
of interest on what are basically demand deposits, a 
return that is illegal in the United States. Further, 
holders of certificates of deposit (CD's) have moved their 
assets into Euro-dollar deposits when Regulation Q 
ceilings limited the return that U.S. banks could pay on 
CD's.
Speculators enter the market as suppliers when there 
are unsettled conditions in the foreign exchange markets 
and when expectations of local currency devaluation are
2 9 "Euro-Dollars: A Changing Market," o£. cit.,
pp. 774-775.
30see Note 10, Chap. 2 and 39th Annual Report, op. 
cit., p. 148.
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strong. The Euro-dollar market is a haven for "hot" 
money in these periods, except when the dollar itself is 
the currency under suspicion. In addition, arbitrage
31activities can affect supply (and demand) in the market.
Of great importance in the market are the funds 
placed by official institutions, both at the national and 
supranational levels. Central banks of many foreign 
countries have utilized the market for several reasons.^
^ciendenning, o£. cit., pp. 108-109.
32The Federal Reserve has not entered the market 
directly but has, of course, influenced, its growth tremen­
dously, through the use of various controls placed on U.S. 
commercial banks. An interesting experiment was under­
taken, however, in early 1971 by the Federal Reserve in an 
attempt to influence the flow of funds from the Euro­
dollar market into German marks. By selling marks for­
ward, the Federal Reserve was able to increase the cost of 
(or reduce the incentive for) swapping Euro-dollars for 
marks. (By driving the forward mark price down, the 
higher yields associated with German securities was 
offset.) This action was taken in order to slow the buildup 
of dollars occurring in official German reserves, reduce 
the possibility of conversion of these dollars into gold or 
SDR's by the Germans, and thwart the negation of the German's 
anti-inflation policy which this flow entailed. The results 
of this action appeared to be insignificant, at best, for 
German reserves have continued to increase. Thus, in ad­
dition to interest arbitrage, par value speculation has been 
occurring and affecting the Euro-dollar market. See "New 
York Reserve Experiment," Wall Street Journal (March 1, 1971), 
p.5 and Coombs, o£. cit., pp. 51-52.
The FederalReserve has also affected the market in­
directly by entering into swap agreements with foreign 
central banks, the object of these swaps being the soaking up 
of temporarily (hopefully) excess dollars in the foreign 
exchange markets. Williams, 0£. cit., p. lOn.
Recently, it has been reported that a group of Euro­
pean central banks are planning to manipulate the Euro­
dollar market in order to reduce the supply of funds and 
drive up the interest rate in the market. This will be 
accomplished by the central banks' Withholding the
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They have found it necessary, at times, to place funds 
in the Euro-dollar market in order to stabilize it, to 
stabilize the foreign exchange markets, and to maintain 
or implement their policy g o a l s . 33 These are basically 
defensive-type actions in that they maintain the status 
quo and, although they may be only marginal in amount, they 
occur after all other market forces have been felt and 
may thus be quite effective in influencing rates and the 
flow of funds. . , . .
In addition to their stabilization activities, 
central banks have also entered the market as investors.
Euro-doliars normally gained in their exchange rate 
stabilization operations from the market rather than re­
cycling them immediately as they have done in the past.
This had the aim of reducing supply, driving up interest 
rates, and reducing pressure on their domestic interest 
rate structures which they have been attempting to main­
tain at high levels for counter-inflation effects. The 
flow of Euro-dollars returned to Europe by U.S. banks which 
can now obtain funds inexpensively in the U.S. has driven 
Euro-dollar rates down. This has caused European investors 
to sell Euro-dollars, replacing them with mark, franc and 
other higher earning assets. The central banks then must 
buy the Euro-dollars and in so doing create more domestic 
liquidity than they desire. See Chapter 6 and "European 
Bankers Planning to Manipulate Dollar Supplies: Washington
Seen Uneasy," Wall Street Journal (April 7, 1971), p. 4. 
The similarity between these central bank actions and ' 
Federal Reserve open market operations, at least in effect, 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6 .
33These goals may either be general policy aims, such 
as restricting credit or short-term capital flows, or they 
may be aimed at assisting the banks in order that they may 
finance trade, purchase foreign assets or exchange, or 
reduce their foreign liabilities. Clendenning, op. cit., 
p. 44.
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They have placed their excess dollar reserves in the 
market with the purpose of earning an interest return. 
Whether for stabilization or investment purposes, the 
central banks have several ways by which they can effect 
the placement of Euro-dollars. Direct deposits of dollars 
in banks outside the U.S., including domestic banks, swap 
or loan arrangements with their domestic banks,35 or 
operations in the foreign exchange markets are all methods 
by which central banks place funds.36 Indirect methods, 
such as the placement of dollar deposits with the Bank for 
International Settlements or the European Investment Bank 
have also been employed.3^
It should be noted that the direct deposit and the 
foreign exchange operation may not affect the Euro-dollar
3 4As Williams, 0£. cit., p . n  and others have noted. 
The latest BIS Annual Report states, as reported in 
"Eurodollar Banking: . .. ? " oy. cit. , p. 13, that European
central banks have made official placements in the market 
for many years. One reason for these placements has been 
the responsibility placed on the banks"... for 'conserving' 
the value of their countries' official external monetary 
assets; and 'in times of mounting inflation, the preserva­
tion of this value means securing a reasonable return on 
them.' Briefly, the central banks seek the highest re­
turn on their dollar assets." (p. 13)
35These arrangements usually stipulate that the 
dollars gained must be used in certain restricted. ways.
36Williams, ojd. cit., p. 10; Scott, 0£. cit., p. 4; 
Clendenning, 0£. cit., pp. 44-45.
3 ^Scott, loc. cit.
95
market directly.3® While the commercial bank with which 
the central bank places dollars may place these funds in 
the market, the decision to do so is based on the various 
yields, risks, liquidity, and costs that pertain to other 
possible uses,, such as conversion into domestic currency 
(which may frustrate the policy of reducing dollar re­
serves) , conversion into a third currency (which may 
merely shift the reserve adjustment burden to another 
country), or investment of the funds in the U.S. money 
market itself (in which case, the dollars are returned to 
the U.S. but do not affect the Euro-dollar market or the 
rates there). Operations in the foreign exchange market 
may also have counter-productive results, at least under 
certain circumstances.
Finally, as is evident from the above discussion of 
other participants in the market, foreign commercial banks 
and foreign branches of U.S. banks play a central and in­
fluential role in the market. These banks undoubtedly make 
up the largest part of the market both on the demand and on 
the supply sides.3® This is the case since they act both
3®Clendenning, oj>. cit., p. 45.
39Williams, 0£. cit., p. 10. Swap arrangements be­
tween U.S. banks added to both the supply and the demand 
for Euro-dollar funds. In this case, however, demand 
created its own supply, or the reverse, and had no effect 
on true demand and supply pressures operating in the 
market. Account of such operations should, nonetheless, 
be taken.
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as creators of funds, intermediaries,40 and users of 
funds. They are the primary agents through which the 
other suppliers operate and, in addition, they act for 
their own account by undertaking the lending of (created) 
Euro-dollar deposits.
The source of Euro-dollar system reserves has changed 
over the decade of the I960*s. In the early years of the 
decade, official institutions and corporations in Europe 
(the "inside" area, according to Bank for International 
Settlements classification) were the largest suppliers of 
reserves to the Eurobanks but in the later years of the 
decade, the "outside" area (non-European, including the 
U.S. and Canada) became increasingly important as a 
supplier of funds.^1 Thus, the Eurobanks' source of re­
serves has shifted, at least partly, from depositors 
located within Europe, to those located outside Europe. 
These non-European sources are generally not financial
4^The intermediation process, also incorrectly 
called pyramiding, can have several steps. Thus, an 
original deposit may move through several banks before 
it is lent to a final borrower. The limit to the number
of intermediate steps that can occur is the level to which
the rate can be raised before the market demand disappears. 
Since this activity of borrowing and relending is so im­
portant in the market, and since the final result is
basically the same (i.e., a certain amount lent to a final 
user), data calculations on the size of the market are net 
of these transactions. See Chapters 2 and 5 and Machlup, 
op. cit., p. 230; and "The Euro-Currency Market," 39th 
Annual Report, op. cit., pp. 146-151.
^ 3 9 th Annual Report and 40th Annual Report, op. cit., 
pp. 147-150 and pp. 155-159, respectively.
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institutions but are rather non-banks, both individuals 
and c o r p o r a t i o n s . ^2 ^o matter what the source of these 
funds may be, the increased reserves held by the system 
have augmented the supply of Euro-dollar deposits by 
making possible the increased lending of created deposits.
C. Institutional Constraints
Institutional or structural factors have affected 
the supply as well as the demand for f u n d s . 43 while 
basic price, risk, liquidity, and transactions costs 
determine supply, interferences in the market have acted 
both to augment and to restrict the supply of reserves.
Increased supply has been encouraged through 
Federal Reserve imposed Regulation Q ceilings. When 
effective, this restriction on the rate of return payable 
on time deposits in the U.S. has made the Euro-dollar 
market more attractive to investors and has generated an 
increased supply of Euro-dollars. In addition, the U.S. 
restriction of payment of interest on deposits of a
4 2ciendenning, o£. cit., p. 51.
43The general outline of most of these constraints, 
but not the analysis, may be found in Williams, op. cit.,. 
pp. 11-13.
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maturity of less than 30 days would make any market that 
did provide a return on this type of deposit attractive.
The practice of foreign central banks of placing 
their dollar reserve balances in the Eurobanks has tended 
to augment the supply of Euro-dollars both directly and 
indirectly through the supplying of reserves necessary to 
the credit creation process. This practice arose from 
these banks1 concern for the stability of the interna­
tional monetary system and the deleterious effects the 
alternative action of withdrawing gold or other reserves 
from the United States would (presumably) have had. It 
also arose from the desire to obtain higher yields on dollar 
reserves held.44 jn addition, central banks have shifted 
their reserve holdings to Euro-dollar deposits for reasons 
of nationalism, proximity to the deposit, control over the 
depository banks, and the facilitating of monetary policy. 
The central banks began to withdraw from the market in 1971 
as they came to realize the harm their deposits had caused. 
Their withdrawal, however, was too slow and too late to 
halt the impending collapse of the international payments 
system. The collapse was at least partly due to the
As will be noted in Chapter 6, this practice in fact 
led, through a greatly increased supply of Euro-dollars, 
to the collapse of the international exchange rate system 
and, prior to that, generated destabilizing influences on 
their own monetary systems. The policy was, to say the 
least, ill advised.
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growth of the Euro-dollar system which was, in turn, due 
partly to central bank use of the system.
The relatively high degree of competition among the 
Eurobanks for Euro-dollar deposits (and reserves) may 
also have increased the supply of Euro-dollars.^ The 
cartel arrangements that exist within most of the domestic 
European banking systems tend to hold interest yields down. 
The competitive nature of the Euro-dollar system, however, 
has brought about high deposit interest rates. The com­
paratively higher return on Euro-dollar deposits may have 
generated an increased demand for the deposits by asset 
holders and, thus, an increased supply of reserves and 
loanable funds. Redeposits in the system, motivated by 
the higher interest rates, allowed further increases in 
the supply through multiple credit creation.
Increased supply also occurs temporarily due to 
window dressing activities by foreign banks at quarterly 
and year-end bank statement dates. As statement dates ap­
proach, Euro-dollar supply increases and, after the date 
has passed, demand for Euro-dollars increases. Central banks 
enter the market to offset these influences.46
45"Euro-dollars: A Changing Market," 0£. cit., p. 774.
46Coombs, op. cit., pp. 51, 54, and earlier reports; 
Williams, o£. cit., pp. 10, 31-32; "Euro-dollars: A Changing
Market," 0£. cit., pp. 767-768, 771. The BIS also frequently 
enters the market for purposes of stabilization.
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Restrictions on supply derive primarily from 
official activity or interference. For instance, Regu­
lation Q limits do not apply to foreign official deposits 
in U.S. banks. Had these limits applied, a greater flow 
of funds than actually occurred might have moved into the 
Euro-dollar market from official sources. The magnitude 
of this negative effect on supply is difficult to gauge.
Also, the restrictions placed on U.S. businesses and banks 
by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve for balance of 
payments purposes have tended to reduce the (visible, but 
not necessarily actual) supply of dollars flowing into the 
market from the United States. However, while this set of 
restrictions may have reduced the supply of reserves to the 
Euro-dollar system and thus the supply of Euro-dollars, its 
impact was probably felt primarily on the demand side of 
the market. The demand for Euro-dollars has certainly been 
increased by the imposition of these restrictions. To 
the extent that the flow of funds from the U.S. to the 
Euro-dollar market might have.risen as interest rates rose 
in that market, it can be said that these balance of payments 
restrictions negatively influenced supply as well. In the 
same way that Regulation Q restrictions were plausible in 
their effects on the supply so also might these balance of 
payments restrictions be important. Nonetheless, the 
practical significance of the controls appears to be quite 
limited.
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Finally, there have been some rather significant 
institutional restraints on the growth of (or, perhaps, 
maintenance of) the size of the Euro-dollar market.4^
These restraints are the controls placed on lending and 
borrowing activities of Eurobanks by their home central 
banks. As the demand for Euro-dollars began to grow in 
1968 and due to various circumstances in several of the 
countries, restrictions on dealings in Euro-dollars were 
placed on the banks. France, Italy, Belgium, the Nether­
lands , and Canada all instituted restraints on the flow of 
funds into and out of the market in 1969.48 In most 
cases, balance of payments considerations were the 
principle cause of these limits but the effects of the fund
flows on the efficacy of monetary policy were also impor- 
4Qtant. Germany especially found that the Euro-dollar 
market made it more difficult to implement an effective
4 7a fairly complete discussion of these restraints may 
be found in "Euro-dollars: A Changing Market," op. cit.,
pp. 779-784.
4 ^Indeed, quite recently several foreign central banks 
have begun to explore the possibility of reducing the supply 
of Euro-dollars by failing to recycle such funds gained in 
the exchange stabilization activities they normally under­
take. "European Bankers Planning to Manipulate...," loc.cit. 
See Chapters 6 and 7 for a more detailed discussion.
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monetary policy in 1970 and 1971.50 The effect of these 
restraints is difficult to evaluate, but it would appear 
that at least the supply of funds originating in the 
countries in question was reduced. However, the increase 
in the flow of funds from the "outside" area may have 
negated the effectiveness of these restraints. Further, 
the intermediary functions performed by these banks were 
probably little affected. Certainly, the British banks 
have long experienced controls but their intermediary 
activities have been affected not at all.^
To conclude, supply has been increased by the develop­
ment of the market, through various institutional influences, 
through the increased availability and usage of the dollar 
in the international monetary system, and most important, 
through the redeposit of Euro-dollar loans within the 
system, allowing credit creation to occur. Redeposit of 
dollar funds gained in foreign exchange market stabiliza­
tion activities by central banks has also generated an 
increased supply of reserves to the Euro-dollar system.
Basically, then, supply refers to the flow of reserves 
(dollar deposits in U.S. banks) into the system and the re­
deposit of Euro-dollar deposits originally borrowed and used
50Coombs, 0£. cit., pp. 45-47, 50-52.
51Clendennmg, op. cit., pp. 22-24.
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as payment of debts into the system. A decline in the 
influx of primary deposits (reserves) may be offset by 
the reduced leakages out of the system and consequent 
increased money multiplier.
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL DETERMINATION OF THE DEMAND 
FOR EURO-DOLLARS BY U. S. BANKS 
I . Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed the general deter­
minants of the supply and demand for Euro-dollars. The 
analysis was nonquantitative and focused on those factors 
that might logically be expected to affect demand and supply. 
In this chapter, a quantitative test of some of the influ­
ences postulated in Chapter 3 will be outlined. The results 
of a regression analysis of the determinants of Euro-dollar 
demand by U.S. banks will be reported and the implications 
for U.S. monetary policy of these results will be discussed.
II. Hypotheses
A. General Demand Considerations
The actions of the Federal Reserve appear to contribute 
significantly to determining the amounts of Euro-dollar 
borrowing undertaken by U.S. banks. Therefore, the analysis 
of the determinants of U.S. bank borrowing of Euro-dollars 
in the 1960's must logically begin with the influence of 
tight money on U.S. banks. The availability of reserves and 
other factors imposed by the Federal Reserve compose one set 
of influences that must be included in a quantitative study. 
Secondly, an allowance for cost factors must be made, since
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the purchase or borrowing of anything is theoretically 
influenced by the price required to gain the use of the good. 
Thirdly, the demand for Euro-dollar funds is a derived 
demand, derived from the demand by borrowers from U.S. banks 
for loanable funds. Therefore/ some measures of the 
original demand may be useful in explaining Euro-dollar 
borrowing by U.S. banks. Fourth, seasonal factors should 
normally be taken into account, and fifth, changes in the 
environment in which the banks operate (including, for 
instance, the imposition of marginal reserve requirements 
on liabilities to foreign banks and branches) must be 
specified.
Taken together, the determinants of U.S. bank Euro­
dollar borrowing are a complex of interrelated factors. In 
order to determine which factors may influence this borrow­
ing most significantly, regression analysis may be employed. 
By analyzing quantitatively the relationships postulated to 
exist between U.S. bank borrowing and various independent 
variables, it becomes possible to isolate the specific 
determinants that most influence Euro-dollar borrowing 
by U.S. banks.
Prior to an analysis of this type, it is useful to 
postulate or hypothesize the relationships that are expected. 
Given the analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the fol­
lowing hypothesis is made. The amount of Euro-dollar borrow­
ing undertaken by U.S. banks in the mid-to-late 1960's 
was primarily determined by U.S. monetary policy and the
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resultant contraction in the availability of reserves to 
U.S. banks. That is to say, a combination of factors, all 
influenced or imposed by the Federal Reserve, caused U.S. 
banks to turn to the Euro-dollar market for loanable funds. 
Reserve stringencies and high U.S. interest rates were 
direct results of the implementation of restrictive monetary 
policy by the Federal Reserve. The decline in time deposits 
outstanding at U.S. banks was due to Regulation Q interest 
payment limitations that became effective (and restrictive) 
as U.S. market rates rose. Finally, the method by which 
cash items in process of collection and liabilities to 
foreign branches were treated was stipulated by the Federal 
Reserve in its Regulations D and M. Taken together, these 
factors motivated U.S. banks to borrow in the Euro-dollar 
market. The market provided the least cost alternative 
source of funds in the tight money periods of the 19 60's.^ 
The nominal price of Euro-dollars may not have a 
significant effect on the amount of U.S. bank borrowing 
because the advantages of this borrowing, even at rel­
atively high interest rates, outweighed the nominal costs. 
Further, the differential between Euro-dollar interest rates 
and domestic (U.S.) interest rate levels remained relatively 
constant throughout these periods. It was non-price factors
Some part of the cost of maintaining foreign branches 
should be included in the determination of the total cost of 
borrowing Euro-dollars. However, no data is available on 
these expenses. It must be assumed that these costs were 
not large enough to deter Euro-dollar borrowing or, indeed, 
that they may actually have motivated increased borrowing 
in order to reduce the per-dollar cost of such borrowing.
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from which U.S. banks derived the cost benefits. In ad­
dition, the increased price of Euro-dollars in these 
periods may well have been the result of, rather than the 
cause of, increased U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing.
It is expected that, beyond some measure(s) of avail­
ability or reserve losses, the demand for loans from which 
the demand for Euro-dollars is derived will have some influ­
ence on Euro-dollar borrowing. Commercial and industrial 
loans by large banks may serve as an indication of the 
demand for loans and, as these loans increase during tight 
money periods, so also may Euro-dollar borrowing increase 
in order to fund such loans. Seasonal factors and changes 
in the structure under which U.S. banks operate may also 
have some influence on U.S. bank borrowing of Euro-dollars.
It is expected, therefore, that U.S. bank Euro-dollar 
liabilities will be a function of CD's outstanding at 
U.S. banks (negatively), some interest rate differentials 
between Regulation Q ceilings and various U.S. money market 
investment vehicles such as Treasury Bills or commercial 
paper, commercial and industrial loans (positively), and 
seasonal and structural factors of some type.
B. Specific Possible Demand Determinants
This section outlines in some detail the possible 
determinants that may have affected or influenced Euro­
dollar borrowing by U.S. banks in the 1960's. Each variable 
specified and the logical basis for its inclusion in the 
regression analysis is stated.
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The hypothesized determinants are:
1. The interest rate on three month Euro-dollar deposits. 
The interest rate is the nominal price of Euro-dollars and 
may be expected to influence the quantity of Euro-dollars 
demanded by U.S. banks. It is the rate paid by the U.S. 
banks' branches for these funds. Theoretically/ as the 
price (interest rate) rises, the amount of borrowings 
should fall.2 Although the rate is not expected to be a
^The three month rate is utilized because the three 
month deposit has been one of the more popular maturity 
lengths, the rate is available, and is closest to the average 
maturity of Euro-dollar deposits at U.S. bank foreign branches. 
(See Release G. 17 issued monthly by the Federal Reserve. The 
April l, 1971 release is reproduced below.) In addition, this 
rate is easily compared to many other U.S. money market rates.
MATURITY OF EURO-DOLLAR DEPOSITS IN FOREIGN 
BRANCHES OF U.S. BANKS 
(end of month)
Amounts in Cumulative
Maturity of Liability billions of dollars percentage
1970 1971 1970 1971
Nov. Dec. Jan. Nov. Dec. Jan.
Overnight 1.30 1. 37 1.51 4.8 4.9 5.4
Call 2.07 1.78 1.77 12.4 11 . 2 1 1 . 8
Other liabilities,
maturing in following
months after report date:
First calendar month 9.07 10.69 8 . 85 45.9 . 49.3 43.5
Second 5.32 4.46 5.00 65.5 65.1 61.5
Third 3.23 3.75 3.91 77.4 78.5 75.6
Fourth 1.58 1.57 1.51 83.2 84.0 81.0
Fifth 1.39 1.33 2.03 88.4 8 8 . 8 88.3
Sixth 1.29 1.46 1.48 93.1 94.0 93.6
Seventh .34 .26 .23 94.4 94.9 94.4
Eighth .25 .19 .20 95.3 95.6 95.1
Ninth . .18 .16 .18 95.9 96.2 95.8
Tenth .14 .14 .23 96.5 96.7 96.6
Eleventh .15 .20 .24 97.0 97.4 97.5
Twelfth .21 .20 .14 97.8 98.1 98.0
Maturities of more
than 1 year .60 .53 .54 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
Total 27.11 28.10 27.83
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significant explanatory variable, a test of the influence 
of price on quantity demanded should normally be attempted.
2. The Federal Funds rate and the Discount Rate. These 
two variables are indicative both of availability and of 
alternative costs. As these rates rise as a result of 
restrictive monetary policy, Euro-dollars become a relatively 
less expensive source of liquidity, ceterus paribus.
Thus, a direct relationship may exist between either rate 
and Euro-dollar liabilities. In actuality, of course, the 
increased demand for Euro-dollar funds will drive up Euro­
dollar rates too, but perhaps not by the same amount, given 
the depth of the possible Euro-dollar supply. That is, 
the elasticity of the supply of Euro-dollars is relatively 
high.3 Indeed, the availability of the various types of 
funds may well be the determining factor,^ rather than the
Average Maturity at end of January: 2.3 months. —
Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.
Source: Release G.17 (Washington: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, April, 1971). Abridged version also 
published monthly in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, Table No. 
22,"International Capital Transactions of the U.S."section.
3Klopstock, "Euro-dollars in the...," o£. cit., p. 79.
^The literature on the availability doctrine is sub­
stantial. For a good summary see Mayer, op. cit., pp.
127-137 and Joseph Aschheim, Techniques of Monetary Control 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), pp. 12-16.
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rate charged, since all rates have tended to move 
together.^
3. Two interest rate spread variables. These are, first, 
the interest rate spreads between three month Treasury 
bills and the Regulation Q ceiling rate on CD's and, second, 
the yield spread between 4 to 6 month commercial paper and 
the Q ceiling rate on CD's. Both the Treasury Bill rate 
and the commercial paper rate indicate the state of monetary 
policy. That is, a restrictive monetary policy means
that the spread between these rates and the Q ceiling rate 
becomes positive and larger. In response, banks would, 
it is assumed, increase their borrowings of Euro-dollars. 
Further, as yields rise on Bills and paper, these debt 
instruments become more attractive as investment vehicles, 
both to former CD holders and to the banks themselves.
4. Large certificates of deposit (CD's) outstanding at 
large banks. The amount of CD's issued by U.S. banks may be 
expected to have a strong influence on Euro-dollar 
liabilities.6 CD's outstanding is a measure of the avail­
ability of funds and, more important, is an indication of
5Rates tend to move together unless interferences of 
some type impede the adjustment of a particular rate, i.e., 
Regulation Q and CD rates.
6Indeed, one would expect this variable to be of 
overriding significance, for it is Regulation Q and its 
effects on CD's outstanding that is generally conceded to 
have given impetus to the growth and development of the 
Euro-dollar market. This expectation is not disappointed 
in the results.
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the loss of competitiveness of U.S. banks in the short-term 
money markets in times of tight money and Regulation Q 
restrictions.? U.S. banks appear to have resorted to the 
Euro-dollar source as CD runoffs reduced time deposits, 
increased average required reserves, and reduced the banks' 
ability to lend funds. A negative relationship between 
CD's outstanding and Euro-dollar liabilities of U.S. banks 
is expected.
5. Commercial and industrial loans by large banks. This is 
a measure of the underlying demand for Euro-dollars. Should 
these loans increase at large banks with access to Euro­
dollar funds during restrictive monetary policy periods, 
rising as Euro-dollar liabilities rise, a direct relation­
ship will exist and the assumption that Euro-dollars are 
financing at least part of these loans may be made. Further, 
as noted in Chapter 2, Euro-dollar borrowing allows an in­
crease in loans outstanding, ceterus paribus.
However, since commercial and industrial loans will 
rise in periods of easy money as well, and since Euro-dollar
7The values utilized are for large ($100,000 or more) 
negotiable time CD's outstanding at large commercial banks. 
The data was readily available (in contrast to other CD data) 
and applied to large banks, the institutions that have access 
to the Euro-dollar market and, further, who feel the impact 
of Regulation Q first and most severely. Brimmer, Euro- 
Dollar Flows..., op. cit., p. 5.
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liabilities will decline,8 given their "high" cost, 
the relationship between the changes in loans and in Euro­
dollar liabilities may be more informative. As the amount 
of change in these loans declines, indicating restrictive 
monetary policy, the amount of increase in Euro-dollar
ft . .°Witness the 1970-71 experience, as recounted in 
"Banking and Monetary Developments in the Fourth Quarter 
of 1970," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Monthly Review, 
Vol. 53, No. 2 (February, 1971), pp. 30-34; “The Money and 
Bond Markets in November," Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York Monthly Review, Vol. 52, No. 12 (December, 1970), 
pp. 277-278; and "Eurodollar Banking Today," First Na­
tional City Bank Monthly Economic Letter (July, 19 70), 
pp. 78-80.
It is interesting to note the predictions made by 
Henry Wallich in "What Ever Became of the Balance of 
Payments," Morgan Guaranty Survey (March, 1970), pp. 13-14. 
Wallich notes that should the demand for Euro-dollars 
subside appreciably because of cheaper funds in the U.S., 
United States banks might substantially reduce their Euro­
dollar liabilities. This decline "would be self-limiting, 
for as such repayments were made, Eurodollar rates . . .  
would decline (which) would tend to keep such rates in line 
with interest rates in the United States, thereby minimizing 
American bank motivation to make further (Euro-dollar) re­
payments." (p. 13) Further, such repayments as do occur 
may not end up in official reserves since other foreign 
rates would also decline, reducing any incentive to move 
out of Euro-dollars. (pp. 13-14) Experience in the last 
year and a half has shown the danger in forecasting movements 
based on assumptions of non-interference by official 
institutions. Wallich is correct in his analysis, as far as 
it goes. However, since it appears that official inter­
vention can not be ruled out and since U.S. banks view Euro­
dollars not as alternative fund sources but as marginal fund 
sources, it is questionable to conclude that these banks 
will continue to draw on the Euro-dollar system in the face 
of equally cheap and readily available funds at home. The 
market interferences in Europe by central banks attempting 
to maintain high domestic rates for inflation fighting pur­
poses and in the U.S. by the Federal Reserve in the form of 
marginal reserve requirements on Euro-dollar borrowings, com­
bine to make Euro-dollar borrowing a great deal more costly 
than comparable U.S. borrowing. Thus, the run down of
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borrowings is expected to increase, and vice versa. An 
indirect relationship is therefore expected in these first 
differences.^
Any relationships that occur between the stock 
variables will indicate either trend (rather than determina­
tion) , the inviolability of these loans, the effect of 
Euro-dollar borrowing on loans, or a combination of all 
these factors. The sanctity of commercial and industrial 
lending means that this is the last type of lending activity 
to be reduced in periods of restricted reserve growth.1®
The lines of credit previously negotiated, the profitability 
of business loans, and the need to maintain market position 
all dictate that these loans be made if at all possible.
Thus, in spite of the supposed "lock-in” effect that the 
banks experience11 with respect to government and other 
securities during tight money periods, loans, not securities,
Euro-dollar borrowings by U.S. banks has occurred in spite 
of Wallich's theoretically sound analysis.
^These loans, of course, depend on Euro-dollar 
borrowing during "tight" money periods since they are 
financed from this source. The reverse relationship postu­
lated in the text is intended to measure the impact of tight 
money on Euro-dollar borrowing.
1 0Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows..., op. cit., pp. 5-6,8.
1 1Basically, it is thought that in periods of "tight" 
money, when interest rates are high, banks will find them­
selves "stuck" with bonds bought in boom periods at high 
prices. In the subsequent period, bond prices decline and 
the capital loss that would result should the bond be sold 
is thought to deter the banks from liquidating their 
securities holdings. Thus they are considered "locked-in" 
to holding the securities.
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appear to be the last asset to be reduced, at least at 
these large banks. ^
6 . Free Reserves at member banks.-*-3 This is an additional 
availability variable that may be related to movements in 
Euro-dollar liabilities of U.S. banks. While free reserves 
may be an imprecise or incorrect measure of monetary ease 
or tightness, the Federal Reserve has apparently used the 
measure as a target.14 Therefore, when free reserves
Thomas Mayer, Monetary Policy in the United States 
(New York: Random House, 19 6 8 ), pp. 130-134 discusses
the "locking-in" effect but doubts its significance. His 
footnotes 21 and 22, pp. 133-134 refer to the literature 
on the effect and the empirical evidence cited to support 
or condemn it. The term derives from Robert Roosa and 
J. H. Williams' development of the availability thesis 
approach to monetary policy. Mayer, o jd . cit., pp. 127-128.
l^Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows..., op. cit., pp. 5-15.
l^Free reserves at all member banks are used because 
it is assumed that the Federal Funds market in particular 
and the U.S. money market in general are perfect enough to 
allow the transmission of ease or tightness with little 
friction throughout the system. Alternatively, it may be 
assumed that, while the effects of monetary policy hit latge 
money market banks first, their relationships with banks 
throughout the country are such that they can utilize the 
excess reserves that exist there to offset some of the im­
pact of this policy. Funds will flow to those willing to 
pay the highest rates for them.
1 4See, for instance, William Dewald, "Free Reserves, 
Total Reserves, and Monetary Control," Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 71, No. 2 (April, 1963), pp. 141-153; Jack 
Guttentag, "The Strategy of Open-Market Operations," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 80 (February, 1966), 
pp. 1-30; and Mayer, 0£. cit., pp. 100-104 and his foot­
notes 27, 29-34 on these pages.
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decline or become negative, monetary policy is restrictive, 
at least as far as the Federal Reserve is concerned. Since 
it appears that Euro-dollar liabilities increase in re­
sponse to stringencies of various types imposed by the 
Federal Reserve, it may be postulated that an inverse re­
lationship exists between the level of free reserves and 
Euro-dollar liabilities.
7. The adjusted money supply. This variable is another 
that.indicates reserve availability and it may influence 
the movements of Euro-dollar. liabilities. An increase in 
the money supply generally indicates that monetary policy 
is not stringent, the amount or rate of increase (above 
some minimum level) being an indicator of the amount of 
ease.
Since banks have borrowed Euro-dollars primarily to 
offset tight money, an increase in the money supply would 
imply a decrease in (the need to incur) Euro-dollar 
liabilities. It is probable that the change in the money 
supply (i.e., the first differences) may be the most 
valuable form for this variable. Since banks borrow Euro­
dollars in order to continue making loans, any relation­
ship obtained between the money supply and Euro-dollar 
liabilities will require cautious explanation. Further, 
since a decline in CD's (a non-money supply item) increases 
demand deposit levels and since Federal Reserve policy in 
1966 and 1969 was specifically aimed at a reduction in 
outstanding CD's, a rise in the money supply may be
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associated with a rise in Euro-dollar borrowings, both 
variables reflecting "tight" money.
8 . U.S. Government securities held by large banks. This 
variable should also indicate the direction of monetary 
policy and is expected to move inversely to Euro-dollar 
borrowings. Security holdings are traditionally reduced by 
banks during tight money periods and since, as noted above, 
large banks are least influenced by any "lock-in" e f f e c t , - ^  
they may be expected not only to increase Euro-dollar 
liabilities but also to decrease their holdings of govern­
ment securities during tight money p e r i o d s .
l^See note 11, this chapter. This assumes that large 
banks are more concerned than smaller banks with employing 
their assets as profitably as possible. See D. R. Cawthorne, 
"Reserve Adjustments of City Banks," Essays on Commercial 
Banking (Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
1962) , p. 31; Stuart Greenbaum, "Competition and Efficiency 
in the Banking System," Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
75, No. 4, Pt. II (August, 1967), pp. 461-479; and Jack 
Guttentag and Edward Herman, Banking Structure and Per­
formance (New York: Institute of Fxnance of the Schools
of Business, New York University, 1967), pp. 15-19, 21-29.
^valuation problems are present in this variable. 
Should the securities held by the banks be valued at market 
prices, the value of these holdings would decline in tight 
money periods. Should the more likely method of valuing 
at par be followed, the value of such holdings would still 
decline (without any sale of securities) if the funds deri­
ving from maturing issues are not reinvested. Whichever, 
government securities were sold off by the large banks as 
they adjusted to tight money in 1969. See Brimmer, The Euro- 
Dollar Market..., op. cit., pp. 8-9ff; "The Economy xn 
1969," Survey of Current Business, Vol. 50, No. 1 
(January, 1970), p. 20.
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9. Two sets of seasonal dummy variables. These variables 
are entered to take account of possible seasonal influences. 
One dummy was postulated for the summer months (June, July, 
and August). An alternative set of dummies was included in 
order to test the influence of each month separately.
The summer dummy was included for two reasons. The summer 
months typically cause a decline in business activity 
generally and financial activity specifically.-*-8 Second, 
preliminary tests of the 1969 weekly demand model indicated 
that there was some type of summer influence on Euro­
dollar liabilities, unexplained by any other variable. The 
monthly dummies allow the months which had the greatest 
effect on the dependent variable to be precisely determined. 
As such, they allow a greater degree of precision in 
analyzing seasonal impact.
10. A dummy variable representing structural change.
The imposition of marginal reserve requirements on Euro­
dollar borrowings from foreign branches and the redefini­
tion of cash items in process of collection by the
•^Ronald Wonnacott and Thomas Wonnacott, Economet­
rics (New York; John Wiley and Sons, 1970), pp. 68-77 
explain the use of dummy variables.
18This is evident in the financial press. See also 
Stanley Black, "An Econometric Study of Euro-Dollar 
Borrowing by New York Banks and The Rate of Interest on 
Euro-Dollars," Journal of Finance, Vol. 26, No. 1 
(March, 1971), pp. 87-88.
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Federal Reserve in September 1969 changed the environment 
in which Euro-dollar borrowing occurred. Presumably, by 
making Euro-dollar borrowings more expensive, the demand 
for these liabilities would decline. This, at least, was 
the reasoning the Federal Reserve used in imposing the 
requirements in response to the massive increases in such 
borrowing in 1969.19 Thus, when the dummy is coded 1 
(reserves required and cash items redefined) Euro-dollar 
liabilities should decline, and when coded 0 (no reserve 
requirements and cash items defined as before) these 
liabilities should increase.
III. Estimating Procedure and Sources
of Data
A. Estimating Procedures
Regression analysis requires the statement of a 
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. 
The movements in the independent variable(s) are hypo­
thesized to influence the movements of the dependent 
variable. By analyzing the contribution that each inde­
pendent variable makes toward the explanation of the
l^See, among others, "Euro-dollars: A Changing
Market,” 0£. cit., p. 766; Gaines, 0£. cit., p. 1; 
Williams, op. cit., pp. 12, 25-28; "Eurodollar Banking 
Today," op. cit., p. 78; Coombs, o£. cit., (March, 1970), 
p. 64; and Andrew Brimmer, The Euro-dollar Market and the 
United States Balance of Payments, paper presented at the 
London School of Economics, London, November, 1969.
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dependent variable's movements, an equation can be con­
structed that explains or predicts the value the dependent 
variable will take depending on the values that the in­
dependent variables take. This equation is an estimate of 
the true relationships that exist between the dependent 
and independent variables.
This section outlines briefly the procedure used in 
estimating the demand equations for Euro-dollars by U.S. 
banks. The following section indicates the sources of the 
data used in the analysis. With this basis, the results 
of the regession analysis and an interpretation of the 
results will be provided.
The dependent variable specified in the analysis is 
the amount of Euro-dollar borrowings by U.S. banks. This 
value can be approximated by the data compiled by the 
Federal Reserve and titled, "Liabilities of U.S. Banks to 
Their Foreign B r a n c h e s ."20 The measure omits the amount of 
direct borrowing by U.S. banks of dollar balances held by 
European banks, such data being unavailable. However, it 
seems logical to assume that such direct borrowing, 
while perhaps less profitable, was motivated by the same
2 0see, for instance, Table 21, Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, Vol. 56, No. 12 (December, 1970), p. A 8 6 .
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factors as impelled the borrowing of Euro-dollars through 
European branches. Further, the effects of such borrowing 
on the efficiency of U.S. monetary policy are generally 
similar to those that result from borrowing from overseas 
branches.
The time period considered is January, 1966 through 
December, 1970. Monthly data was collected for each of the 
hypothesized determinants of demand and, in addition, weekly 
data for 1966-67 and 1969 (January through August) was com­
piled and tested. Comparing the results obtained for the 
weekly subperiods with those obtained from the monthly 
analysis provides an indication of the explanatory power of 
certain independent variables in different situations. The 
1969 weekly test has the added advantage of being structur­
ally (internally) consistent.21 That is, the period begins 
with the imposition by the Federal Reserve of tight money 
and ends as marginal reserve requirements on Euro-dollar 
liabilities above the base amount are about to go into 
effect. Thus, Euro-dollar borrowing in this period occurred 
under comparatively constant conditions and provides an 
excellent model in which to test the hypotheses of this
21See J. Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York: 
McGraw Hill Book Co., 1963), p. 232.
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dissertation. Finally, a comparison of the differences 
between this period and the entire period under review 
is possible.
A starting date of January 1966 was chosen for the 
study since it was in this year that banks first actively 
entered the market on a large scale. Prior to this time, 
relatively little borrowing from branches occurred and 
most U.S. banks were, it appears, generally unaware of the 
advantages the market offered to them.22 December 1970 is 
the end point of the analysis because reliable data beyond 
this date could not be obtained due to research time con­
straints. In addition, the movement by the Federal 
Reserve towards encouraging the maintenance of Euro­
dollar balances by the banks for balance of payments 
reasons introduced a change in the structure or environ­
ment that made the date seem a logical concluding point.
The procedure used in estimating the predictive or
I
descriptive equations was to postulate the major theo­
retical determinants of the demand for Euro-dollars by 
U.S. banks (Chapter 3), approximate these determinants with 
quantifiable measures (this chapter, Section II,B), collect
2 2See, for instance, Williams, op. cit., pp. 9-11, 
and Clendenning, op. cit., pp. 26, 56.
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the data describing these factors for the time period 
under consideration, and utilize a stepwise regression 
program to sort out the most important factors influenc­
ing d e m a n d . 23 r p ^ e  stepwise procedure operates, as its 
name implies, in steps. In the first step, the compu­
tation of the simple regression line between the depen­
dent variable and the independent variable that reduces 
the standard error to its smallest value is undertaken. 
Thus, the independent variable that explains the most 
variation in the dependent variable is chosen and the 
regression equation between it and the dependent variable 
is calculated. Then, step by step, additional variables 
are added to the equation one at a time in the order that 
reduces the unexplained variation by the greatest amount.24 
The determination of which variable should be added 
is made by taking that variable, not included in the 
equation as it stands, which has the highest partial cor­
relation coefficient and adding it to the regression
^Here, the BIOMED 02R canned program was utilized. 
An outline and explanation of the print out of this program 
may be found in Donald Harnett, Introduction to Statistical 
Methods (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co., 1970), chapters 9 and 10. The following explanation 
derives from this discussion.
2 4 i b i d . , pp. 354-355.
*
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equation. The square of the partial correlation coefficient 
indicates the proportion of the unexplained variation which 
is reduced by adding that variable, relative to the varia­
tion remaining to be explained. The addition of variables 
based on this criteria continues until all the specified 
variables have been added or until the stated number of 
steps has been reached.
The stepwise procedure becomes somewhat unwieldy 
when a large number of variables are postulated. This 
occurs because there often exist several different 
equations that equally well explain the variation in the 
dependent variable. Thus, alternative specifications of 
the variables to be included and excluded from the re­
gression equation must be made. For example, the simple 
stepwise regression may indicate that one variable is 
extremely important in the determination of the variation 
in the dependent equation. However, if this variable is 
excluded from the equation, it often appears that other 
variables, whose influence was swamped by the original 
important variable and were therefore of little or no 
importance in explaining the variation, become quite 
important. This frequently indicates that multicollin- 
earity is present. The determination of which variables 
to include in the final equation, then, rests not merely on 
the mechanical determination of the explanatory power of 
each variable and on the observation of multicollinearity,
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but on the researcher's intuition as to the proper 
variables to include. The researcher has available to him, 
in many instances, several different equations, all ex­
plaining remarkably well the variation in the dependent 
variable. The choice of which equation finally to use 
then rests on the theoretical basis upon which the model 
was originally constructed.25 Also, since both flow and 
stock analyses were computed, a choice between the par­
ticular form the equation will take must be made. The 
final criterion will be the attainment of the best de­
scriptive equation possible.
No lag structure was specified in the variables for 
several reasons. Most important, it was assumed that the 
international and U.S. financial markets are sufficiently 
well organized and the participants sufficiently well in­
formed that responses to changes in a particular sector of 
a market are relatively rapid. The communication of 
pressures from one market to another, and between sectors 
within a market, was assumed to be quite fast. A second
25Edward Kane, Economic Statistics and Econometrics 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, l$t>8 ) , pp. 273-274
makes this warning. He also notes that the testing of so 
many different hypotheses or combinations of variables in­
creases greatly the probability that at least one "signifi­
cant" result will be obtained. The solution to these prob­
lems, as noted above, involves the specification of the model 
based upon logical or sound theorization. This will provide 
insurance against spurious significance. Secondly, careful 
observation of the effect on the partial correlation co­
efficient of a dropped variable when other variables are 
added will insure that the dropped variables are truly of 
no value.
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reason for omi ttinq a lag structure was that the results 
obtained wiLhout specifying such a structure were quite 
satisfactory. Finally, anticipations play an important 
role in the money markets and it was therefore assumed that 
any lags which might exist were offset by the anticipations 
and resultant discounting of future changes that occur.
B. Data Sources
Most of the data used was obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, the Wall Street Journal, and the pub­
lications of Salomon Brothers.^6 in some cases, consis­
tent data back to 1966 was not directly available. In 
these cases, and where possible, reconstruction of the data 
was undertaken. Where this was not possible, the Federal 
Reserve Board supplied copies of the records it maintains 
for its own use.
Monthly data is published as of the end of the month 
in some cases and as of the first of the month or as of the 
first Wednesday of the month in others. To maintain con­
sistency, an attempt to convert all data to beginning of 
the month values was made. Published data as of the end 
of the month were utilized as a measure of the variable 
for the following month. While some slight irregularities 
might result, cross checking indicated that they were very
26primarily An Analytical Record of Yields and Yield 
Spreads (New York! Salomon Brothers and Hutzler, 1969 (?)), 
and tHeir weekly Bond Market Roundup and Comments on Credit.
126
minor. Measures of a variable for June 30, for instance, 
and July 1 do not normally vary greatly. In the case of 
a few series of data that were available only for the 
first Wednesday of the month, no adjustments were 
possible. These series were used as they were and it is 
conceded that a slight lag may therefore exist in these 
series. However, it is a short lag, of less than a week 
and probably of limited importance. The data used for the 
weekly models is consistently as of Wednesday of each week. 
This is the form that such series are issued by the 
Federal Reserve Board. The source of each data series is 
noted in Appendix A.
IV. Empirical Results and Implications
A. The Basic Equations
The use of a stepwise regression program was under­
taken in order that an equation with substantial explana­
tory power might be obtained. This procedure, as noted in 
section III, entails the specification of a number of 
theoretically relevant variables. These variables are 
entered into the analysis, one at a time, and a regression 
run. Values for the excluded variables are also calculated 
so that a check may be maintained on the effect that adding 
(or deleting) a variable has on the power and significance 
of all the included (and excluded) variables. In this way, 
a respecified equation including only the significant 
variables can be obtained. Table 1 indicates the final
TABLE I
REGRESSION RESULTS --- STOCKS AND FLOWS1
Stock Demand-Monthly R' SEE
(1) E$D = -22,665.2 -.197CD +.112CIL +.13MS +1.17RCP-RQL 
(3.7) (18.7) (3.65) (11.05)





(2) AE$D = 402.61 -.3ACD -.26ACIL -.41RRE$ -847.6JAN
(4.8) (2.98) (3.07) (5.09)




Stock Demand - 1966-67 Weekly
(3) E$D = -9,850.23 -.2CD +.28CIL -509.21JUNE
(9.1) (14.4) (4.3)
[-.241] [.878] [-.154]

















TABLE 1 - CONTINUED
Flow Demand - 1966-67 Weekly




















-2,246.32ARCP-RQL +1,214.23 JUNE 
(2.29) (2.79)
[-.543] [.793]
Black's 1966-68 Weekly Demand2
E$D = -.446CD -1,480E$RATE +650RFF +1,681RTB +26.0TREND 















Significant at .02 level. 
iFigures in millions of dollars except interest rate and dummy variables. 
2Stanley Black, "An Econometric Study of Euro-Dollar Borrowing by New York 
Banks and the Rate of Interest on Euro-Dollars," Journal of Finance, 




stock anti flow equations that best explain the fluc­
tuations in Euro-dollar liabilities of U.S. banks for the 
late 1960's. The particular equations were chosen because 
of their various attributes, discussed below.
The t value for each variable is indicated in paren­
theses directly below the variable and, unless starred, the 
variable is significant at the .01 level. In addition, the 
Beta coefficient is noted in brackets below each variable.^ 
The summary measures, R^, SEE (Standard Error of Estimate), 
and P value for the entire equation are indicated for each 
equation. Table 2 lists the complete variable set used in 
each analysis and, in addition, indicates the theoretically 
expected coefficient . signs derived from the analysis in 
Section II.
2?The Beta coefficient is obtained by multiplying the 
regression coefficient by the ratio of the standard de­
viation of the variable to which the regression coefficient 
applies and the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
The result is sometimes called a standardized or normalized 
regression coefficient. The usefulness of the measure is 
that, unlike the regression coefficient, the impact or im­
portance of each variable on the dependent variable is in­
dicated by the relative size of its Beta coefficient. The 
sign of the coefficient may be positive or negative, de­
pending upon the sign of the original regression coeffi­
cient. However, the sign is often omitted since it has no 
significance in explaining the importance of each variable.
The Beta coefficient is unaffected by the units of 
measure of each variable. The square of the coefficient is 
the direct contribution of that particular variable to the 
of the entire equation. One drawback of the Beta co­
efficient is that it becomes less reliable as the degree of 
multicollinearity increases. See Mordecai Ezekiel and 
Karl Fox, Methods of Correlation and Regression Analysis 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959) , p. 197 and Norman
Draper and Harry Smith, Applied Regression Analysis 
(New York: John Wiley ana Sons, 1966), Chapters 2 and 4.
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TABLE 2
VARIABLES TESTED AND THEORETICALLY EXPECTED
COEFFICIENT SIGNS
Monthly Demand
1. Liabilities of U.S. banks to their foreign branches
2. Euro-dollar interest rate on deposits (-)
3. Large CD's outstanding at large banks (-)
4. Commercial and industrial loans at large banks (+)
(-for flows)
5. Free reserves at all Federal Reserve System member 
banks (open)
6 . Dummy for required reserves on Euro-dollar liabilities, 
starts September 1969 (-)
7. U.S. government securities held by large banks (-)
8 . Dummy for summer, June, July, and August (-)
9. Money supply, adjusted (open)
10.  20. Monthly dummy, excluding December (open)
21. Federal Funds rate (+)
22. Discount rate in effect (+)
23. Three month Treasury bill rate versus Regulation Q 
ceiling rate on three month CD's— spread (+)
24. Four-six month commercial paper rate versus Regulation 
Q ceiling rate on three month CD's— spread (+)
Note: minus value for spread means favor of CD's,
positive value means spread in favor of bills or 
commercial paper.
Demand-1966-Weekly
1. Liabilities of U.S. banks to their foreign branches
2. Euro-dollar interest rate on deposits (-)
3. Large CD's outstanding at large banks (-)
4. Commercial and industrial loans at large banks (+)
5. Free reserves at all Federal Reserve System member 
banks (open)
6 . U.S. government securities held by large banks (-)
7. Dummy for summer, June, July, and August (-)
8 . Money supply, adjusted (open)
9. — 19. Monthly dummy, excluding December (open)
20. Federal Funds rate (+)
21. Three month Treasury bill rate versus Regulation Q
ceiling rate on three month CD's— spread (+)
22. Four-six month commercial paper rate versus Regulation 
Q ceiling rate on three month CD's— spread (+)




1. Liabilities of U.S. banks to their foreign branches
2. Euro-dollar interest rate on deposits (-)
3. Large CD's outstanding at large banks (-)
4. Commercial and industrial loans at large banks (+)
5. Basic deficit at 5 Chicago and 8 New York banks 
(-means surplus) (+)
6 . Free reserves at all Federal Reserve System member 
banks (open)
7. Dummy for summer, June, July, and August (open)
8 . Money supply, adjusted (open)
9. U.S. government securities held at large banks (-)
10. Federal Funds rate (+)
11. Discount rate in effect (+)
12. Three month Treasury bill rate versus Regulation Q 
ceiling rate on three month CD's— spread (+)
13. Four-six month commercial paper rate versus Regu­
lation Q ceiling rate on three month CD's --spread (+)
14-20. Monthly dummy, excluding January (open)
Note: Signs as in Monthly Demand.
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There are several general points that should be made 
concerning the analysis. First, stock equations may be 
expected to exhibit autocorrelation since this is a time 
series analysis and since the omission of variables, both 
known and unknown, may be important in some combination. 
Also, these disturbances may affect more than one week or 
month.2® As the table shows, the Durban-Watson d statistic 
indicates the presence of autocorrelation in the stock 
equations. Autocorrelation is not indicated in the flow 
equations, however, which confirms that here, at least, 
first differences analysis solves this problem.
Second, multicollinearity is expected in at least 
some cases and does occur in the stock analysis. For 
example, the preliminary regressions indicated that the 
various interest rate spreads were correlated with each 
other, as well as with the dependent variable. The final 
equation contains only one such spread, however, which 
negates the problem. The correlation between interest rate 
spreads is to be expected if the assumption of interrelated 
money markets and interrelated rates within markets is 
valid. The flow analyses are basically free of multi­
collinearity because all but one of the related variables is 
dropped in the final equations.
2 8Black, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
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Third, the variables that were found to be signifi­
cant in the stock analysis are generally so in the flow 
analysis although, as can be noted, the use of first 
differences reduces the number of significant variables 
(and generates a somewhat lower r2 ).
Fourth, the signs of the coefficients are generally 
as expected with one or two exceptions. The most glaring 
abnormality was a positive coefficient attached to the 
Euro-dollar rate in several equations of monthly demand. 
None of these preliminary equations was finally selected. 
They indicated that as Euro-dollar rates rose, demand for 
these funds increased. One explanation for this is that 
the rate rises as a result of the increased demand. 
Government securities also tended, in some cases, to be 
positively related to Euro-dollar liabilities, a some­
what unexpected result but one that valuation problems 
may explain.29 Again, the final equations did not 
include this variable.
Fifth, the multiple r 2 measures indicate a high • 
explanatory power for both the stock and flow equations. 
Exceptions to this include the flow weekly demand for the 
two subperiods. In the 1969 case, the equation explains 
about half of the variation in Euro-dollar liabilities. 
For the 1966 weekly flow analysis, less than one-fifth of 
the variation is explained by the best equation. Flow
29Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Market..., op. cit., pp. 8-9ff.
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analysis of these subperiods is therefore of marginal 
usefulness. Whether the equations are misspecified or 
merely confirm the suspicion that the weekly data is 
affected by transitory forces of a truly random character 
is unknown. However, since the variables specified did 
allow the formulation of several good monthly equations, 
both stock and flow, it seems likely that it is transi­
tory forces rather than misspecification that is respon­
sible.
Sixth, the Beta coefficients indicate the wide 
variability in the explanatory power of the significant 
independent variables. In some cases, one variable 
clearly contributes more to the explanation of the 
variation than any of the others while in other cases each 
independent variable has relatively the same power of 
explanation. As stated in note 27, the Beta coefficient 
indicates, by its relative size, the impact of each in­
dependent variable on the dependent variable. Since it is 
stated in absolute numbers, the units of measure do not 
bias the interpretation of the contribution of each de­
terminant, assuming that there is little or no multi- 
collinearity. The sign of the Beta coefficient indicates 
the sign of the particular variable's coefficient and the 
variable's contribution to the slope of the final re­
gression line.
Overall, the flow analysis of monthly demand may be
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considered the most satisfactory equation. While the high 
multiple measures associated with the stock equation 
indicates a better explanatory power, the flow or first 
difference analysis avoids several of the problems asso­
ciated with stock time series analyses and has a suffi­
ciently high to be both useful and acceptable.
The standard error associated with all of the 
equations is relatively small. It varies from about 
$150 million to slightly above $700 million. Given the 
magnitudes being considered (billions of dollars), these 
error ranges seem acceptable. The F values associated with 
each equation are, in all cases, significant at the .01 
level.
Finally, the equation that Stanley Black has derived 
to explain weekly Euro-dollar demand‘d  (reproduced in 
Table 1) is similar to the equation derived here for 
1966-1967. Black's equation is distinguished by the im­
portance of a trend component and several interest rates. 
Neither it nor the weekly equation derived here predict 
well the 19 69-70 experience.
B. Interpretation of the Generated Equations 
Introductory
The equations finally chosen as the best descriptions 
of the demand for Euro-dollars by U.S. banks generally
^®Black, op. cit., pp. 8 6-8 8 .
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verify the hypotheses made prior to the regression, analysis. 
As was expected, the monthly demand for Euro-dollars was 
influenced primarily by monetary policy or the effects of 
such policy. Thus, CD's outstanding and an interest rate 
spread (in this case, between the commercial paper rate 
and the CD ceiling rate) have substantial effects on the 
amount of Euro-dollar borrowing undertaken by U.S. banks.
In addition, the demand for commercial and industrial loans 
at large banks in the U.S., as indicated by the amount 
of such loans outstanding, affected Euro-dollar borrowing. 
The basis of the demand for loanable funds by banks (i.e., 
Euro-dollar borrowing) derived from the demand by their 
customers for such funds and from the pressures restrictive 
monetary policy placed on the banks.
Monthly Demand
The stock monthly demand equation 1 indicates that 
U.S. monetary policy affected the demand for Euro-dollars 
by U.S. banks. Based on the Beta coefficients, the money 
supply variable (MS) is the most important determinant 
of Euro-dollar borrowing. An increase in money is asso­
ciated with an increase in Euro-dollar liabilities. This 
direct relationship was not expected since Euro-dollar 
borrowing appears to rise during tight money periods and 
one of the characteristics of tight money is a halt or 
decline in the growth of the money stock.
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Several explanations of the strong direct relation­
ship are possible. First, the money supply rarely stops 
growing completely, even in tight money periods. There 
is, therefore, an upward trend in the money supply series.
In the time period tested, Euro-dollar borrowing also rose 
fairly steadily. Thus, since both series trend upwards, 
a direct relationship results in the regression analysis. 
This trend explanation is reinforced by Stanley Black's 
results (Table 1, equation 7). He found a positive weekly 
trend of $26 million affecting Euro-dollar demand. This 
variable was the most important influence on Euro-dollar 
demand. The other independent variables were regarded 
by Black as " . . . determining deviations around the un­
explained trend increase of $26 million per week."31 
Equation 1 presented here may be viewed as utilizing the 
money supply as a proxy for the trend evident in the 
Euro-dollar liabilities series. Money supply rose less than 
$1 billion a month over the tested time period. This means 
that the money supply variable "explained" something less 
than $13 million a month of the total rise in Euro­
dollar liabilities. While this is only l/8th the effect 
that Black's trend variable has, the negative impact of 
rising Euro-dollar rates in Black's equation, taken to­
gether with the trend, generates a total effect roughly 
similar to that postulated by the money supply in equation 1 .
3 1Ibid., p. 8 8 .
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A second possible explanation of the direct relation­
ship between money supply and Euro-dollar liabilities 
relies on the analysis presented in Chapter 2. Euro­
dollar borrowing was undertaken by U.S. banks as they lost 
CD's in 1966 and 1969 due to effective Regulation Q limits. 
These time deposits became demand deposits as former CD 
holders channeled their funds into more profitable in­
vestment vehicles. Time deposits are not included in the 
money supply but demand deposits are. Therefore, a direct 
relationship between money supply and Euro-dollar lia­
bilities of U.S. banks derives from the purely mechanical 
fact that the shift from time deposits to demand deposits 
occurred at the same time that banks were increasing their 
Euro-dollar liabilities, i.e., during tight money periods.
Neither of the above explanations implies any real 
affect of money supply on Euro-dollar liabilities. The 
inclusion of a money supply series in such an equation, 
therefore, must be based on the usefulness of the variable 
as a proxy for trend, monetary policy or economic activity, 
or as an indicator of the impact of monetary policy on the 
composition of bank deposits and thus on the banks' desire 
to borrow Euro-dollars.
It should also be noted that multicollinearity re­
duces the value of the Beta coefficient. Since multi­
collinearity was present in the analysis, the Beta value 
may be giving false significance to the money supply 
variable.
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The other variables that contribute to the ex­
planation of the monthly variation in Euro-dollar lia­
bilities are also associated with monetary policy. As 
hypothesized, outstanding CD's are negatively related to 
these liabilities, but not in the magnitude expected. 
Commercial and industrial loans at large banks (CIL) are 
positively related to Euro-dollar borrowings. The lessened 
availability of U.S. funds and higher domestic interest 
rates associated with tight money thus did not choke off 
these loans but merely redirected the lending banks' 
search for funds to finance them. As noted in Chapter 2, 
Euro-dollar borrowing allows the banking system to increase 
its loans even though the money supply remains constant. 
This, combined with the upward trend of both Euro-dollar 
liabilities and loans, generates the direct relationship 
observed.
Finally, the positive relationship between Euro­
dollar liabilities and the yield spread advantage of 
commercial paper over CD's indicates that monetary policy, 
by restricting rates payable on time deposits, causing 
other market rates to rise, and increasing the proportion 
of demand deposits and thus average reserves, provided a 
further incentive to U.S. banks to borrow in the Euro­
dollar market. Taken together, the explanatory variables 
of Euro-dollar borrowing reflect the impact of monetary 
policy in the United States.
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Both multicollinearity and autocorrelation appear in 
the stock equation. Multicollinearity was expected 
because money supply and commercial and industrial loans 
are interrelated. Since both variables contribute appre­
ciably to the explanation of Euro-dollar borrowing, however, 
they are both included in the final equation. The 
presence of autocorrelation, as indicated by the Durban- 
Watson d statistic, implies that there is some unexplained 
correlation between Euro-dollar liabilities and the 
residuals.
To solve the autocorrelation and multicollinearity 
problems, first differences analysis of the monthly demand 
data was undertaken. J In this flow analysis(equation 2) 
the same types of variables that were significant in the 
stock analysis are significant except that the influence 
of seasonality (January and July), the imposition of 
marginal reserve requirements (a dummy, RRE$), and the 
lack of significance of changes in the money supply are 
evident. The r 2 is lower in equation 2 indicating a 
lower explanatory power for the flow equation. The 
benefits derived from the reduction of autocorrelation
^^Tests excluding each of the variables in turn in­
dicated that both variables had significant explanatory 
power. In addition, both retained the signs obtained when 
utilized together.
^-^Wonnacott and Wonnacott, o£. cit., p. 140.
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and multicollinearity and the achievement of correctly 
signed coefficients outweigh the loss implicit in this 
reduced explanatory power.
In addition to the seasonal factors, the marginal 
reserve requirements dummy is significant in the flow 
analysis. Euro-dollar demand falls substantially when 
reserve requirements go into effect. But, the month of 
July brings out large upward changes in Euro-dollar 
borrowings. This may be due to pure seasonality or to some 
other unspecified factor. The suspicion is that the un­
winding of mid-year window dressing by Eurobanks increases 
Euro-dollar demand. But this would not explain the greatly 
increased demand for borrowings by U.S. banks in these 
particular months. The explanation is elusive.
Changes in CD's outstanding (ACD) is the most 
important variable in the flow equation. These changes 
are negatively related to changes in Euro-dollar liabili­
ties, an expected result. Large commercial and in­
dustrial bank loans (ACIL) are also negatively related to 
the dependent variable. This result also conforms to the 
postulated relationships previously noted. While Euro­
dollar borrowings are directly associated with loans, the 
change in loans outstanding is inversely related to changes 
in the dependent variable. Thus, smaller and smaller in­
creases in loans occur in tight money periods while the 
change in Euro-dollar borrowings is increasing, a logical 
and expected result.
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A yield spread between the rate on Treasury Bills 
and on CD's is significant, as is a similar spread in the 
stock analysis. Thus, except for the seasonal and 
structural components in the flow analysis, and the money 
supply in the stock analysis, the two monthly demand 
equations and Black's weekly equation covering the same 
general period are quite similar. They indicate that 
Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks is affected by monetary 
policy, as measured by the different variables included. 
Further, access to the Euro-dollar market negates, in 
some sense, the efficiency of monetary policy.
Demand-Tight Money Periods
The 1966 weekly demand-stock analysis (equation 3) 
includes the same basic factors as did the monthly demand. 
CD's outstanding (CD), commercial and industrial loans 
(CIL), a rate spread between Treasury Bills and the 
Regulation Q ceiling (RTB-RQC), and early summer seasonal 
factors are the significant variables. All have the ex­
pected sign and are significant at the .01 level.
The most important determinants are CD's and com­
mercial and industrial loans. Note the pervading influence 
of loans, CD's, seasonal factors and a yield spread on 
demand, whether in the monthly or in the 1966 weekly sub­
period. The flow analysis of weekly 1966 demand (equa­
tion 4) is of little value, indicating only that May had 
a positive influence on changes in Euro-dollar borrowings
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and changes in government securities held by large banks 
had a negative influence.
Weekly demand, stock, for 1969 (equation 5), includes 
the variables for CD's and the Treasury Bill-Regulation Q 
ceiling spread. The equation is significant at the .01 
level and explains 97% of the 1969 variation in Euro­
dollar borrowings. The flow equation (equation 6 ), ex­
plaining half the variation in Euro-dollar liabilities, 
includes government securities holdings (ASECS), the 
Treasury Bill-Regulation Q ceiling spread, commercial paper- 
Regulation Q ceiling spread, with the wrong sign (ARCP-RQL), 
and the June dummy. Only the June variable was Significant 
at the .01 level.
The 1966 and 1969 demand tight money subperiods 
tested generally support the entire period demand analysis 
conclusions. All include in some form reference to CD's 
outstanding and spreads between the Q ceiling and either 
Treasury Bills or commercial paper. In addition, some 
include a seasonal factor aYid a factor "measuring bank 
assets, either loans, government securities, or the like.
All have substantial explanatory power.
Conclusions
Demand equations can be constructed to explain al­
most all of the variation in Euro-dollar liabilities of 
U.S. banks for the 1966-70 period. While the problem of 
the independence of the variables does exist, the pre­
dictive power of the equation is substantial. By using
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first differences some of the predictive power is 
foregone but the problems of multicollinearity and 
autocorrelation are solved.
The 19 70 and 19 71 experience with U.S. bank borrow­
ing of Euro-dollars alters the structure of the model 
used in this dissertation. The increased marginal reserve 
requirements, the change in the definition of cash items 
in process of collection, the lifting of the CD rate 
ceiling, and the influence of tight money in Europe on 
Euro-dollar rates have all combined to make the equations, 
as presently constituted, somewhat less than reliable as 
predictors of future Euro-dollar demand by U.S. banks. 
Prediction, however, was not the primary aim of the re­
gression analysis presented here. Rather, explanation 
was the goal. The determination, quantitatively, of the 
major factors that influenced U.S. bank Euro-dollar 
borrowing in the period considered was undertaken. The 
results were, for the most part, as expected. Generally, 
the monthly flow equations explain somewhat less of the 
variation but overcome some of the disadvantages inherent 
in the stock equations. The weekly flow demand equations 
on the other hand, were unacceptable primarily because 
weekly changes were so erratic. Here the stock equations 
were of more value. All the equations, stock and flow, 
point to the impact of monetary policy on Euro-dollar 
borrowing and, in reverse, the leakage from the effective­
ness of such policy due to bank access to the Euro-dollar 
funds market.
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Further analysis could be undertaken combining the 
best stock and flow variables. In addition, an extension 
of the time period and the specification of an easy money 
subperiod could be undertaken. Whether Euro-dollar 
borrowing, at the considerably lower level now prevailing, 
is affected by the same determinants in the same magnitude 
is questionable. Also, whether this low level of borrowing 
has any appreciable impact on monetary policy in the United 
States is debatable. It would appear, however, that the 
decline in U.S. bank Euro-dollar liabilities in 1971 is 
added proof of the marginal nature of Euro-dollar 
borrowing to U.S. banks and of the importance of monetary 
policy on such borrowing. It may be that the flurry of 
Euro-dollar borrowing in the last half of the 1960's 
was a temporary aberration. Only further experience will 
verify or negate this.
CHAPTER V 
CREDIT CREATION AND MONETARY POLICY
I . Introduction 
The last chapter verified empirically that U.S. 
monetary policy was the primary determinant of Euro­
dollar borrowing by U.S. banks. As measures of this 
policy, the amount of CD's outstanding and interest rate 
differentials served as the best proxies. Previously, 
in Chapter 2, a discussion of the Euro-dollar system 
mechanism was undertaken and a description of the basic 
process by which credit creation can occur in the system 
was given.
In this chapter, a more extensive discussion of 
Euro-dollar credit creation, the Euro-dollar money 
multiplier, and the effects on U.S. and European 
monetary policy of such credit creation will be presented. 
Of primary interest will be an investigation of the 
effects of Euro-dollar credit creaticn on U.S. bank 
borrowing and thus on U.S. monetary policy. It is 
through such borrowing of Euro-dollars that the Euro­
dollar monetary system impinges directly on the U.S.
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monetary system. Further, the substantial intervention
by central banks and official institutions has influenced
credit creation in the Euro-dollar system and, through
U.S. bank borrowing from the system, has affected the
*
efficiency of U.S. monetary policy. The effects of this 
intervention on credit creation in the Euro-dollar 
system and a comparison between Federal Reserve open 
market operations and the evolving open market-type 
operations by European central banks and official 




A. The Money Multiplier in the Euro-dollar System
Two distinctive differences between the U.S. and 
the Euro-dollar monetary systems with regard to credit 
creation were noted in Chapter 2. First, leakages of 
unpredictable magnitude may occur in the Euro-dollar 
system while such leakages in the U.S. system are small 
and usually predictable. Second, the reserves of the 
Euro-dollar system are the created money of another 
monetary system rather than the created money of the 
Euro-dollar system. Thus, credit creation in the system 
depends upon two factors, neither of which is completely 
controllable by the Euro-dollar system itself. To a 
certain extent, these factors can be overcome. Re­
serves may be obtained by exchanging domestic currency 
assets for dollars in the foreign exchange markets and by 
making Euro-dollar deposits more attractive to dollar 
holders. Leakages may be reduced by increasing the 
value to the user of holding Euro-dollar deposits. This 
can be achieved by higher interest rates on deposits and 
by measures designed to increase the availability and 
acceptability of the currency produced. Nonetheless,
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leakages and reserves present the two greatest problems 
to credit creation in the Euro-dollar system.
Theoretically, multiple credit creation in the 
Euro-dollar system,^ with a given level of reserves, 
depends on the percentage of reserves required or 
optionally held on each deposit and upon the loan 
retention ratio. The amount of reserves held will vary 
depending on the number of intermediaries that are used 
before final disposition of the funds is made. Interbank 
lending of Euro-dollars may appreciably increase the 
proportion of the original dollar deposit held as 
reserves and, as such, represents a leakage that reduces 
possible credit creation levels. Basically, the credit 
creation multiplier is equal to the inverse of leakages
•*-The following credit multiplier was developed by 
Swoboda, op. cit., pp. 31-33, 41, and his basic idea and 
notation is used below. His analysis has been con­
siderably expanded here.
2The loan retention ratio represents the pro­
portion of a loan that is redeposited within the system, 
on average.
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out of the system and into other currency assets or 
withheld from circulation in res e r v e s . ^
If the primary deposit is denoted x, the reserve 
ratio a_ (assumed, for simplicity, to be the same for all 
intermediaries, including the final lender), and the 
ratio relent as b=l-ja, then the total amount of Euro­
dollar deposits (original, intermediary, and final loan), 
i.e., gross deposits, are:
(1 ) n _ m i 
G '
i = o
where m is the number of bank intermediaries able to
Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation:...," op,, cit., pp. 
239-242 also discusses the Euro-dollar system multiplier, 
noting the leakages that can occur and the fact that a 
statistical reserve multiplier, based on the keeping of 
reserves of less than 1 0 0% of deposit liabilities, does 
not prove that a positive credit multiplier exists. What 
does prove it, for Machlup (p. 241), is that Euro­
dollar deposits do not equal, but rather exceed, the 
total of net transfers of balances from U.S. to European 
banks plus other dollar payments to European banks.
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operate on the lending-borrowing interest spread.^ Net
deposits after intermediation is netted out are:
(2) D = x+xbm .N
Both (1) and (2) apply before the loan proceeds are 
utilized.
When the borrower utilizes the proceeds of his 
loan either he or the receiver may convert the funds 
into domestic currency. In this case, after clearing, 
all that remains is the original primary Euro-dollar 
deposit. No credit creation has resulted and Djj = x.
Should the creditor redeposit some or all of the 
Euro-dollar funds received (or reconvert the domestic 
currency into dollars and deposit the dollars) into a 
Eurobank, multiple credit creation can occur. Denote 
the proportion of the loan redeposited by the payee as d..
4Swoboda, loc. cit_., refers to gross lending 
rather than to gross deposits. However, only if the 
original deposit is considered a loan would this be gross 
lending. As Machlup correctly notes, original Euro­
dollar deposits are no more to be considered loans than 
are dollar deposits in U.S. banks. Ibid., pp. 223-225. 





The loan based on the original deposit x has induced a 
further deposit of x(bmd) and the creation, after inter­
mediation, of the loan deposit x(bm )2d. Upon use, should
the proceeds of the loan be redeposited, the amount 
in 2x(b d) would begin the next cycle and the final loan 
deposit created would be x(bm )3d2 . Thus, net deposits
Cwithin the Euro-dollar system may be stated as
(3) _ _ n
DN " £  x (bmd) -1
i = 0
where ri is the number of times redeposits of loan funds 
occur. Net loans are
(4) n+1%  =1 X<bma-V .
i = 1
Total Euro-dollar deposits, excluding inter­
mediation accounts between banks, may expand by various 
amounts, depending upon the leakages caused by the com­
bination of reserve holdings, a_, intermediation stages,
This presumes that the Euro-dollar deposit created 
by the final loan clears against the system.
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m, and redeposits rates, ci. The greater is a, the lower 
the amount b that can be lent out. The greater the 
system's loan retention ratio, or redeposit rate, d, 
the more that can be relent. Finally, the higher is m, 
the smaller the amount reaching a final borrower. 
Generally, the lower the reserves held, the fewer the 
intermediation steps (which compound the reserve leakage), 
and the higher the loan retention ratio, the greater the 
amount of Euro-dollars that can be created.
The credit creation or money multiplier can be 
approximated by
(5) M = ________ 1_______  .
1 - bmd
^This is the multiplier obtained by Swoboda, 
o p . cit., p. 41. He takes the limit of the series 
n
(6) £  (hmA)x = l+bmd + (bmd) 2 + (brad )3 + ... + (bmd)n
i = 0
as n _______ . , for bmd<l.
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Table 1 provides an example of Euro-dollar lending and 
redeposits for two stages, after which the funds are lost 
to the system. It also presents net deposits, net loans, 
and the value of the money multiplier. Note in the 
T-accounts and calculation that the E$64 loan 
deposit becomes a E$51 redeposit. Since the loan 
retention ratio is .8 , 20%  of the funds are not recycled 
but rather represent a leakage from the system.
The credit creation multiplier depends on the 
leakages from the system in the same way as do net 
deposits. In reality, the reserves kept by banks on 
Euro-dollar deposits are very low, frequently approaching 
zero. The Eurobanks are able to maintain these low 
reserves because they generally equalize the maturities 
of their Euro-dollar deposits and of their Euro-dollar 
loans or redeposits. Nonetheless, small amounts of 
reserves are kept for working balances purposes and 
to recompense the New York banks for the paperwork 
involved with large volumes of Euro-dollar t r a n s f e r s . ^
7Wxllrams, op. cit., p. 16; Scott, op. cit., p. 10; 
Little, op. cit., pp. 14-16; Klopstock, The Euro-Dollar 
M a r k e t o p . cit., pp. 6-7; Klopstock, "Money Creation 




Eurobank A____________   Eurobank B
$100 U.S. E$100 primary $80 U.S. E$80 deposit of 

















(upon use and 
clearing)
Eurobank C Eurobank D
$51 U.S. E$51 deposit $41 U.S. E$41 deposit of

















(upon use and 
clearing)
Eurobank E Eurobank P





$5 U.S. deposit 
(reserves) 













a = 20% 
b = 80% 
d = 80% 





M__= ____ 1 ________
l - .8 2 • 7s~
M = 1________  _JL





%  = £  x(hmd)x
i = 0
Dn = 100 + 100(.8 2 • .8 ) + 
100(,84 * .82)
%  = 100 + 51 + 26 = E$177
Net Loans 
n+ 1
%  = £  x (bmd- 1 )1
i = 1
I'jj =  1 0 0 (.82 * .81 _ 1 ) +
4 . 9 —1100(.8 .8Z i) +
100(.86 * .83"1)
LN = 64 + 33 + 17 = E$114
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The reserve ratio that prevailed in the last half of 
the 1960's has been estimated to have been between one 
and five percent.®
With regard to the number of intermediaries that 
can exist on the rate spread between borrowing and 
lending interest rates, little information is available. 
It has been reported that spreads of 1/8 percent or less 
were sufficient to induce intermediation by some London 
E u r o - b a n k s .^ Given the normal 1/2 point spread 
between bid and offer rates quoted in the p r e s s , t h r e e  
intermediations could occur before a new deposit is 
relent to a final borrower (assuming the final 
borrower pays the offer rate). With a 50% redeposit
gWilliams, oj>. cit., p. 16; Scott, 0£. cit.,
pp. 1 0 -1 1 .
9Saunders, op> ext., p. 23; Exnzxg, ojo. ext.,
p. 73.
•1-0"Money Rates, " The Economist, last page, 
each issue.
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ratef-*- the money multiplier, M = _______ 1______ , equals
l-bmd
about 1 .8 .
For every new primary deposit of $1 placed in the 
Euro-dollar system, an original deposit of E$1 plus a 
further E$.80 was created. The Euro-dollar system has, 
then, been able to approximately double its size by 
credit creation. It is an example of a fractional 
reserve system, holding reserves of 50% on its deposit 
liabilities (based on the ratios assumed here).
Various writers have attempted to estimate the 
value of the multiplier at work in the Euro-dollar 
system. Klopstock has stated (without supporting 
calculations) that the multiplier varies from 1.5 to
•^The rate assumed may be low since the European 
central banks have practised recycling of Euro-dollar 
funds gained in the foreign exchange market. Machlup, 
"The Magicians...," op. cit., p. 6 , discusses the prob­
ability of redepositing. The lowest probability 
is assigned to the redeposit of loans made to U.S. 
citizens. A somewhat higher probability of redeposit 
attaches to loans to, or investments in debt instruments 
of, non-U.S. non-financial Europe parties. The greatest 
chance of redeposit derives from loans to financial 
Europe individuals. Taken together, the 50% redeposit 
assumed is probably not completely unrealistic. Indeed, 
in 1970 and 1971 the greatest part of Euro-dollar loans 
have been made to financial Europe individuals. See 
"Euro-dollar Banking: —  ?" op,, cit., pp. 12-13.
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1.9.^ He maintains that the redeposit cycle terminates 
at a very early phase since the high level of U.S. bank 
borrowing has drained large quantities of funds from the 
system. However, Klopstock does not take into account 
the recycling activities of the central banks (halted 
in mid-1971 in an attempt to slow the growth of the 
market). In addition, the repayment by U.S. banks of 
over $10 billion of borrowings of what were Euro-dollar 
system reserves in 1970-71 and the increased demand and 
use of Euro-dollar deposits by Europeans in 1971 have 
served, theoretically, to increase the multiplier above 
that postulated by Klopstock.^ a redeposit rate of .8 
(rather than the .5 postulated above) would increase the 
credit creation multiplier to 3.3 or more, ceterus 
paribus.
12Fred Klopstock, The Eurodollar Market: Some Un­
resolved Issues, Essays in International Finance, No.
65 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 8 .
Multiplier values restated to conform to those used above.
•^These events occurred after Klopstock published 
his study. See"Eurodollar Banking:...?" op. cit., pp.
11-12.
160
In contrast to Klopstock, Geoffrey B e l l ^  and 
Milton Friedman-1-5 have argued that the multiplier 
operating in the Euro-dollar system may be a good deal 
larger than 2. That is, for every dollar primary deposit, 
more than one additional Euro-dollar is generated. 
Friedman sees the possibility of an almost infinite 
multiplier while Bell limits his to less than 10.
Friedman bases his thesis on the premise that there are 
few if any reserves kept on Euro-dollar deposits and that 
redeposits are substantial. Bell is less sanguine about 
the redeposit rate but still assumes that there is a 
large reflow into the system.
Most other writers lean to the view that the multi­
plier is quite small but only Klopstock has clearly 
indicated an alternative explanation for the rise in' 
Euro-dollar deposits outstanding over the last decade,-1-5
■^Geoffrey Bell, "Credit Creation Through Euro­
dollars?" The Banker, Vol. 114 (August, 1964), pp. 497- 
498. Multiplier restated.
**-5Friedman, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
16In his "Money Creation...," op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
Klopstock accuses Friedman of confusing what is possible 
with what actually occurs, (p. 1 2 )
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pointed to by Friedman as partial proof of his thesis.
Klopstock attributes the rise in Euro-dollar deposits
not to credit creation but to the attractiveness of the
Euro-dollar investment vehicle. Funds have flowed to
the Euro-dollar market, and, " . . .  in recent years
(Eurobanks) have drained huge balances from major foreign
17money and loan markets." Also, the placement of funds 
in the market by foreign central banks has been sizeable. 
These funds have derived from U.S. balance of payments 
deficits which have placed more dollars in the hands of 
central banks than they have desired to keep for 
reserve purposes.'*'®
The dispute between Friedman and Klopstock over the 
amount of ink in the Euro-dollar bookkeeper's pen (to 
use Friedman's expression) is an empty dialogue. Both 
men are correct in their different frames of reference.
^ Ibid., p. 14.
•*-®The deficit has caused the supply of dollars to 
exceed the demand for dollars at the fixed rates main­
tained in the foreign exchange markets by the European 
central banks. They have, therefore, had to purchase 
these "excess" dollars, ibid.
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Klopstock views the Euro-dollar system from the vantage 
point of reserve flows while Friedman views it primarily 
from the point of reflows. The supply of reserves is a 
necessary condition for the expansion of Euro-dollar 
deposits but to view all such deposits, as Klopstock 
appears to do, as primary deposits is clearly incorrect. 
By the same token, to presume that the overwhelming 
majority of such deposits may be secondary deposits 
(redeposits), as Friedman does, is to ignore the fact 
that leakages of some magnitude do occur and that there 
is some basis required upon which to build Euro-dollar 
deposits. Friedman is persuasive, however, in showing 
that the $9 billion U.S. liquidity deficit over the past 
five years and the less than $5 billion decline in 
central bank dollar holdings do not in any sense equal 
the E$30 billion in deposits outstanding (1969) plus the 
Eurobond issues placed over this period. - The difference 
is clearly the result of credit creation within the 
Euro-dollar system. ^
•^Friedman, pp. cit., p. 4. This ignores, of 
course, the creation of official dollar reserves by the 
BIS, as noted by Machlup, "The Magicians...," op. cit..
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It appears likely that the magnitude of the 
multiplier has increased dramatically in the last few 
years. While U.S. bank borrowing drained reserves from 
the system in the late 1960's and held down credit 
creation,20 the decline in U.S. bank borrowing in 1970-71 
and the increased European demand for Euro-dollar deposits 
allowed greater credit creation and raised the multiplier 
to higher levels. Future credit creation by the system 
may be smaller than that which occurred in the past, 
however. European central banks have stopped recycling
pp. 12-14. The inclusion of these created dollars in 
official reserves thus causes an understatement of the 
decline in central bank dollar holdings. See also 
Machlup's article referred to above, pp. 8-11, for a 
discussion of the discovery by analysts that the 
difference between U.S. liquid liabilities to official 
foreign and foreign exchange holdings of foreign monetary 
authorities was growing larger and larger in the mid- 
to late 1960's. No plausible explanation except Euro- 
dollar-creation appeared possible.
20The sensxtivity of supply to interest rate 
changes may have offset much of this leakage, however.
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dollars gained in foreign exchange operations^! and 
uniform higher reserve requirements, taxes, and other 
discouragements have been under consideration as well. 
These actions will undoubtedly reduce the flow and re­
flow of funds into the Euro-dollar system. Further, 
until the international monetary system is reconstructed, 
capital controls will continue to impede the flow of 
funds across national boundaries. Even with these 
restraints, however, it is doubtful that the supply 
of ink in the bookkeeper’s pen will run completely d r y . 22
B. U.S. Bank Borrowing and Credit Creation
In the last half of the 1960's, U.S. banks steadily 
increased their borrowings of Euro-dollars. Much of 
this increased activity was attributable to tight money 
policies imposed by the Federal Reserve. Euro-dollar
2 ^The dollars gained now are either sold to the 
U.S., exchanged for various Treasury issues, or not 
purchased in the first place (the German floating mark 
case). See "Eurodollar Banking:...?" op. cit., pp. 11- 
13; "Common Market Panel...," loc. cit.; "Europe's Centre! 
Banks...," loc. cit.; "Bundesbank Will Buy...," loc. cit.; 
"Central Banks Ponder...," loc. cit.
22 "Eurodollar Banking:...?" op. cit., pp. 14-15; 
"Central Banks Ponder...," pp. cit., p. 13.
borrowing was a valuable source of funds to individual 
banks but did not bring about any appreciable increase 
in the total U.S. money supply or in total reserves. The 
borrowing did, however, allow an expansion of loans by 
U.S. banks at times when Federal Reserve pressures were 
working to restrict such loans. Beyond the maintenance 
or increase in loan portfolios allowed by Euro-dollar 
borrowing, U.S. banks were able to reduce for one day 
their required reserves by the amount of the borrowing. 
This was allowed, until September, 1969, under Regulation 
D. The draft used to collect the borrowed funds was 
treated as a cash item in process of collection.
Thus, the short term advantage in borrowing 
Euro- dollars was the reduction in required reserves.
The long term advantage derived from obtaining funds 
upon which reserves were not required. Both these 
advantages were reduced by Federal Reserve amendment of 
the relevant regulations in 1969.
Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks has had major 
effects on the Euro-dollar system. On its face, this 
major leakage of reserves must reduce severely the 
amount of credit that can be created in the Euro-dollar
166
system. However, to the extent that the additional 
credit created in the U.S. as a result of these 
borrowings generates higher U.S. incomes and thus higher 
U.S. imports, some of the dollars will flow back into the 
Euro-dollar system. In addition, the higher Euro-dollar 
interest rates generated by the increased U.S. bank 
borrowing have drawn more funds into the Euro-dollar 
market. While it is likely that a complete offset to 
the leakage caused by U.S. bank borrowing did not occur 
in past years, nonetheless, U.S. credit creation based 
on these borrowings may have had some positive effect 
(as well as the direct negative effect) on Euro-dollar 
system reserves.
Mention must also be made of the effect that money 
creation by the Euro-dollar system has on U.S. banks.
This may seem quite obvious. Credit creation in the 
system has no effect on U.S. banks since it is not 
Euro-dollar deposits that U.S. banks borrow but rather 
Euro-dollar system reserves, and Eurobanks can not 
"create" these reserves. Yet, if they can not "create" 
reserves, they can, as a group and individually, obtain 
more of them. While U.S. banks individually can obtain
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reserves by selling assets and thereby altering the com­
position of their asset structures, U.S. banks as a 
group can not "create" more reserves. One bank gains 
reserves at the expense of another. Eurobanks individu­
ally can also alter their asset structures to gain more 
reserves. But no Eurobank need lose reserves as a con­
sequence of this alteration.
The Eurobank desiring more U.S. bank deposits 
(Euro-dollar system reserves) may sell non-deposit 
dollar assets in the United States. This will provide 
additional dollar deposits in U.S. banks. However, 
since these dollar assets may be minimal, Eurobanks 
may also sell domestic currency assets at home. The 
domestic reserves gained may then be converted into 
dollars (U.S. bank deposits) in the foreign exchange 
market. Neither of these actions (sale of dollar assets 
or of domestic assets and conversion) adversely affects 
either U.S. banks or other Eurobanks. They merely 
transfer ownership of the deposit previously held by a 
U.S. citizen or by the foreign central bank to the 
Eurobank. Indeed, if the central bank sells dollars 
it holds with the Federal Reserve, the deposit is
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transferred to a U.S. commercial bank with ownership to 
the Eurobank. This increases U.S. bank reserves.
Eurobank activity, then, may increase U.S. system 
reserves. Whether this occurs or not, the Eurobank 
has obtained more reserves. While the Eurobanks do not 
create these reserves they do gain the use of them. The 
Federal Reserve can control the absolute amount of 
dollar system reserves and the various European central 
banks can control, equally, the volume of domestic 
currency reserves in their systems. However, neither 
has directly controlled the amount of Euro-dollar system 
reserves. The limits on Eurobank reserve gains are 
therefore set by strictures placed on asset composition, 
the actual magnitude of these assets, and the price they 
are willing to pay for such reserves.
Credit creation by the Euro-dollar system has pre­
sented U.S. banks with competition in the provision of a 
transactions medium and in the provision of new loans.^3
23 . . .Some extensive discussions of the competitive
effects of the development of the Euro-dollar system have
been published. This particular topic is beyond the
scope of the present paper, except tangentially. See,
for an exceptionally clear and original exposition,
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The competitive aspects of the production of a new 
dollar asset by less regulated non-U.S. banks can not 
be underestimated. While credit creation by the Euro­
dollar system may have no direct effect on U.S. banks 
(or, at most a temporarily positive one), indirectly 
Euro-dollar credit creation has meant the growth of 
a very competitive source of dollar denominated bank 
deposits and loans.
Euro-dollar credit creation has also affected 
individual U.S. banks. They find themselves in a 
more competitive atmosphere and, in addition, the 
deposits they have issued to foreigners are generally 
more volatile than domestically held deposits. The 
shifting of ownership of the deposit and the 
movement of the deposit into and out of
Swoboda, op. pit., pp. 11-14, 17-22. Also see Helmut 
Mayer, Some Theoretical Problems Relating to the Euro- 
Dollar Market, Essays in International Finance, No. 79 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 26-
31; Williams, op. cit., pp. 27-29; Bloch, pp. cit., pp. 
22-24; Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation:...," op. cit.. 
p. 243; and Makowski, pp. cit., p. 182.
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particular banks may require the banks to hold an 
increased level of reserves.^4 The higher reserve ratio 
reduces credit creation possibilities in the U.S. system 
and represents a leakage from the system. This is one of 
the penalties borne by a system whose currency serves as 
an international money.
The effects on European banks individually and 
collectively of credit creation in the Euro-dollar system 
are quite varied. The existence of the Euro-dollar system 
presents to the banking institutions of these countries 
competitive problems similar to those faced by U.S. 
banks. Borrowers and depositors now have an alternative 
monetary system available to them. Its currency is 
accepted by creditors and convertible into other currencies 
on demand. The Eurobanks generate both dollar denominated 
and home currency loans and deposits. They appear to be in 
a more favorable position than their counterparts in the 
United States since they offer a broader product line than 
U.S. banks. However, this difference is more apparent than
This is, at least, the normal assumption made. 
Greater volatility requires a higher safety margin of re­
serves. John Leimone, "The Euro-dollar Market: An Element
in Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Monthly 
Review, Vol. 53, Mo. 8 (August, 1968), p.4, notes that in­
creased Euro-dollar transactions tend to substitute more 
volatile demand deposits for less volatile time deposits.
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real for large U.S. banks have international facilities 
and can lend any currency desired (or they can lend 
dollars that can be converted into the desired currency).
The development of the Euro-dollar system has re­
duced the market power of the banks in particular 
countries. Cartel arrangements among national banks in 
Europe had tended to reduce competition in the money 
m a r k e t s . T h e  Euro-dollar system, however, makes 
available to prospective borrowers and depositors a wide 
range of institutions and its international character has 
tended to undermine the cartel arrangements that 
previously e x i s t e d . T h e  Euro-banks face competition 
from other Eurobanks and also from banks in the United 
States.
The effect of Euro-dollar credit creation on Euro­
pean monetary systems is substantial. Borrowers of 
Euro-dollars may, at their option, convert loan proceeds
2^Bloch, loc. cit.; Swoboda, loc. cit.
26Ronald McKinnon, Private and Official Inter­
national Money: The Case for the Dollar, Essays in
International Finance, No. 74 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969), p. 21.
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into domestic currency in the foreign exchange markets.
The central bank must supply the home currency in order 
to maintain the par value of its currency. Therefore, 
without offsetting monetary policy, the existence of the 
Euro-dollar system and the availability of funds from it 
(and through the foreign exchange markets the availability 
of domestic currency) will increase the money supply in 
the home country. The lack of control over the creation 
of Euro-dollars combined with foreign exchange market 
requirements means that an additional uncontrollable 
source of domestic liquidity is available to home citizens.
The central banks can, of course, reduce Euro­
dollar system reserves by holding the dollars gained in 
these transactions. Further, they can offset the inflow 
of domestic purchasing power by restrictive monetary 
policy. These actions may not be desirable to the central 
bank forced to take them, however. In addition, they 
may be counterproductive, attracting greater amounts of 
foreign purchasing power due to high interest rates.
U.S. bank borrowing of Euro-dollars has had 
several effects on the European countries. Since such 
borrowing reduces the reserves of the system, it reduces
173
the credit creating power of the system and thus the 
possible impact on European domestic liquidity. On the 
other hand, U.S. bank borrowing has driven up Euro-dollar 
interest rates and has tended to draw funds into the 
system.27 This flow of funds transmits the high rates 
prevailing in the Euro-dollar system to the various 
national systems and may offset easy money policies being 
pursued by the central banks. Also, the flow of funds 
replenishes Euro-dollar system reserves lost due to U.S. 
bank borrowing and allows continued credit creation to 
occur. The net result of these forces may be a continued 
flow of liquidity into the national systems, since the 
credit creating power of the Euro-dollar system remains 
substantial.
To summarize, U.S. bank borrowing reduces the 
reserves and the credit creation capabilities of the 
Euro-dollar system. It also tends to transmit to other 
national money markets high interest rates prevailing in 
the U.S. during times of tight money. Finally, it tends
27Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...," 
op . cit.. p. 73.
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to draw funds from these money markets into the Euro­
dollar system (and then to the U.S.) depleting fund 
supplies in these countries.
Credit creation in the Euro-dollar system has 
little direct effect on U.S. banks since these banks 
borrow, ultimately, the reserves of the Euro-dollar 
system and these reserves are limited in magnitude. 
Indirectly, credit creation assists the Eurobanks to 
compete in the production of dollar denominated assets 
with U.S. banks. However, while Euro-dollar credit 
creation has made it easier for these banks to compete 
with U.S. banks, it has also introduced competition into 
the European banking system. Finally, credit creation 
in the Euro-dollar system introduces into the various 
European monetary systems both leakages and injections' 
of funds over which the central banks have exerted less 
than full control.
The following section is concerned with the various 
actions central banks can take to offset the effects of 
Euro-dollar credit creation. It concludes with a 
brief discussion of the similarity between Federal Re­
serve open market operations and the evolving policy of
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the European central banks with regard to the Euro­
dollar system.
III. Official Intervention and Credit Creation
A. Central Bank Investment O p e r a t i o n s ^ ®
Until fairly recently, European central banks 
entered the Euro-dollar market primarily for investment 
purposes and for domestic stabilization reasons. The 
actions of these banks were generally uncoordinated and 
were aimed at solving specific national problems. The 
banks have found, however, that the multinational scope 
of the Euro-dollar system makes it quite difficult to 
exert any control over the system.
From the return to convertibility in 1958 until 
the surge of Euro-dollar borrowing by the U.S. banks in 
1969, there were few controls on the operation of the
2®Clendenning, oja. cit.. pp. 44-45 indicates that 
investment activities did not play a major role in cen­
tral bank intervention or participation in the market. 
Others, however, note the use of the market for such pur­
poses and indicate the investment was a primary reason 
for these banks' entry. The fact of recycling, which was 
undertaken constantly over several years, implies in­
vestment as well as stabilization goals. See, on this 
point, "Eurodollar Banking:...?" o£. cit., p. 13 and the 
various Wall Street Journal articles referred to in this 
chapter. Williams, op. cit., p. 10 also supports this 
view.
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29Euro-dollar market. This is not to say that central 
banks did not enter the market during this time but rather 
that it was basically a free market with few real re­
strictions. The central banks operated within the market 
structure and did not attempt to change it. As noted in 
Chapter 3, central banks have been active suppliers of 
Euro-dollar funds and, in a few cases, they have been 
demanders of funds as well. They have supplied funds 
both in order to gain a high interest return and also 
in an attempt to control domestic liquidity or offset 
the effects of window dressing activities by their 
commercial banks.
The investment activities of the European central 
banks eventually generated difficulties which they had 
not anticipated. The stabilization policies were less 
disruptive, in the long term, than were the investment 
activities since the former were temporary in nature.
29 "Euro-dollars: A Changing Market," pp. cit.,
pp. 779-784; Donald Hodgman, Euro-Dollars and National 
Monetary Policies, Irving Economic Study (New York: 
Irving Trust Co., 1971 (?)), pp. 13-24.
^^illiams, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
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Central banks have kept dollars as international
reserves for many years. Many of these reserves were
placed in various money market instruments in the United
States or in deposit balances at the Federal Reserve or
commercial banks. As the Euro-dollar market developed
it was a logical extension of these banks' basic
investment policies to place dollar funds in the
31investment vehicles offered in this market. Placement
of funds in the system gave the central banks an
;opportunity to keep the funds closer to home, allowed 
them to assist their banks in competing with U.S. banks, 
and perhaps most important, enabled them to earn a 
higher return on their reserves than was available in 
the U.S.
^ T h e  facilities of the BIS offer an alternative 
to the direct placement of these excess dollar reserves. 
Central banks may deposit dollars with the BIS and the 
BIS then invests the dollars gained in Euro-dollar 
instruments. Thus, whether the central banks or the BIS 
redeposit the dollars in the Euro-dollar market, the 
system becomes more closed and leakages from it are 
reduced. Machlup, "The Magicians...," o£. cit., pp. 11- 
13 illustrates this process and notes not only the Euro­
dollar credit creation that can result from this 
activity but also the reserve dollar creation occurring 
through BIS issuance of dollar deposit liabilities.
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In addition, as the basic U.S. balance of payments 
continued to worsen, an ever increasing amount of dollars 
flowed into these central banks. These became excess 
international reserves but, given the precarious con­
dition of the gold exchange standard, all the dollars 
could not be converted into gold or own currencies at the 
U.S. Treasury. Further, there was little reason to wish 
to convert the excess dollars into sterile non-yielding 
gold balances.32 Thus, the dollars were placed in the 
Euro-dollar system for the return they could bring.
It appears that the central banks did not realize 
the consequences that could result from their investment 
activities. The flow of funds into the Euro-dollar 
system that these banks originated was a flow of Euro­
dollar system reserves. These primary deposits allowed 
the creation of additional Euro-dollar deposits 
(derivative deposits) and thus assisted in the growth of 
the Euro-dollar system.
^That is, there was no reason to obtain non­
yielding gold except the feeling that ultimate value 
rested in gold and that there were/are risks involved in 
maintaining a position in national currencies, especially 
ones that may be devalued.
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The effects of this central bank supported 
expansion of Euro-dollar deposits were several. First, 
the Euro-dollar deposit expansion allowed the Euro­
dollar system to develop into a strong and mature 
monetary system able to engage in a great many financial 
operations. Further, this development fed upon itself, 
making the Euro-dollar an acceptable currency for more 
and more kinds of transactions. Also, the market's 
strength and breadth attracted additional funds 
suppliers, further increasing its reserve base.
Second, the expansion allowed the system to extend 
ever larger amounts of loans. These loans were sometimes 
converted to domestic currencies and were sometimes used 
in the form in which they were received. As noted above, 
the conversion of Euro-dollar loans/deposits into 
domestic currency increases the liquidity of the parti­
cular economy i n v o l v e d . ^3 The central bank must supply 
the funds for this expansion if it is to maintain the
33Williams, o£. cit.. pp. 39-40 discusses the 
effects of Euro-dollar lending on other countries. He 
notes the implications of this lending on interest rate 
policy, on credit policy, on central banks, and on the 
attempts by these banks to deal with speculative flows.
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par value of its currency vis-a-vis the dollar. The 
receiving central bank, having added to its dollar 
reserves, normally reinvested (recycled) the funds by 
purchasing Euro-dollar system instruments, i.e., by 
placing the dollars in Euro-dollar deposits. The 
potential leakage from the Euro-dollar system represented 
by the conversion of Euro-dollar deposits into domestic 
currency was halted and a further expansion of Euro­
dollar deposits was made possible by the central bank 
redeposits.
Third, the expansion greatly sensitized the 
European money markets to various international 
pressures, especially those emanating from the United 
States.34 A restricted availability of funds in the 
United States, such as the 1969 experience, tends to 
drive up interest rates both in the U.S. and, as demand
3 4Scott, o£>. cit., pp. 17-27 has an especially com­
plete discussion of this integration of national money 
markets. See also C.P. Kindleberger, "The Euro-Dollar 
and the Internationalization of United States Monetary 
Policy," Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro Quarterly Review,
No. 88 (March, 1969), pp. 13-15.
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is diverted from the U.S. money market to the Euro-dollar 
market, in the Euro-dollar market as well. Funds from 
various European money markets are then drawn into the 
Euro-dollar market and, as supply drops in the national 
money markets, domestic interest rates are driven up.
The rise in rates may contradict the monetary authorities' 
policy goals.
A rise in rates in the national money market can be 
countered by an increased supply of reserves to the banks, 
provided by the central bank. This response may not have 
the desired effect of lowering interest rates, however, 
because the funds may leak out of the national system and 
into the Euro-dollar system as rapidly as they are 
supplied. Unless the central bank is able and willing to 
supply sufficient funds to offset the restricted avail­
ability of funds in the U.S., there appears to be little 
that can be done to keep domestic rates down without re­
sorting to various capital controls to staunch the outflow.
When reserves become more readily available 
in the United States, as they did in 1970, a reduced 
demand for Euro-dollars by U.S. banks results. This 
occurs because Euro-dollars are a relatively
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expensive alternative source of funds to the b a n k s .
The reduced demand will tend to pull down Euro-dollar 
market rates and national money market rates. While 
the pressure on those countries attempting to maintain 
easy money may abate, the pressures deriving from the 
Euro-dollar system on those countries implementing 
tight money will become severe. The 1970-71 German 
case illustrates this d i l e m m a . A s  U.S. reserve 
availability increased, U.S. banks reduced their Euro­
dollar borrowing and paid off those liabilities out­
standing. This reduced demand drove interest rates down 
in the Euro-dollar market. The reduced cost of funds 
drew German borrowers into the market and discouraged
^Wallach, oja. cit., pp. 13-14 has written that 
Euro-dollar borrowing would not decline with the easing 
of money in the United States because interest rates . 
would move down in the Euro-dollar market in sequence 
with U.S. rates. However, the availability of funds 
from U;S. sources in amounts in excess of those desired 
by U.S. banks has meant a reduction in, rather than the 
maintenance of, Euro-dollar borrowing by the banks.
See Coombs, o]d . cit. (March, 1971 and September, 
1970), and Hodgman, loc. cit.
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German suppliers from entering it. The combination of 
increased loanable funds supplies in Germany and reduced 
borrowing in Germany tended to push interest rates down 
and increased the liquidity of the German economy. The 
Bundesbank could have reinforced its tight money policy 
by further restrictive actions but, again, it would have 
been necessary to reduce reserve availability by some 
proportion of the incoming funds and increased domestic 
supplies.
!As is evident, the Euro-dollar system and credit 
creation therein has served as a conduit for the trans­
mission of monetary pressures from the United States to 
European countries. Only if all these countries, 
including the United States, were "in phase" would this 
this problem be minimized.37 The pressures flow primarily 
from the U.S. to the European countries, a situation not 
unlike pre-Euro-dollar system days. The development of
37"Eurodollar Banking:...?" o£. cit., p. 12. But 
as Hodgman, o jd . cit., p. 14 notes, the impact of the 
operation of the Euro-dollar market can not be completely 
eliminated even when the business cycle phases in 
various countries coincide.
this system has merely intensified and quickened the
38transmission of the pressures. The size of the 
U.S. economy# the importance of the dollar in world 
trade generally and as the reserve currency of the 
Euro-dollar system in particular# and the present 
system of precariously fixed exchange rates have 
combined to make conditions prevailing in the U.S. 
felt in the European countries quite rapidly.
Reverse pressures do not seem to be particularly 
important except during periods of exchange rate 
speculation. Even then the U.S. is relatively 
isolated from these pressures. Euro-dollar borrowing
38Hodgman# op. cit., p. 29; Kindleberger# op., cit. 
pp. 12-14; "The Future of the Dollar#" First National 
City Bank Monthly Economic Letter (November# 1970), 
p. 125.
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by U.S. banks in times of tight money may, as noted, 
ease reserve stringencies but the Federal Reserve can 
offset these inflows more easily than can their counter­
parts in European countries. Euro-dollar inflows 
contribute a smaller proportion to U.S. liquidity 
than they do to European liquidity.39 Further, the 
reserve status of the dollar under the international 
exchange standard does not require an open end 
commitment to support its value in the foreign 
exchange markets as is the case with other countries' 
currencies.
To conclude, the investment activities of the 
European central banks have been aimed at maximizing the 
return on reserves that could not readily be transformed
39Williams, ojd. cit., pp. 43-45.
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into gold or domestic currency. These operations fed the 
growth of the Euro-dollar system and allowed increased 
credit creation to occur. This resulted in the central 
banks' loss of complete control over the liquidity of the 
domestic system and sensitized the money markets to 
conditions prevailing in the United States. These problems 
have until recently been attacked by piecemeal responses 
that have been of limited effectiveness. Section C will 
discuss these responses and those which have been 
contemplated.
B. Central Bank Stabilization Activities
European central banks and official institutions 
have also entered the Euro-dollar market for domestic 
stabilization purposes. To maintain interest rate 
structures, for instance, these central banks have 
frequently bought Euro-dollars at quarterly bank statement 
dates as commercial banks attempted to temporarily convert 
their dollar assets into domestic currency for window 
dressing purposes. After the statement date, the central 
banks have resupplied these Euro-dollars to the banks.
Swap arrangements and repurchase agreements have also been 
used, in addition to outright purchases and later resales. 
Central banks have also entered the Euro-dollar market to
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control domestic liquidity levels, especially
during times of exchange rate speculation when "hot"
money flows have threatened to dry up or flood the
40domestic money markets.
Any action by a central bank which supplies funds 
to the Euro-dollar system will, as with investment 
actions, supply reserves to the system and support 
credit expansion by the system. However, these 
stabilization activities may not be particularly 
important over the long term since they are relatively 
temporary in nature and are reversed when the pressures 
they are designed to offset subside. Only to the 
extent that there may be trends at work for which 
there must be constant compensations will these 
activities have a long term effect. Under- or over-valued
40The above and following paragraphs are based 
upon the descriptions of stabilization activities in 
Williams, op. cit., pp. 10-11 as well as on Clendenning, 
op. cit., pp. 43-45; Kvasnicka, op., cit., p. 12; 
Klopstock, The Euro-Dollar Market..., op. cit., pp. 2-3; 
Helmut Mayer, op. cit., pp. 12-15.
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exchange rates, for instance, may require fairly
constant stabilization activities.
The following section discusses recent European
central bank operations in the Euro-dollar system. It
draws a parallel between these operations and Federal
Reserve open market operations in the U.S. money markets.
41C. Open Market Operations
In 1970 and 1971 European central banks, together 
with the BIS, realized that their activities in the 
Euro-dollar narket were at least partially responsible
The first use of the term open market operations 
to describe official intervention in the Euro-dollar 
market with the aim of influencing credit creation in 
that system was made in "Eurodollar Banking:...?" op. 
cit. (July; 1971), p. 13. Previously, mention of 
multipliers and the like appeared in the Wall Street 
Journal. Gaines, "Public Policy Issues," ojo. cit., pp. 
2-4 has applauded the Treasury's decision to issue bonds 
to soak up the excess Euro-dollars. Its acceptance of 
its ultimate responsibility for the supply of dollars 
in the world markets is commended by Gaines. There is 
some question as to the logic of this. Why, for. 
instance, should Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks be 
viewed as undesirable but Treasury borrowing of these 
same Euro-dollars be commended? A distinction between 
the effects of the borrowing by the two types of 
institution may be drawn (especially with reference to 
the efficiency of monetary policy) but if the goal is 
the control of the world supply of dollars, then it 
makes no difference what U.S. institution does the 
borrowing. Indeed, it may be more desirable to have the 
banks do the borrowing.
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for that system's remarkable g r o w t h . T h e y  had become 
more and more concerned with the effects the Euro-dollar 
system was having on their own particular monetary 
systems, especially with regard to the frequent con­
tradiction by the system of monetary policy goals of the 
central banks. The various currency crises, particularly 
that in the spring of 1971 when the mark came under 
extraordinary pressure, and in which the Euro-dollar 
market played a major role in facilitating the destabi­
lizing money movements, crystallized the central banks' 
determination to take measures to counteract the in­
fluence of the Euro-dollar system.
In 1969 various controls were instituted by some of 
the central banks in an attempt to limit the movements of 
funds into and out of their c o u n t r i e s .^3 Primarily,
^2This realization has been evident from the reports 
on various meetings held by European central banks. See, 
on this topic, "Europe's Central Banks Agree...," loc. 
cit.; "Drive for Eurodollar Curbs Called Aided,...," loc. 
cit.; "Central Banks Ponder...," loc. cit.
43 "Euro-dollarss A Changing Market," loc. cit.; 
Hodgman, op,. cit., pp. 13-24.
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the desire then was to reduce the flow of funds being 
drawn into the Euro-dollar system by the high rates pre­
vailing there. These flows adversely affected the 
balance of payments of the countries experiencing the 
outflows. These controls were placed on the domestic 
banks and were only mildly successful since British banks 
were still free of these controls and were the center of 
the market. Further, the movement of funds by individuals 
was not particularly restricted.
The combination of events in 1969 was quite dis­
similar to the situation which prevailed in late 1970 
and in early 1971. In 1969 U.S. banks borrowed heavily 
in the market at a time when tight money policies were in 
effect in both the U.S. and in Germany. There were, 
therefore, no contradictory pressures existing between 
these two systems. Other European countries, however, 
were attempting to maintain somewhat easier monetary 
policies than those prevailing in the U.S. and Germany. 
They were generally able to offset the pressures to­
ward higher rates emanating from the Euro-dollar system
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by continued increases in the liquidity of their 
44systems.
In the more recent period (1970-71), U.S. banks 
paid back much of their massive Euro-dollar 
liabilities. This tended to drive interest rates 
down in the Euro-dollar market. In addition, upward 
revaluation of several European currencies was expected 
by many currency speculators. Thus, the pressures 
arising from the Euro-dollar market were substantially 
different from those of 1969.
While funds were being drawn out of the national 
systems, in 1969, funds were flowing into the systems in 
1970-71. Germany, continuing its attempt to maintain 
tight money and facing large balance of payments sur­
pluses which placed its currency under upward valuation 
pressures, was presented with Euro-dollar system 
influences that were completely inimical to its 
requirements. Other countries, including Switzerland, 
Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands also were ex­
periencing revaluation pressures and consequent
44For a comprehensive report on these developments 
see the articles by Coombs, op. cit. (March and 
September of each year), various pages.
45inflows of funds. The U.S., with a continuing massive 
balance of payments problem, supplied additional dollars 
to the system.
The Euro-dollar system provided a convenient 
source of funds to speculators. Once borrowed, the 
Euro-dollar funds could be converted into the 
currencies that were likely candidates for revaluation. 
This, of course, forced more unwanted dollars into the 
central banks which, if recycled, would wind up right 
back in their reserves on the next circuit. In 1969 
several European' currencies were under speculative 
attack as candidates for devaluation. Hot money 
flowed from these currencies into the Euro-dollar system. 
In contrast, in 1970 and 1971, the dollar came under 
speculative attack and hot money flowed into these 
currencies. These tremendous flows of very volatile
45Ibid.
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funds at last brought action from the central banks. 
This action is remarkably similar in effect to that 
generated by open market operations of the Federal 
Reserve in the United States.
Federal Reserve open market operations involve 
the sale or purchase of bonds and the consequent 
reduction or increase in bank reserve levels. The 
Euro-dollar system, however, operates in a manner 
slightly different from the U.S. monetary system. 
Eurobonds do not play a major role in the 
availability of reserves in this system. ^ 6 pother,
46This xs not to say that such bonds could not 
play an important role in the future. Should a 
sufficient quantity of these Eurobonds be outstanding 
and a portion be held by the central banks or other 
official authorities, this vehicle could be used to 
control reserve levels.
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the reserves of the Euro-dollar system are not created by 
European central banks but rather are merely U.S. bank 
deposits. To affect these reserves and thereby credit 
creation by the system requires adding or withdrawing U.S. 
bank deposits from the system.
The Euro-dollar open market is a market for dollar 
deposits. Bids for and offers of deposits are made in a 
manner similar to bids and offers in the U.S. (bond) open 
market or in the Federal Funds market. The central banks 
may, therefore, supply reserves to the market or drain them 
from the market by offering or bidding for Euro-dollar 
deposits. In this way they may influence reserve 
availability in the system.
In addition to the difference in the type of open 
market and instruments used, the goals of the authorities 
vary somewhat. In the Euro-dollar system, the central 
banks attempt to influence reserves and credit creation not 
to affect national income, directly, but rather to alter or 
lessen the impact of the system on foreign exchange markets, 
central bank reserves, domestic money markets, and domestic 
monetary policy efficiency. Certainly, the final impact is 
on national income unless compensatory actions are taken, 
but the goals supporting interference are different from 
those in the U.S. In Europe, the direct effect of the
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Euro-dollar system on the exchange rate and central bank 
reserves may often be the primary causal factor behind 
these central bank open market operations. Rarely is 
this the goal of open market operations in the United 
States.
While the type of market is somewhat different and 
the immediate goals of the operations may vary between 
the Federal Reserve and European central banks, the same 
basic tool or measure (bank reserves) is utilized in both 
cases. Control of reserve balances brings a measure of 
control of the credit creating abilities of the system 
involved. In the U.S., the control of credit creation is 
undertaken for domestic stabilization. Within the Euro­
dollar system, control is desired in order to moderate 
the effects of Euro-dollar flows on the various national 
systems and upon exchange rate fluctuations. The "hot" 
money flows that upset exchange rate relationships and the 
flow of funds into and out of the national systems in 
search of maximum safety or interest returns involves the 
transmission of monetary pressures between the U.S. and 
Europe. These open market operations by the European 
central banks may influence to some degree the impact, of 
these flows on the national systems.
The operations at present consist of attempts by
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major European central banks to cooperate in their 
deposit policies, in the spring of 1971 these banks 
first agreed to withhold new deposits from the Euro­
dollar system.^ That is, they decided that for the 
present they would not recycle dollar funds gained in 
their foreign exchange market operations. Later, they 
further agreed that, in addition to withholding "new" 
deposits, they would withdraw selectively some of 
the funds already placed in the Euro-dollar system. 
These actions, of course, reduce the reserves and thus 
the credit creating potential of the system and its 
impact on the various national economies.
The BIS has also been active in placing funds in 
the Euro-dollar system over the years and has gained a 
wide knowledge of the operations and mechanics of the 
Euro-dollar system. It appears to be developing into
47 "Europe's Central Banks...," loc. cit.« "Central 
Banks Ponder...," loc. cit.? "A Step to Slow Eurodollar 
Flows," Business Week, No. 2175 (May 15, 1971), pp. 
110-111.
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the primary coordinator of European central bank actions 
to influence the Euro-dollar system's reserves.^ The 
U.S. Treasury has been cooperating in these attempts to 
control the Euro-dollar system. Since withholding and 
withdrawing funds from the system means that large 
amounts of dollar funds accumulate in central bank 
reserves, the U.S. has moved to provide alternative 
investment vehicles to these banks to soak up their 
excess dollars. It has issued large amounts of bonds 
to the central banks providing a relatively high rate 
of i n t e r e s t . I n  addition, in order to moderate the 
return flow of funds from U.S. banks to the Euro­
dollar system, the Treasury and the Export-Import Bank 
have issued special securities to U.S. bank foreign
"A First Step to Curb the Eurodollar Market," 
Business Week, No. 2181 (June 19, 1971), p. 35.
SOIbid.; "Bundesbank Will Buy...," loc. cit.; 
"Euro-dollar Banking:...?" ojd. cit., pp. 13-14.
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branches to soak up some of these funds (and Euro­
dollar system reserves as well).51 These actions have 
immobilized large quantities of Euro-dollar reserves 
and have limited the expansion of credit by the system.
Finally, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, as the 
operating arm of the Federal Reserve System, has experi­
mented with intervention in the forward market for marks 
in order to decrease the incentive that has existed to 
swap Euro-dollars for marks.52 That is, it has attempted 
to reduce the gains possible from interest arbitrage and 
thus slow the flow of dollar funds to the Bundesbank.
This action, of course, really reduces leakages from the 
Euro-dollar system and encourages credit creation. In 
any case, it was not particularly successful and was 
halted.
The first conscious effort to influence credit 
creation by the Euro-dollar system has been undertaken
51"Treasury, Seeking to Sop Up Eurodollars, Offers 
New Issue to U„S. Banks Abroad," Wall Street Journal 
(July 20, 1971), p. 6 ; Gaines, "Public Policy Issues," 
loc. cit.• "Treasury Slates...," loc. cit. These issues 
were allowed to mature in late 1971 during the floating 
exchange rates period that existed then.
52"New York Reserve Experiment," loc. cit.
by these institutions. Previously, all these groups 
had influenced the system, but in a haphazard manner.
Each had its own motives and goals and these frequently 
conflicted with the goals of the others. As with the 
operation of the present international monetary 
standard, cooperation is essential to the operation of 
any effective controls on the Euro-dollar system. The 
Federal Reserve does not follow the goal of yield maxi­
mization and the official institut i.ons that are 
attempting to affect the Euro-dollar system will have 
to do likewise. They must subordinate their desire to 
maximize income in order to develop effective stabili­
zation or credit creation control policies for the 
Euro-dollar system.
The United States has provided alternative 
investment vehicles to alleviate the loss of income this 
subordination entails and to moderate returning dollar 
flows to the Euro-dollar system from U.S. banks. Further, 
the dollars gained by the Treasury through the sale of 
bonds to the European central banks has had the side 
effect of reducing the demands made on the U.S. money 
markets by Treasury deficit financing. This, of
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course, has had the effect of reducing interest rates 
in U.S. money markets and driving more funds into the 
Euro-dollar system, reducing rates there.
It appears that the situation created by central 
bank investment and recycling activities in the Euro­
dollar system may be brought under control through the 
coordinated efforts of the various official 
institutions involved. Direct controls, such as the 
institution of uniform reserve requirements are also 
under consideration.53 They will probably be necessary 
in order to domesticate the Euro-dollar system fully. 
These measures may well be less than completely 
effective in controlling the market, however, since the 
Euro-dollar system is not tied to a particular 
country or area. As one U.S. banker said, in response 
to the contemplated regulation of the Euro-dollar system, 
"If they start regulating the Eurodollar market, we'll
53 "Drive for Eurodollar Curbs Called Aided,...," 
loc. cit. 7 "Common Market Panel...," loc. cit.; "Central 
Banks Ponder...," loc. cit.
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just open a branch in Kinshasa and call them Congo 
d o l l a r s . C o o p e r a t i o n  or coordination of policies, 
thus, is a primary requirement for any effective control 
of the system5  ̂ but may not be sufficient for such 
control. Capital controls may also be necessary to gain 
complete control.
"Central Banks Ponder...," op. cit., p. 13.
55Such coordination was suggested by former 
Federal Reserve Board chairman, William M. Martin, in 
September, 1970. See "International Control of Euro­
dollar Market Suggested by Former Reserve Board Chief," 
Wall Street Journal (September 15, 1970), p. 5. Some 
form of open market operations utilizing the BIS as 
an international central bank was suggested by 
Kindleberger, loc. cit. The foresight of this 
suggestion was a rare insight in an otherwise super­
ficial article.
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To the extent that the major European central 
banks control a significant part of the reserves of 
the system, however, open market operations may be 
effective in moderating credit creation by the system 
no matter where it is physically located. Should this 
be the case, the destabilizing effects of such creation 
on monetary conditions and exchange rate structures may 
be lessened appreciably and capital controls may not 
be required.
The following chapter is concerned specifically 
with the effects of U.S. bank borrowing on the 
efficiency of U.S. monetary policy. Credit creation 
as such by the Euro-dollar system will not be important 
since reserves rather than deposits are borrowed by 
U.S. banks. However, flows of new funds into the 
system in response to this borrowing will be important.
CHAPTER VI
EURO-DOLLAR BORROWING AND U.S. MONETARY POLICY
I. Introduction
More has been written about the impact of U.S. bank 
Euro-dollar borrowing on U.S. monetary policy than on any 
other aspect of the Euro-dollar phenomenon. This relative 
profusion has not, however, been accompanied by any agree­
ment on the complex interactions that occur between Euro­
dollar borrowing and U.S. monetary policy. The purpose 
of this chapter is to outline the major effects of U.S. 
bank Euro-dollar borrowing on the efficiency of U.S. 
monetary policy. In addition, some mention of Federal 
Reserve controls on this borrowing will be made and the 
future effect of Euro-dollar borrowing on monetary policy 
will be postulated.
Basically, this chapter concludes that the 
effectiveness, of a given degree of monetary tightness in 
the U.S. is influenced both positively and negatively by 
Euro-dollar borrowing. The positive aspects occur 
through the transmission of monetary policy to all the 
banks in the system more rapidly than was the case prior 
to the existence of Euro-dollar borrowing. Additionally,
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a more even impact on the various classes of banks of a 
given monetary policy is postulated. The availability 
of Euro-dollars to U.S. banks has apparently reduced the 
discriminatory impact of monetary policy on certain U.S. 
money market banks.
Negatively, Euro-dollar borrowing has offset, to 
some unquantifiable degree, the impact of a given amount 
of monetary tightness. It has also added an additional 
factor to those that the Federal Reserve must take into 
consideration when implementing monetary policy. Finally, 
it may have promoted a feeling of loan availability during 
tight money periods, an atmosphere directly contrary to 
that being fostered by the Federal Reserve.'*' Thus, 
Euro-dollar availability has introduced a leakage (and 
an additional variable) into U.S. monetary policy. In the 
absence of the positive effects postulated above, these 
factors may require a greater effort by the Federal Reserve 
than was previously necessary in order to achieve a given 
level of tightness in the U.S. monetary system. Further, 
the variation in the results attained by a given Federal 
Reserve action may have been increased.
This chapter will explore in some detail these 
positive and negative effects of U.S. bank Euro-dollar 
borrowing and will attempt to reach some conclusions on the
^Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows..., op. cit. , p. 4.
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net effect of these influences on the efficiency of U.S. 
monetary policy.
II. Reserves, Credit Creation, and Euro-Dollar
Borrowing
Euro-dollar borrowing is undertaken by U.S. banks
primarily to offset reserve stringencies imposed by the
Federal Reserve in its implementation of tight money.
As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, Euro-dollar borrowing is a
direct response to tight money conditions and is rela-
2tively unimportant m  times of easy money. Euro-dollars 
represent an expensive alternative source of funds and, 
as such, U.S. banks have turned to the Euro-dollar system
'‘However, m  1967, during an easy money period, 
Euro-dollar liabilities of U.S. banks continued to grow and 
exceeded the levels attained during the short 1966 tight 
money experience. This appeared to indicate; that U.S. 
banks had come to view the Euro-dollar system as a per­
manent addition to their sources of liquidity. Further 
experience and increased borrowing costs, however, caused 
a decline in Euro-dollar borrowings and verified the 
marginal nature of the system to U.S. banks, as did the 
analysis undertaken in Chapter 4. Also, the use of Euro­
dollar borrowings to reduce required reserves via the cash 
items in process of collection method, and tacit agree­
ments among banks on one day trades to effect this result, 
may explain the increased borrowing levels experienced in 
these years. See, on this subject, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Office Correspondence, "Revision of Money 
Supply," 0£. cit., pp. 787-789; Little, op. cit., p. 13; 
Kvasnicka, o£. cit., pp. 14-15; Wallich, op. cit., p. 13; 
and Leimone, 0£. cit., p. 3.
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for funds primarily when domestic funds were either not 
available or were more expensive than Euro-dollars. When 
money has become available, the banks have deserted the 
Euro-dollar market in spite of the erosion of their reserve 
free base that occurs when they do so.3
Euro-dollar borrowing allows individual banks to 
increase their loan portfolios during times when the 
Federal Reserve is pursuing tight money policies. This 
is accomplished, as noted in Chapter 2, by obtaining a 
claim on a deposit in another U.S. bank, converting the 
claim into reserves at the Federal Reserve, and ex­
changing a created demand deposit in the amount of the 
reserves gained for a debt instrument. Thus, one bank 
loses reserves, loans, and demand deposits and another 
gains reserves, loans, and demand deposits. The net 
result, then, is a redistribution of assets and liabilities 
between the gaining and losing >banks.
-^While the Federal Reserve originally instituted 
the 1 0 % reserve requirement on all liabilities outstanding 
above a given base to moderate the banks' borrowing of 
Euro-dollars, it subsequently attempted to use this tool 
to reduce the reflows of funds to Europe. This was under­
taken in order to alleviate the effects of these repayments 
on the U.S. balance of payments. By raising to 20%
(in January 1971) the reserves required on all liabilities 
outstanding above the base and specifying that the compu­
tation of the reserve-free base would be based on the 
current level of Euro-dollar liabilities outstanding, the 
Federal Reserve hoped to induce the banks to maintain 
their Euro-dollar borrowing levels, and thus their bases, 
even though the immediate comparative costs of so doing
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However, in addition to the redistribution that 
occurs, the use of the Euro-dollar vehicle creates a 
liability to foreign branches on the borrowing bank's 
balance sheet. This liability represents a net addition 
to the gaining bank's balance sheet and is offset by the 
increased reserves it temporarily holds. After the bank 
creates a demand deposit and lists the debtor's IOU as an 
asset, and after the demand deposit so created is used and 
clears against the bank, the bank is left with a loan 
asset and a liability to foreign branch. Succeeding banks 
gain reserves and demand deposits and in turn create 
additional demand deposits by lending out their excess 
reserves. The net result, as shown in Table 1, is an 
increase in loan assets and total liabilities of the 
banking system but no increase in the money supply. The 
money supply has remained constant because the deposit 
expansion generated by the lending activities of the gaining
were high. The Federal Reserve was spectacularly un- 
successful in its attempt. See "Change in Discount Rate," 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 56, No. 12 (December,1970) 
pi 963; '‘Banking and Monetary Developments in the Fourth 
Quarter of 1970," Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Monthly Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (February, 1971), p. 33; 
"Recent Monetary and Bank Credit Developments," Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Monthly Review, Vol. 53, No. 5 
(May, 1971), p. 101. The Federal Reserve also wished to 
halt the reduction in required reserves that short-term 
Euro-dollar borrowing allowed (through the cash items in 
process of collection vehicle) and amended Regulation D 
in September 1969 to do so.
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Table 1. The Effect of Euro-dollar Borrowing
Gaining Banks Losing Banks
Step 1. The Euro-dollar Borrowing
Bank A Bank B
+100 Claim on + 1 0 0 20 Reserves 100 Demand
Bank B Liability to 80 Loans Deposit dueforeign Eurobankbranch and then
Bank A
Step 2. Collection of Claim and Use of Reserves 
Bank A.
- 1 0 0 Claim on 100 Liability
Bank B to foreign
+ 1 0 0 Reserves branch
























100 Liability to 
foreign branch 






Step 4. Net Results 
All Gaining Banks All Losing Banks
+100 Reserves 
+500 Loans
+100 Liability -100 Reserves
to Foreign Branch





Reserve ratio is 20%. Assumes Losing Banks are fully 
loaned up and no reserves required on Pliabilities to 
Foreign Branches.
banks is exactly offset by the contraction caused by the 
loss of reserves of the losing bank(s). To obtain the 
necessary reserves, the losing banks must contract their 
reserves by the amount due Bank A. In so doing, a con­
traction of loans and deposits occurs.
The results of the simple case outlined above may 
differ in several ways, depending on the conditions pre­
vailing at the time. For instance, the type of deposit 
that is extinguished may influence the final results. 
Should the Euro-dollar borrowing involve a claim on a. time 
deposit, the transfer of reserves will involve a greater 
contraction by the losing banks. This will occur because 
the reserves held on time deposits are much smaller than 
those held on demand deposits. Thus, should the $100 
deposit that Bank B loses be a time deposit with 5% re­
serves, $95 of loans will be retired instead of the $80 as 
shown in Table 1. This means that a $475 demand deposit 
contraction (versus $400) will occur in the other losing 
banks. Presuming all other deposits are of the demand 
variety, a greater reduction in loans by the losing banks 
or a smaller net increase in loans of the entire banking 
system will result. However, while total deposits will
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also decline/ the money supply will rise since the lost 
time deposits were not included in the money supply but 
the newly created demand deposits are. Demand deposits 
decline by $475 but rise by $500. (See Table 2.)

























A second variation of the basic case occurs when 
monetary policy forces a change in the composition of 
total deposits. Thus, Regulation Q restrictions cause 
the conversion of many low reserve time deposits to higher 
reserve demand deposits. This change requires additional 
reserves and, while the money supply rises due to this 
conversion, total deposits and loans are reduced through 
the multiple contraction of demand or time deposits. 
Euro-dollar borrowing in this case may offset the loan 
decline but will, as in the simple case, have no further 
impact on the money supply. (See Table 3.)
















-75 Demand Deposits 
sults-All Banks
-75 Loans -100 Time Deposits 
+ 25 Demand Deposits
Reserve ratios: 5% on Time Deposits
20% on Demand Deposits
Generally speaking, Regulation Q and a restric­
tion on reserve growth in 1969 and 1966 brought about a 
change from time to demand deposits, a reduction in the 
lending capabilities of the banks and in total deposits, 
and a slight increase in the money supply. Euro-dollar 
borrowing offset the loan declines that were taking place 
and, to the extent that such borrowing caused further 
shifts from time to demand deposits, caused some rise in 
the money supply. Reserve stringencies, however, held
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money supply growth to quite low levels during these 
periods.^
To conclude, it appears that access to the Euro­
dollar market allows banks to at least offset loan declines 
brought about by tight money policies but is incapable of 
having any large scale effect on the money supply. Since 
monetary policy is geared to interest rates, money supply, 
and reserve levels, Euro-dollar borrowing does not im­
pinge to an appreciable degree on the effectiveness of such 
policies. However, since lending activity may be main­
tained through Euro-dollar borrowing, it seems evident 
that in a broader sense Euro-dollar accessibility does 
interfere with the goals of monetary policy. Further, 
this accessibility adds another dimension to the environ­
ment in which the Federal Reserve must operate.
The introduction of marginal reserve requirements 
on Euro-dollar borrowings, first of 10% in September 
1969 and then of 20% in January 1971,creates an interest­
ing variation on the cases outlined above. As Table 4 
indicates, a 20% reserve requirement on Euro-dollar 
borrowings of $ 1 0 0 effectively destroys the credit crea­
tion (loan) increases previously possible. Not only does 
the money supply actually decline, but loans remain at the 
same levels previously existing. The 10% marginal reserve
^"The Money and Bond Markets," Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Monthly Review, various months, 1966 and 1969.
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requirement partly destroys the lending ability of the 
banks. However, since the reserve requirement applies 
only on borrowings above a base amount (assumed in 
Table 4), the impact of the reserve requirements is 
substantially reduced.
Table 4. The Effect of a 20% Marginal Reserve Requirement 
Gaining Banks Losing Banks
Bank A Net Results (as before)












+ 80 Reserves +400 Demand
+ 320 Loans Deposits
All Banks-Net Results
-100 Demand Deposits 
+100 Liability to foreign 
branch
The original 10% marginal reserve requirement was 
instituted to reduce the advantages gained from borrowing 
in the Euro-dollar market. The increase to a 20% marginal 
reserve requirement, however, was not imposed to reinforce 
tight money implementation. Rather, the reserves required
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above the base amount were increased in an attempt to 
slow the repayment by U.S. banks of their Euro-dollar 
liabilities. By encouraging banks to maintain their Euro­
dollar borrowing levels and thus the reserve-free base, 
it was hoped that the negative effect of these massive 
repayments on the U.S. balance of payments would be re­
duced. Given the enormous decline in Euro-dollar liabili­
ties both prior to and after the increase in marginal 
reserve requirements, it is doubtful that any significant 
amount of borrowing was ever subject to either the 1 0 % or 
the 20% reserve requirements. While future tight money 
periods might see a resurgence in U.S. bank borrowing, it 
is unlikely that this case of reserve absorption has
5yet occurred.
The initiation of the 10% reserve requirement had 
a definite impact on U.S. banks and altered their 
borrowing activities. Euro-dollars borrowed reached a 
peak prior to the effective date of marginal reserve re­
quirements, remained at a high level for the rest of 1969, 
and began to decline in 1970. While renewal borrowing 
within the reserve-free base could continue, increased
5The Federal Reserve has promised that this higher 
reserve requirement will be maintained. If it were not, 
the "good” banks that maintained their bases would be 
penalized while the "bad” banks would gain. Gaines, "The 
Dollar?" bp. cit., p. 1; Gaines, "Public Policy Issues," 
op. cit., pp. 3-4.
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borrowing levels were subject to the marginal reserve 
requirements.
The source of the borrowed Euro-dollar may affect 
the impact of Euro-dollar borrowing. If the source is 
private or officially held U.S. bank deposits, no additional 
analysis is necessary. However, should the source of the 
Euro-dollars be officially held (i.e., foreign govern­
ment and central bank) dollar reserves at the Federal 
R e s e r v e ,^ then an expansionary effect may occur and 
Federal Reserve actions will have to be of a greater 
magnitude in order to achieve a given degree of tightness. 
The process may be simply illustrated. U.S. banks 
borrow Euro-dollars in the market. These funds may be 
supplied by a European central bank for any of the 
several reasons noted in Chapter 3. The central bank 
transfers its funds from its account at the Federal Reserve 
Bank to a commercial bank and ownership of the funds to 
the borrowing bank. The reserves of the particular 
borrowing U.S. bank and of the U.S. banking system are 
thereby increased by the amount of the borrowing and 
credit creation within the U.S., based upon these new
gOr, should the source be special non-marketable 
Treasury securities issued to the central banks and 
redeemed by them at the Treasury in return for Federal 
Reserve balances, such an expansionary effect may also 
occur.
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reserves, can occur. To offset this increase in reserves, 
the Federal Reserve must enter the bond markets, selling 
bonds to soak up (neutralize) the newly acquired reserves. 
This action must be supplemental to the normal actions 
being undertaken to restrict reserve availability.
It should be noted that, as far as U.S. bank re­
serves are concerned, the source of the privately or 
officially held bank deposits that supply Euro-dollar 
borrowers is unimportant, except in the case outlined 
above. Thus, a central bank may hold U.S. money market 
instruments and sell them in order to obtain the necesr 
sary funds to deliver to the Euro-dollar borrower. The 
sale of the instrument does not, however, create more 
U.S. bank reserves. Rather, it merely redistributes 
the ownership of assets and reserves among all the par­
ticipants in the U.S. markets. Only if foreign held 
Treasury debt or Federal Reserve deposits are monetized 
will there be an effect on reserve levels in the U.S. 
system.?
Finally, the treatment of Euro-dollar borrowings
?The sa^e °f gold or drawings on the swap network by 
foreign central banks have been ignored here as sources 
of Euro-dollar funds. Both may certainly oc,cur and may 
have the same expansionary effect on U.S. bank reserves as 
does the shifting of foreign held Federal Reserve balances. 
See H. Mayer, op. cit., p. 28; Leimone, 0 £. cit., p. 5.
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as cash items in process of collection when the drafts 
evidencing the borrowing are placed in the clearing 
mechanism tend to increase the banks' ability to lend and 
create demand deposits. To the extent that swap arrange­
ments between banks existed, the possibility of increased 
lending and reduced required reserve levels was further 
increased. This avenue of evasion was closed in 1969 and 
no longer presents a problem to analysis.
The following section reports the results* of a re­
gression analysis devised to determine the actual in­
fluences affecting average reserve levels of U.S. banks 
in general and New York banks in particular. As such, it 
attempts to verify empirically the impacts theorized in 
this section.
III. Average Reserves and Euro-dollars
Average required reserves held by U.S. banks may 
be influenced by many factors. It was noted above that 
Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks reduced required 
reserves only to the extent that the evidence of such 
borrowing (a draft on the deposit-losing bank), when 
placed in the clearing mechanism, became part of the 
gaining bank's cash items in process of collection. These 
cash items were subtracted from deposits subject to 
reserve requirements under Regulation D provisions. In 
September, 1969, the regulation was amended to exclude 
the drafts arising from Euro-dollar borrowing from
218
consideration as cash items in process. Prior to 
September, 1969, there was at least one force acting to 
reduce required reserve levels. Other forces, such as the 
conversion of time deposits to demand deposits and the 
imposition of marginal reserve requirements on Euro­
dollar borrowings tended to increase required reserve 
levels.
To test whether these forces actually did influence 
average reserve levels, resort may be made to regression 
analysis. The dependent variable, the average percentage
qof required reserves held by U.S. banks ( X ^ ) , is stated. 
Possible influences on this variable include those noted 
above, i.e., access to Euro-dollar funds (XEDq ),9 the 
amount of such funds actually borrowed ( X ^ ) , and the 
imposition of marginal reserve requirements on Euro­
dollar borrowings and the amendment of Regulation D 
(Xr r e )*^® Other possible influences include the actual
^The average was obtained by adding gross demand 
deposits, unadjusted for cash items in process of col­
lection, and time deposits. This total deposit value was 
then divided into the amount of required reserves held by 
the banks in the same time period. The resulting per­
centage represents the proportion of total deposits held 
as reserves.
9a  dummy variable, coded 0 for 1962 through 1965 and 
1 for 1966 through 1970, indicates the discovery of the 
Euro-dollar source by U.S. banks in the 1966 tight money 
period.
10A dummy variable, coded 0 for 1962 through August, 
1969 and 1 for the months thereafter, indicates the
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required reserve ratio on deposits (Xr r r ) , ^  the pro­
portion of time deposits to total deposits (Xijp) , and 
free reserve levels (Sr r ).
Taken together, these factors might reasonably 
be expected to explain the variation observed in the per­
centage of required reserves held by U.S. banks. Should 
the Euro-dollar factors prove to assist in the explana­
tion of this variation (with the correct coefficient 
signs), empirical proof of the value of Euro-dollar 
borrowing to U.S. banks and of the impact of such borrowing 
on U.S. monetary policy will be obtained. That is, 
should the proportion of required reserves be indirectly 
(negatively) related to the Euro-dollar borrowing vari­
ables, cash items will be shown to have been a signifi­
cant factor in determining the impact of Euro-dollar 
availability on the U.S. banking system.
 $ho«*v-arJL3tion in average reserves may also be
explained by monetary policy. The proportion of time
presence or absence of marginal reserve requirements on 
Euro-dollar borrowings and changes in Regulation D.
■^The ratio used was the percentage required on 
demand deposits. While a weighted ratio including time 
deposit requirements could have been used, there seemed no 
reason to undertake these essentially sterile calculations. 
It is the change in the ratio that affects the average 
reserves percentage and time and demand required reserve 
ratios changed at the same times and by like amounts.
220
deposits to total deposits will indicate Regulation Q 
influences (among others) and the changes in required 
reserve ratios and the imposition of Euro-dollar 
marginal reserve requirements (and changes in Regulation 
D) will also indicate monetary policy. Open market opera­
tions designed to augment or reduce reserve levels should 
not be reflected in average required reserve proportions 
but free reserves, used as a measure by the Federal 
Reserve of the impact of monetary policy, may serve as 
a proxy for this type of monetary policy.
The time period chosen was 1962 through 1970.
Monthly data for each year was collected and a test of 
both the U.S. member bank average reserves proportion and 
New York City banks required reserves proportion was 
undertaken.
The results of these tests are shown in Table 5.
Unless otherwise noted the included variables were signifi­
cant at the .05 level or better. First difference analysis 
proved generally useless and those results are not re­
ported here.
The following points may be noted. With regard to 
all member banks, the most important explanatory variable 
was the proportion of time deposits to total deposits, a 
not unexpected result. This proportion was negatively 
related to required reserves. As the proportion of time 
deposits declines (and demand deposits proportion increases),
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Table 5. Average Required Reserves Equations 
All Member Banks
X ^ p  =. 0 65 - ,14lXrjip + .004XjjjQQ *̂ -̂ ®xRRR
(-10.5) (3.6) (2.3)
[-1.09] [.50] [.46]
R2 = .937 SEE = .001
New York Banks
XARNY = .109 - .012Xe d d - .020X*Tp
(-6 .6 ) (-1.4)
[-.16] [-.80]
R2 = .620 SEE = .004
*significant at .10 level 
t values in parentheses 
Beta values in brackets
XT p : Proportion of time to total deposits
XEDD: Euro-dollar access dummy
XpRRi Required Reserve Ratio on Demand Deposits
the average required reserves proportion increases 
(decreases). Similarly, as the required reserve ratio 
increases, so also does average required reserves. The 
discovery of Euro-dollars as a source of funds in 1966 
generated a very slight positive effect on the average 
required reserve ratio. This result may support the hypo­
thesis that Euro-dollar borrowing by the large money 
market banks drew time deposits from other U.S. banks,
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increasing average required reserve levels for all banks 
taken together. It does not support the hypothesis that 
Euro-dollar borrowing generally affected average required 
reserve levels. The explanatory power of the equation is 
quite high.
Of greater interest are the results obtained for the 
New York banks. Here, only the time deposit proportion 
and Euro-dollar access dummy variables were at all signifi­
cant. In this case, as in the case for all member banks, 
the proportion of time deposits was the most important 
explanatory variable and was negatively related to the 
dependent variable. However, the decline in time deposits 
as a percentage of total deposits had less impact on 
average required reserves than the same variable had on 
all member banks.(.02 for New York as opposed to .141 for 
all members).
Secondly, the Euro-dollar discovery or access dummy 
acted as expected. The discovery of Euro-dollars and 
their use by the large New York banks acted to reduce by 
over 1 % the average required reserve proportion for the 
New York banks. These two variables explained 62% of the 
variation in the dependent variable. The existence of 
massive and diverse pressures acting on the New York banks 
explains the relatively low R2 that this equation gene­
rates .
The conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis
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are several. First, Euro-dollar availability had little 
impact on total reserves of all U.S. banks. However, this 
availability did influence required reserve levels for 
New York money market banks. Second, monetary policy, in 
the form of free reserves and marginal reserve requirements 
on Euro-dollar liabilities had no appreciable impact on 
average reserve proportions. However, time deposits as 
a percent of total deposits did affect reserve levels.
While part of this effect may be ascribed to the fact that 
required reserve ratios are lower for time than they are 
for demand deposits, it is nonetheless possible to note 
that monetary policy aimed at reducing time deposit levels 
(via Regulation Q ceilings) did affect the percentage of 
required reserves held.
Euro-dollar availability reduced average required 
reserves for the borrowers of Euro-dollars. These borrow­
ers were primarily New York banks. The availability of 
Euro-dollars had little impact on the entire banking 
system or, at least, the contradictory forces put in motion 
by the development of Euro-dollar borrowing (and perhaps 
Federal Reserve responses to this development) had a 
minimal impact. Nonetheless, the results do indicate 
that the treatment of Euro-dollar borrowing claims as cash 
items did significantly affect average reserve levels.
224
IV. Euro-dollar Borrowing and U.S. Interest Rates
Monetary policy works through several channels.
Reserve levels, money supply, and loan creation were dis­
cussed above. The adjustment of interest rate levels is 
also used by the Federal Reserve in its attempts to in­
fluence the economy. Generally, it is only in periods of 
tight money that U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing has any 
significant impact on the implementation of interest rate 
policy.
In tight money periods, interest rates are pushed 
up by the Federal Reserve through the sale of government 
securities and the resultant restriction of reserve 
availability. The rise in interest rates is designed to 
reduce the quantity demanded of loanable funds (the demand 
being determined in part by the price of such funds). As 
demand for funds declines, investment also declines. This 
slows the growth of national income and reduces price 
pressures. Whether this chain of events occurs in fact is 
open to question. However, interest rate levels are used 
by the Federal Reserve to implement its policies. To the 
extent that Euro-dollar borrowing affects these levels, 
such borrowing may be said to interfere with monetary 
policy.
The direct effect of Euro-dollar borrowing on interest 
rate levels in the United States has been to keep rates
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lower than they would be in the absence of such borrow­
ing. 12 The availability of Euro-dollars to banks has 
meant that final borrowers have been able to obtain 
greater amounts of funds from the banks than would other­
wise have been possible. The greater availability of loans
tends to hold down interest rate levels in the money and 
bond markets, contradicting Federal Reserve intentions. 
Further, the psychological effects to which Andrew Brimmer 
has referred -̂3 have tended to offset Federal Reserve goals. 
As Brimmer has noted, Euro-dollar borrowing banks
. . . have found it less urgent to adopt more 
restrictive. . . lending standards or to limit 
their new (loan) commitments. . . (in the 
face of tight money. They thus) transmit to 
the (money) market and to their own customers
an impression that the degree of monetary
riestraint in general is less substantial 
than the monetary authorities say (it is)
• ■ • • ^
The transmission of a general feeling of ease, or at
1 2H. Mayer, op. Cit., pp. 26-28 obliquely refers to 
the various interest rate effects. Leimone, o£. cit., p. 4 
is concerned primarily with the interest differentials that 
exist between countries and the resultant flows of capital. 
The increased interest sensitivity of international capital 
that the Euro-dollar market has brought about means that 
the balance of payments effects must be dealt with by the 
Federal Reserve.
1 3Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows..., op. cit., p. 4.
14Ibid.
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least of lessened tightness, to business borrowers tends 
to frustrate the Federal Reserve's aims. High interest 
rates and a restricted availability of funds are used by 
the Federal Reserve as a signal to business that invest­
ment should be curtailed. The goal, of course, is the 
reduction of investment expenditures and thereby the 
reduction of price and demand pressures. Euro-dollar 
borrowing, however, reduces the effectiveness of this 
signal.
The indirect effects of U.S. Euro-dollar borrowing 
may offset the direct effects noted above. While the 
direct effect of such borrowing reduces the upward pres­
sures on interest rates in the United States by making a 
greater amount of loans available, the source of the Euro­
dollar funds determines the magnitude of the impact of the 
borrowing on interest rate levels. In some cases, the net 
result of Euro-dollar borrowing is to leave interest rate 
structures unaffected. If the funds lent by the Euro­
dollar suppliers are on deposit in U.S. commercial banks, 
there is a redistribution of loanable funds among the banks 
and a net increase in loans. Interest rate levels, thus, 
decline or rise by less than they would in the absence of 
Euro-dollar borrowing. If the Euro-dollar supplier con­
verts U.S. money market instruments into loanable funds,
15Ibid.
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the sale of these securities will tend to drive money 
market prices down and interest rates up .!-6 The net 
effect in this case will be less than if the source of 
funds were commercial bank deposits since opposing forces 
will be at work. The increased availability of loans will 
tend to reduce interest rates but the sale of securities 
will tend to raise them.
Euro-dollar suppliers may be official institutions.
If they draw on their balances in commercial banks or sell 
their U.S. money market securities, the net result on 
interest levels in the United States will be similar to 
the cases outlined above. If they redeem the special 
non-marketable debt issues sold to them by the Treasury 
for their "excess" dollar reserves, their action will 
draw down Treasury balances at the Federal Reserve, 
pumping reserves into the banking system. This will tend 
to increase the availability of loanable funds and reduce 
interest levels. However, if U.S. government expendi­
tures remain constant and receipts do not increase, the 
Treasury will be required to sell additional bonds or 
bills in the U.S. money market. Such sales will tend to 
drive up interest rates, offsetting the negative influence 
the Euro-dollar borrowing and increased reserve availability 
will have on these rates.
While the majority of foreign central bank assets
1 6H. Mayer, 0£. cit., p. 27.
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are held in U.S. Treasury b i l l s b o t h  private and 
official conversion of other market instruments may also 
occur. For instance, should the source of Euro-dollar 
funds b§ the sale or attrition of U.S. commercial paper 
holdings, the commercial paper issuer would, ceterus 
paribus, be required to increase his bank borrowing or 
reduce his expenditures. This increased borrowing would 
tend to increase interest rates, offsetting to some degree 
the impact of Euro-dollar borrowing.
Finally, should the official Euro-dollar supplier 
draw on his balances at the Federal Reserve, the reserves 
of the commercial banking system will be increased.
This will reinforce the downward pressure on interest 
rates generated by the Euro-dollar borrowing. The Federal 
Reserve offsets these reserve changes arising from foreign 
official transactions as part of its normal activities. 
Nonetheless, the pressures generated in this case will 
tend to reinforce the downward movement of interest rates 
unless offset by the Federal Reserve.
To conclude, interest rate levels in the U.S. may be 
affected by U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing in a manner 
contrary to Federal Reserve policy. However, in some cases 
offsets to these pressures occur through the sale or
17Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...," 
op. cit., p. 79.
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disposition of U.S. assets owned by the Euro-dollar 
suppliers. In general, it appears that Euro-dollar 
borrowing by U.S. banks will tend to exert downward pres­
sures on interest rate levels in the United States. Thus, 
Federal Reserve policy must respond to these pressures if 
effective restrictive monetary policies are to be suc­
cessfully pursued.
V. The Money Supply 
One of the policy variables that the Federal Reserve 
uses in essaying the impact of its actions on the economy 
is the rate of growth in the money supply. In Section II 
of this chapter, it was noted that money supply changes 
deriving from Euro-dollar borrowing would be nil except to 
the extent that restrictive monetary policy forced changes 
in the composition of total deposits or in cases where 
reserves were increased due to cash items factors or the 
movement of official funds into the banking system. Euro­
dollar' borrowing is not the cause of the changing compo­
sition of deposits, except minimally, but rather is the 
result of such changes. The effect of Euro-dollar borrowing 
on the money supply, then,is relatively insignificant. 
However, the actual measurement of the money supply may be 
influenced by Euro-dollar borrowing and, if such borrowing 
does cause the under- or overstatement of the money supply 
or of changes in it, Federal Reserve policy decisions may 
be based on erroneous information.
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It has been said that the borrowing of Euro-dollars 
by U.S. banks understates the actual money supply in the
T OUnited States and overstates the published money supply.
The proposition is supported as follows. When Euro-dollars 
are first borrowed, the published money stock tends to 
fall since foreign branches hold their dollar balances 
in U.S. demand deposits until they are "lent" to the 
home office and take the form of "liabilities to foreign 
branches." These liabilities are not included in the 
money supply but, according to Little, these funds are 
included in the published money supply figures when they 
are held as demand deposits.19 Thus, to the point where 
the funds become "liabilities to foreign branches" the 
published money supply overstates the "real" figure 
since these funds, unless borrowed by U.S. residents, are 
not part of the stock of transactions medium available 
to U.S. residents, even though they are counted as such.20 
To this point, then,the published money stock has been 
overstated. When the funds are borrowed by U.S. banks,





the published figure falls, approaching the actual or 
real money stock values.21
As reserves are released through Euro-dollar 
borrowing, according to Little, new loans are made and the 
published and real money supply, i.e., demand deposits 
plus currency used for investment and consumption in the 
United States, increase, approaching the level that the 
published data indicated before the borrowing. But, as 
Euro-dollar rates rise, an incentive to substitute U.S. 
demand deposits due to a foreign bank or U.S. foreign 
branch for previously held CD's appears. This occurs be­
cause asset holders switch from CD's to Euro-dollar
^ T h e  following discussion pertains to the long-run 
effects of Euro-dollar borrowing on the calculation of 
money supply values. Short-run effects also occur. When 
banks borrow Euro-dollars, they place in the collection 
system a draft on the bank giving up the deposit. This 
draft was considered part of cash items in process of col­
lection until September, 1969, and as such was a deductable 
item from demand deposits upon which reserves had to be . 
held. Since the money supply is calculated from net 
deposit values, after cash items in process are subtracted, 
Euro-dollar borrowing may be said to reduce the measured 
money supply. The real money supply, as noted below, does 
.not change immediately. The demand deposit previously held 
by a foreigner (bank) becomes a liability of a U.S. bank to 
its branch. Both these categories are excluded from con­
sideration as part of the real money supply. However, 
since the purpose of borrowing Euro-dollars is to obtain 
loanable funds, such borrowing will eventually increase 
both the measured and real money supplies.
Should the banks engage in swap arrangements whereby 
they borrow Euro-dollars from each other on a daily basis 
for the specific purpose of reducing their deposit levels 
and thus their reserve requirements, then it may be said 
that the published money supply figures understate the real 
figures. The deposits that are offset by the cash item in 
process of collection does not change. It remains part of 
the transactions medium of the United States.
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deposits and in so doing, CD's are transformed into U.S. 
demand deposits. Since CD's are not included in the 
narrowly defined money supply but these demand deposits 
are, the effect of such rises in Euro-dollar rates will 
be to generate this substitution by U.S. and foreign 
asset holders and thus to increase the published money 
supply figures. In the meantime, the real or effective 
money supply will drop to the level existing before the 
Euro-dollar borrowing occurred (due to the decline in 
money available for consumption and investment use in the 
U.S.) .
Finally, the transfer from low reserves CD's to 
high reserves demand deposits (according to Little) will 
cause the somewhat overstated published and real money 
supplies to fall. When all these forces have been worked 
out, the final published money supply values will likely 
be somewhat higher than before the borrowing and the 
effective money supply somewhat lower than before.^
Thus, Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks actually 
reduces the real money supply in the U.S. If such were 
the case, and assuming that Euro-dollar borrowing occurs 
in response to tight money policies in the U.S., it can be 
stated that Euro-dollar borrowing reinforces rather than 
thwarts these policies.
Unfortunately, there appear to be several flaws in
22Ibid., pp. 27-28.
the above argument. First, as noted by the Federal Reserve 
in its explanation of the latest revision of the money 
supply f i g u r e s , 23 the basic money stock concept (i.e., the 
public's stock of the means of payment) covers demand 
deposits, currency, and coin liabilities of the U.S. 
banking system held by all transactors, foreign and do­
mestic, except the U.S. government, Federal Reserve, and 
U.S. commercial banks. This system includes U.S. com­
mercial banks, the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury but 
excludes the liabilities of banks in U.S. territories and 
possessions and, most important here, liabilities of 
foreign branches and territorial branches of U.S. b a n k s . 24 
It therefore appears that demand deposits at 
foreign branches of U.S. banks are not included in the 
published money stock. The conversion of CD's for these 
deposits then does not overstate the money stock figures.
The substitution of assets occurs completely outside the 
money stock. Further, the conversion, when U.S. banks 
borrow their branches' deposits of the funds, from deposits 
to liabilities due foreign branches also takes place outside
23"Revision of the Money Stock," Federal Reserve . 
Bulletin, Vol. 56, No. 12 (December, 1970), p. 889.
24lbid.
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the money stock calculations and an overstatement of the 
published stock does not occur here either.
In addition, Euro-dollar borrowing does not increase, 
generally, the total reserves available to the banking 
system. Therefore, as noted earlier, no increase in the 
money supply is forthcoming.
The transfer from low reserve certificates of de­
posit to high reserve demand deposits at foreign branches 
was postulated by Little to cause the published and real 
money supplies to fall since more reserves are required 
to support a given amount of money. This is doubtful, 
however, since few if any reserves are held on Euro-dollar 
deposits by these branches.
In one sense Little's contention is correct, how­
ever. The conversion from CD to Euro-dollar deposit may 
involve the deposit by the Euro-dollar account owner of a 
U.S. demand deposit. That is, the asset holder may con­
vert his U.S. bank CD to a U.S. bank demand deposit and 
exchange this deposit for a Euro-dollar deposit. In 
this case, a greater level of reserves are required and 
assuming that the conversion was undertaken due to higher 
interest rate incentives in the Euro-dollar market deriving 
from U.S. bank borrowing there, the U.S. money supply may 
be reduced. However, the conversion itself will increase 
the money supply, narrowly defined. The net result may 
then be some marginal increase in the U.S. money supply
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occasioned by Euro-dollar borrowing. The magnitude of 
the change would appear to be relatively small, however.
Generally, then, the money supply figures published 
by the Federal Reserve are more accurate than postulated 
by Little. Nonetheless, some revision of the money supply 
figures has been necessary because of an understatement 
of demand deposits that occurred prior to September, 1969. 
As noted in footnote 21 of this chapter, the cash items in 
process of collection that were deducted from demand de­
posit levels included Euro-dollar transactions. Since 
actual deposit levels were not affected by Euro-dollar 
borrowing, such borrowing tended to understate the true 
level of deposits. Thus, the Federal Reserve adjusted its 
money supply measurements to exclude this deduction and
revised Regulation D to exclude Euro-dollar drafts from
25inclusion m  cash items.
Despite the problem considered above, the original 
postulate that Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks makes 
the imposition of tight money policies more difficult re­
mains valid. The money supply, as well as "excess" re­
serves, both rose as a result of the treatment of Euro­
dollar borrowing claims as cash items in process. The 
neutralization of these increases is necessary if a given
^See Ibid., pp. 887-893 and "Revision of Money 
Supply Series,H Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 55, No. 10 
(October, 1969), pp. Ibi-789.
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degree of monetary tightness is to be maintained.
Generally, money supply considerations are of limited 
importance as far as Euro-dollar borrowing is concerned.
VI. Foreign Exchange, Balance of Payments, 
and Gold Policies
Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks has had some 
fairly complex effects on U.S. monetary policy as it 
relates to this country's foreign economic r e l a t i o n s . 2 6  
Basically’, such borrowing has given to the U.S. balance 
of payments a healthier prospect than the underlying 
position warranted. By the same token, the repayment of 
Euro-dollar liabilities by U.S. banks has given the balance 
of payments a more bleak aspect than in reality was the 
case.
Euro-dollar borrowing has affected U.S. foreign 
exchange operations in several ways. Upward and down­
ward pressures on the par values of several countries' 
currencies have been intensified by Euro-dollar borrowing.
The Federal Reserve has, therefore, found it necessary to 
supply dollars to European central banks or, more frequently,
26Leimone, o£. cit., pp. 5-6 develops a partial out­
line of the effects the Euro-dollar market in general has 
upon these factors. The specific impact of U.S. bank Euro­
dollar borrowing is not, however, dealt with in any detail. 
Scott, op. cit., pp. 27-28, 31 has dealt with the impact of 
the Euro-dollar market on the U.S. balance of payments as 
have other writers, including Kvasnicka, op. cit., pp.16-17; 
Williams, o£. cit., pp. 40-45? Klopstock,The Euro-Dollar 
Market:..., op. cit., pp. 13-17.
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has been required to soak up excess accumulations of 
dollars in these central banks.
In addition, Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks 
has, in the process of strengthening the (short-term) 
position of the dollar internationally, required fewer 
gold-dollar redemptions and has thus allowed the United 
States to maintain a status quo position vis a vis the 
international monetary system and gold values. The re­
payment of Euro-dollar liabilities by the banks has, as 
noted, worsened the balance of payments, requiring foreign 
exchange operations to support the dollar and measures to 
protect the gold stock remaining in this c o u n t r y . 2 7
Euro-dollar borrowing has had the effect of tempo­
rarily improving the U.S. balance of payments because 
such borrowing represents an inflow of capital into the 
United States. In addition, the demand for Euro-dollar 
funds has drawn dollars out of foreign central bank reserves. 
This has improved the balance of payments on the official
27The unsettled conditions that have prevailed in 
the foreign exchange markets since the suspension of the 
gold convertibility of the dollar in August, 1971, have 
presented difficulties to the foreign central banks and, 
to a lesser degree, to the Federal Reserve. Obviously, 
While the fundamental weakness of the dollar is not attrib*- 
utable to Euro-dollar borrowing, such borrowing and more 
important, the repayment of these liabilities, in conjunc­
tion with a severely eroding balance of trade position, 
have made these conditions inevitable.
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settlements basis because this balance counts as deficit 
items only those dollars held by official institutions.
The reversal of these flows causes a capital outflow and, 
further, increases dollar balances in official hands.
When Euro-dollar borrowings are repaid, the U.S. balance 
of payments is forced into a (more severe) deficit position.
Federal Reserve balance of payments policy has 
generally had as its goal the reduction of the U.S. deficit. 
High interest rates (especially on short-term debt instru­
ments) have been used to encourage foreign flows of capital 
into the United States. High interest rates are normally 
associated with tight money policies aimed at slowing down 
an overheated economy. In such periods, the balance of 
payments tends to weaken (move into a deficit position or 
move into a deeper deficit position) since greater amounts 
of imports are pulled into the country due to the boom 
conditions. Thus, high interest rates are used not only 
to dampen an overactive economy but also to improve the 
balance of payments. In this case, the two goals may be 
obtained through the use of only one policy tool, i.e., 
monetary policy.28
28See Robert Mundell, "The Appropriate Use of Mone­
tary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability," 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 9 (March, 
1962), pp. 70-79, for a discussion of the difficulties in­
herent in attempting to use one policy tool to achieve two 
goals. Mundell concludes that monetary policy is best
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As noted, Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks gener— 
ally occurs in response to the imposition of tight money 
in the U.S. Since this borrowing also benefits the 
balance of payments, Euro-dollar borrowing tends to re­
inforce Federal Reserve balance of payments policy.
However, to the extent that such borrowing prolongs boom 
conditions (and thus high import levels) in the U.S., the 
benefit derived from capital inflows to the balance of 
payments is offset to some degree by the continued high 
levels of imports. In addition, Euro-dollar borrowing 
tends to push up interest rates in the Euro-dollar market, 
offsetting the attraction to foreign asset holders of high 
rates in the United States. A Federal Reserve policy of 
high interest rates may therefore be neutralized by high 
interest rates in the Euro-dollar market, at least with 
respect to international capital flows. However, if the 
high rates in the market arise from the demand by U.S. 
banks for funds (as they have in the past), the same re­
sults are forthcoming. That is, capital flows into the
suited for international equilibrium and fiscal policy for - 
domestic stability. In the happy event that one tool 
solves two problems, the other tool may be used to re­
inforce the effects of the first or it may play a neutral 
role. This presumes, of course, that these tools are 
truly controllable. Leland Yeager in o£. cit., pp. 109-110 
notes some of the problems in utilizing Mundell's policy 
prescriptions.
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United States directly, due to the attraction of high 
interest rates here, or it flows in indirectly, through 
the intermediation of U.S. banks.
In summary, the effectiveness of Federal Reserve 
balance of payments policy may be reinforced by U.S. bank 
borrowing of Euro-dollars. High interest rates attract 
capital into the country either directly or through the 
agency of the banks. However, the leakage in domestic 
monetary policy implied by U.S. bank induced flows means 
that the restriction of reserve availability and credit 
that monetary policy intends is not fully effective. The 
beneficial results accruing from Euro-dollar borrowing on 
the balance of payments are offset to some extent by a 
continued high level of economic activity and the con­
sequent high level of imports. The net effect of Euro­
dollar borrowing is a smaller assist to the balance of 
payments than might otherwise, be the case.
Finally, the reverse flow of funds that occurs when 
Euro-dollar liabilities are repaid worsens the balance of 
payments. Since this reflow occurs at a time of easy 
money, when the Federal Reserve is attempting, to stimulate 
the economy with low interest rates and unrestricted re­
serve availability, the repayment of Euro-dollar liabilities 
worsens the balance of payments and reinforces the outflow 
of capital that low interest rates involve Generally, then, 
Euro-dollar borrowing and repayment tends to offset some 
of the positive balance of payments effects of high interest
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rates and reinforces the negative effects of low interest 
rates.
With respect to foreign exchange policies of the 
Federal Reserve, Euro-dollar borrowing lessens the need 
for intervention by the Federal Reserve or its foreign
29central bank agents to support the value of the dollar. 
Rather, the borrowing tends to put pressure on foreign 
currencies and merely requires the lending of dollars by 
the Federal Reserve to other central banks. When Euro­
dollar borrowings are repaid, however, during easy money 
periods, the Federal Reserve must draw on its swap lines 
in order to support the dollar. This support becomes 
necessary because the dollar comes under pressure due to 
the influx of the repaid dollars on the foreign exchange 
markets. Thus, the Federal Reserve goal of stability in 
the foreign exchange markets is strained by the effects of 
Euro-dollar borrowing and repayments but, with the 
mechanisms set up to promote international financial sta­
bility, Euro-dollar activity does not appear to have added 
an unbearable burden to the implementation of this policy.
2^See Coombs, 0£. cit. (especially March and 
September 1969-71), various pages, for a fairly detailed 
description of the support operations undertaken by the 
Federal Reserve, Treasury, and foreign central banks. 
Kvasnicka, op. cit., pp. 17-18 discusses the effect of the 
Euro-dollar system on exchange rates generally.
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With respect to gold flows, the borrowing of Euro­
dollars has tended to. .lessen the outflow of gold reserves 
from the United States and their repayment has tended to 
increase these outflows. However, given the weakness of 
the international payments system prior to the suspension 
of gold convertibility of the dollar, only small gold flows 
were possible. Any sizeable outflows threatened the 
viability of the entire system. Thus, gold policy 
basically was aimed at maintaining the status quo and 
searching for temporary palliatives for the problem.^0 
To conclude, the Federal Reserve's international 
policies have been challenged by Euro-dollar borrowing by 
U.S. banks, but since these policies were developed to 
meet the growing strains on the international monetary 
system generally, the development of Euro-dollar borrowing 
has merely added some incremental strains to the system.
The difference has been one of degree, not of kind and, 
indeed, the borrowing, itself tended to ease the strains, 
temporarily.
VII. Equity Among Banks 
One of the primary concerns voiced by several
3°0ne solution may be the creation of SDR*s. See 
Williams, op. cit., pp. 46-48 for a discussion of the 
relationship between the gold market and the Euro-dollar 
market.
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writers, beyond the monetary policy leakage aspect of 
Euro-dollar borrowing, has be'en the effect that the access 
to Euro-dollar funds by a few large U.S. banks may have 
had on the equal impact of monetary policy on various 
classes of banks and on the distribution of reserves 
among the b a n k s . A n d r e w  Brimmer has noted that since 
the few large banks with access to the Euro-dollar market 
have been able to sustain their lending activities,'the 
Federal Reserve has had to exert a greater degree of 
pressure to achieve a given amount of restraint on the 
banking system than it otherwise would have found neces­
sary. A disproportionate share of this pressure has fallen 
on the banks without access to the Euro-dollar market be­
cause these banks are not as able to deflect the impact of 
tight money as are the large banks. Eventually, all banks 
must reduce their expansion of credit but in order to 
obtain this reduction, the Federal Reserve must press 
harder on reserve availability than it otherwise would 
have had to.3^
31Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows..., op. cit., pp. 4-6; 
Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...,,r 0£. cit., 
pp. 79-80; Klopstock, The Euro-Dollar Market;..., op. cit.,
pp. 11-12.
33Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows...,op I cit., p. 4.
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Additionally, Klopstock has noted that access to 
the Euro-dollar market tends to concentrate the dollar 
reserves of foreign central banks in these large U.S. 
banks. Without the Euro-dollar market, these central banks 
would have invested their funds in U.S. money market in­
struments and the resulting reserves would have been widely 
dispersed throughout the U.S. banking system. But, with 
the advent of the Euro-dollar deposit, central banks have 
placed their reserves in this investment vehicle. These 
funds are then borrowed by the few large U.S. banks with 
access to the market and the concentration of these funds 
at these banks occurs.^3
While both Brimmer's and Klopstock's analyses may 
be true, there exist offsets and explanations that tend 
to reduce the seriousness of the problems raised.
Klopstock himself notes that to the extent that foreign 
central banks place a proportion of their dollar reserves 
in time deposits in U.S. banks (which they did prior to 
the development of the Euro-dollar system), the same banks 
that now gain these funds through Euro-dollar borrowing 
would have been (were) the depositories for these time 
deposits before the Euro-dollar system came to prominence.34
33Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...," 
op. cit., pp. 79-80.
34Ibid., p. 80.
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Thus, at least some proportion of the funds now being 
borrowed by the U.S. banks with foreign branches were 
previously held in these same banks anyway. Further, 
foreign reserves were also placed in Treasury bills, 
purchased in New York. At least some of these funds, 
also, wound up in the large New York banks that are now 
active in the Euro-dollar market.35 This is not to deny 
that prior to the development of the Euro-dollar market 
the central bank reserves were probably more widely dis­
persed, ultimately, than since its development. How­
ever, given the increase in these foreign dollar holdings 
and the general concentration of them even before the 
Euro-dollar system evolved, it is likely that this par­
ticular portion of the problem has not had a significant 
impact on U.S. bank equity.
Brimmer's thesis that Euro-dollar borrowing has 
a discriminatory impact is a more involved argument than 
Klopstock's. Whether it is correct or not, however, is 
not important since, if it is correct, the effects may 
not be what they seem and, if it is incorrect, little 
damage results from Euro-dollar borrowing per se. In­
deed, it is the thesis of this section that the existence 
of the Euro-dollar system and the availability of funds from 




If it is true that a discriminatory impact does 
indeed occur, a good case can be made that this impact 
merely offsets the previous discriminatory impact of 
monetary policy that operated in the other direction, 
i.e., against the large banks. And, further, such an 
impact hastens the transmission of monetary pressures 
throughout the economy. In addition, Brimmer's thesis 
may be incorrect. That is, there may not be a discrimina­
tory impact of Euro-dollar borrowing. In this event, this 
particular aspect of monetary policy is not of concern 
vis a vis Euro-dollars, although it may be in a more 
general context.
Taking first the view that Brimmer's thesis is in­
correct, several writers have indicated that there is no 
discriminatory impact with Euro-dollar borrowing.36 
The basis of this statement is that the borrowing of Euro-: 
dollars by large banks in reality merely transfers reserves 
among the big banks themselves. That is, the dollar 
balances that foreigners hold are kept primarily at large 
international-type banks in the major money markets in the 
United States. When one of these banks borrows Euro­
dollars , it more than likely obtains a claim on another 
large U.S. bank. The losing bank then can protect itself 
from such losses by itself borrowing in the Euro-dollar
JOSee, for instance, Little, 0£. cit., pp. 28-30.
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market (defensive borrowing). As Carl Beige has noted, 
Euro-dollar borrowing is similar to the gasoline contest 
games. When one company starts such a game, all the 
others begin their own in self-defense. It is not the 
hope of increased sales that motivates these entrants but 
rather the fear of sales losses if they do not participate 
that impels them to enter the competition. Thus, in the 
Euro-dollar borrowing situation, when one bank enters the 
market, the others must as well, to protect themselves 
from reserve losses.
The main point here is that the dollar deposits 
that are the reserves of the Euro-dollar system are kept 
primarily at the large money market banks in the U.S.
When a large U.S. bank borrows these reserves, it may 
not obtain a claim on a smaller bank but rather on another 
large bank in the U.S. Thus, there is no discriminatory 
impact of Euro-dollar borrowing but merely a reshuffling 
or churning of reserves between the large banks.
If this is the case, some difficulty is encountered 
in explaining how these large banks can continue to make 
loans in tight money periods when they are merely pro­
tecting the reserves they own rather than gaining new 
reserves. Certainly, the fact that required reserves
37in a speech to the Boston Economic Club, April 30, 
1969, as quoted in Ibid., p. 28.
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decrease due to the cash items factor when Euro-dollars 
are borrowed explains some of the continued lending. In 
addition, the earlier analysis in this chapter indicates 
that loans may be increased by Euro-dollar borrowing even 
though the total reserves and deposits of the banking 
system remain constant. Thus, Euro-dollar borrowing in­
volves both an increase in available reserves due to the 
cash items factor (which allows an increase in loans) 
and an increase in loans due to increased liabilities to 
foreign branches.
Finally, Brimmer's thesis may be at least partly 
correct. There may well be some redistribution of re­
serves to the large banks. This is indicated by the in­
crease in the number of foreign branches established by 
banks outside the large financial centers (usually con­
sidered to be New York, Chicago, and San Francisco).^®
The establishment of these branches indicates that the 
reserve losses being experienced by these banks were of 
sufficient magnitude to encourage the placing of branches 
in the European countries. Were these banks insulated 
from the effects of Euro-dollar borrowing, there would 
have been much less pressure on them to establish costly 
foreign branches (although certainly the access to funds 
must play some role in these decisions). It is also
38See Chapter 3 and Williams, op. cit., p. 11.
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indicated by the uses to which large and small banks put 
their available funds in the tight money periods. Large 
banks increased their business loans in these periods 
(19 66 and 1969) while smaller banks did not. These 
large international banks also increased their percentage 
share of such loans. Since they were experiencing heavy 
CD attrition rates, it seems evident that some reserves 
were being gained at the expense of the smaller banks, 
especially since their use of the Federal Funds market de­
creased in these periods.39 For these reasons, it appears 
that some redistribution of reserves did indeed occur.
Assuming that redistribution did occur, the question 
of the equity of impact among banks of tight monetary 
policy must be faced. However, the explanation of the 
equity problem contains hints of the answer to the problem. 
Presuming that it is the desire of the Federal Reserve that 
monetary pressures hit all banks equally and, further, that 
such pressures be distributed throughout the economy as 
rapidly as possible, it can be argued that the large 
banks' access to the Euro-dollar market has actually 
worked in favor of equality of pressure and in favor of a 
more rapid dissemination of the pressures throughout the 
country and the economy.
39Brimmer, 0£. cit., pp. 8, 10-15. The decrease 
arose from the decline in lendable reserves, brought 
about by Federal Reserve imposed reserve stringencies.
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The imposition of tight money, it has often been
argued, hits the large money market banks first and
hardest.^ Since open market operations take place in
New York, the large banks here are the first to feel
reserve stringencies.41 in addition, these large banks
have come to rely on CD's for large quantities of loanable 
42funds. The use of Regulation Q to restrict the com­
petitiveness of the banks in bidding for interest sensi­
tive funds has meant that the large banks have faced high
^While the literature on the subject is limited, 
some analysis of this impact has been undertaken. See, for 
instance, Tilford Gaines, "Financial Innovations and the 
Efficiency of Federal Reserve Policy," in George Horwich, 
ed., Monetary Process and Policy; A Symposium, Purdue 
University Monograph Series (Homewood, Illinois: Richard
Irwin, 1967), pp. 99-118; T. Mayer, 0£. cit., pp. 29; Ira 
Scott, "The Regional Impact of Monetary Policy," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 69 (May, 1955), pp. 269-284 
(this is the classic article on the problem); Ray Ruffin,
"An Econometric Model of the Impact of Open Market Opera­
tions on Various Bank Classes," Journal of Finance, Vol.
23 (September, 1968), pp. 625-637; Warren Smith, "The In­
struments of General Monetary Control," National Banking 
Review, Vol. 1 (September, 1963) , pp. 47-76; Sam Petzman, 
"The Banking Structure and the Transmission of Monetary 
Policy," Journal of Finance, Vol. 24 (June, 1969), pp. 387- 
411; Vittorio Bonomo and Charles Schotta, The Regional Im­
pact of Monetary Policy (Blacksburg, Virginia: Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, Department of Economics, 1970); 
William Yohe, Comments on Bonomo and Schotta "The Regional 
Impact of Monetary Policy" presented at the Southern Eco- 
nomic Association's convention November, 1970.
^ T .  Mayer, loc. cit.; Scott, "The Regional Impact
loc» cit. But Bonomo and Schotta, 0£. cit., p. 21,
have found that there is no differential impact. Their work
has been questioned by Yohe, loc. cit. and the subject 
appears to require further analysis.
42Brimmer, loc. cit.
attrition of their outstanding CD's as interest rates 
rose above the rates they were allowed to pay on such 
deposits. As Brimmer has noted, the large banks depended 
more heavily on CD's for loanable funds than did the 
smaller banks and, tending to draw on more interest sen­
sitive fund sources, lost large amounts of CD's more 
quickly than smaller banks as interest rates rose.^ 
Further, the increased proportion of demand deposits at 
these large banks tended to increase average required 
reserves.
Given the situation described above, it is perhaps 
not incorrect to state that there is a discriminatory 
impact of tight monetary policy on large money market 
banks. Thus, any activities which they undertake that 
may offset some of this impact would, assuming the de­
sirability of equality of impact, be acceptable. Euro­
dollar borrowing has provided an outlet whereby these 
large banks may deflect some of the pressures bearing on 
them. This deflection, by neutralizing some of the dis­
criminatory pressures, leads to a more equal impact of 
monetary tightness.
In addition, to the extent that Euro-dollar borrowing 
generates a redistribution of reserves away from the 
smaller banks, there may be a tendency for a more rapid
43Ibid.
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transmission to the entire banking system of Federal 
Reserve pressures. When the larger banks begin to feel 
these pressures, they normally enter the Federal Funds 
market to bid for reserves. Their increased demand causes 
interest rates in the market to rise and these higher 
rates draw funds from reserve suppliers. However, the 
smaller banks that traditionally supply these funds are 
not forced to do so. Thus, they can maintain their reserve 
positions even while the larger banks are feeling the 
impact of tight money policies. However, while the surplus 
banks may or may not participate in the Federal Funds 
market, they must relinquish reserves when the larger banks 
borrow Euro-dollars. They have no choice in this case 
since they are presented with drafts on their reserves 
which they must honor. Therefore, to the extent that 
reserves do flow from the smaller banks to the larger 
banks as a result of Euro-dollar borrowing, tight money, 
which motivates Euro-dollar borrowing, affects the smaller 
banks sooner than it would otherwise.
Concluding, it appears that the monetary policy 
problem of discrimination or equity of policy impact may 
not be worsened by Euro-dollar borrowing. As Klopstock 
has noted, the funds previously held in the larger banks by 
foreign central banks still wind up in these depositories.44
44Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...," 
op. cit., p. 80.
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The only difference is that the route taken is a bit more 
indirect (and perhaps more expensive to the receiving 
bank). Brimmer's thesis that a discriminatory impact of 
Euro-dollar borrowing harms the smaller banks appears to be 
generally incorrect. If there is such an impact, it may 
merely offset the more stringent impact of monetary policy 
on large banks that results from open market operations.
If there is not such an impact, i.e., if Brimmer's thesis 
is incorrect and reserves are merely transferred back and 
forth between the big banks, then there is no discrimina­
tion problem attributable to Euro-dollar borrowing.
It appears that there may be, on balance, some 
shifting of reserves between small and large U.S. banks 
as a result of the latters' Euro-dollar borrowing. How­
ever, this redistribution may merely make less severe the 
discriminatory impact of Federal Reserve actions. Finally, 
the redistribution that does occur communicates more quickly 
Federal Reserve policy throughout the banking system and 
thus, hopefully, throughout the economy.
VIII. Summary
Monetary policy is concerned with reserve avail­
ability, interest rates, money supply, international 
financial relations, and the equity of policy impact. As 
noted in the preceding sections, Euro-dollar borrowing has 
affected reserve availability, making it necessary for the 
Federal Reserve to apply a greater degree of contractionary
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pressure to the money markets than would have been neces­
sary without this leakage.
However, the direct effect appears to be confined 
to the New York money market banks rather than applying 
to the entire banking system. Further, the increased 
loans made possible by Euro-dollar borrowing means that 
monetary policy must take into account this change.
Bank borrowing of Euro-dollars has also added an 
extra dimension to the atmosphere in which the Federal 
Reserve operates. This factor means that the Federal 
Reserve must contend with additional (and often unknown) 
variation in the money markets. Thus, not only must the 
Federal Reserve frequently apply a greater degree of 
pressure to obtain its goals but it must be prepared to 
face a greater variation in the results it obtains.
Euro-dollar borrowing affects interest rate levels 
in several ways. While this borrowing may hold interest 
rates down due to the greater supply of loans that Euro­
dollar availability allows, it is probable that the sup­
pliers of such funds obtain them, at least in part, through 
the sale of U.S. assets, reinforcing the upward movement 
of interest rates.
Euro-dollar borrowing affects the money supply 
through facilitating credit creation by the borrowers.
The possible mismeasurement of the money supply and thus the 
misdirection of policy, is not, contrary to some views, 
particularly aggravated by Euro-dollar borrowing. With
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regard to international financial relations, Euro­
dollar borrowing has had the effect of requiring swap 
transactions of various kinds between the U.S. and 
European central banks. Euro-dollar borrowing and re­
payment has temporarily alleviated and worsened the U.S.
balance of payments and has required offsetting actions in
the foreign exchange markets and among central banks.
Finally, the equality of the impact of monetary 
policy and the redistribution of reserves that may re­
sult from Euro-dollar borrowing does not appear to be a 
major problem. Indeed, any such redistribution may re­
inforce monetary policy and hasten its transmission to the
economy.
Thus, Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks has created 
difficulties for monetary policy mainly in the sphere 
of loan availability. This difficulty can be offset by a 
greater degree of pressure applied by the Federal Reserve. 
Whether this is necessary, given the postulated more rapid 
dissemination of pressures throughout the system which 
Euro-dollar borrowing facilitates, is open to question.
In any event, the leakage that Euro-dollar borrowing intro­
duced into the operations of U.S. monetary policy has 
been partially alleviated by the imposition of marginal 
reserve requirements on Euro-dollar liabilities. The 
computation of the reserve-free base and the rapid and 
near total repayment of the 1969-incurred Euro-dollar 
liabilities of U.S. banks means that in the next tight
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money period, all or nearly all Euro-dollars borrowed 
will be subject to reserve requirements. While the 
leakage from monetary policy may not be entirely halted, 
the reserve requirement will increase the cost of such 
funds to the point that Euro-dollar borrowing will, in all 
probability, never again approach the magnitude that it 
did in 1969-70. Thus, the challenge to monetary policy 
presented by Euro-dollar borrowing appears to be past. 
However, changes in the reserve requirements and, more 





The purposes of this study were several. They 
embraced, first, a description of the Euro-dollar system, 
including both its development and its operations. Second, 
emphasis was placed on the similarity between the Euro­
dollar system and the U.S. monetary system and on the 
development of policies akin to open market operations by 
the European central banks. Third, the determinants of 
Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks were investigated and, 
finally, the possibilities of multiple credit creation and 
the effects of U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing on U.S. 
monetary policy effectiveness were analyzed. As noted 
in the introductory chapter, the overriding concern of this 
study has been the various effects generated by the 
borrowing by U.S. banks of Euro-dollars. In order to 
analyze this successfully, however, some coverage of the 
history and mechanisms of the system was required. A 
secondary emphasis throughout the study was the fact that 
Euro-dollars were the product of a unique monetary system. 
This product has taken on many of the characteristics of 
money and was dealt with in these terms.
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The Euro-dollar system developed in three basic 
stages. It began as a result of the political tensions 
existing between East and West in the post-World War II 
years. Following the return to general convertibility in 
1958/ a considerable expansion of the system occurred.
Tight money in the United States in 196 6 and again in 
1969 brought U.S. banks into the market for Euro-dollar 
funds, adding a further dimension to the system. A 
fourth stage, which was preceded by the repayment of a 
significant portion of the previous borrowings of U.S. 
banks, began in 1970. This stage may be dated either 
from the turn to easy money in the U.S. in 1970 or may be 
considered as starting with the withdrawal of the gold 
convertibility of the dollar in August, 1971. It is 
marked by the withdrawal of U.S. banks from the system 
(as borrowers) and by the decline in the vehicle currency 
status of the dollar.
As noted in Chapter 2, Euro-dollars may be considered 
a medium of exchange. They are, thus, money. This money 
is produced by a monetary system that, is unique, for it 
is supranational in scope and essentially unregulated by 
any particular national central bank. The money is based 
upon commercial bank deposits in the United States but the 
creation of these reserves is not controlled by the system 
or by the Federal Reserve, except tangentially. The Euro­
dollar is one of the currencies utilized in the international
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payments system and may also be utilized within a country 
as a payments medium.
Euro-dollars are dollar denominated deposits in 
non-U.S. banks. Their issuance is not restricted to 
European banks, although these banks do produce the 
bulk of such deposits. These deposits are the money of a 
monetary system. To call the entire complex of trans­
actions and activities that take place using the Euro­
dollar a market is highly misleading. While the Euro­
dollar market (the trading of deposits) does bulk large 
within the complex of transactions, the Euro-dollar monetary 
system, including all the various activities that a system 
implies, has been the subject of this dissertation.
The mechanisms of the system were also discussed in 
Chapter 2. In essence, the explanation of the Euro-dollar 
system parallels closely the explanation of the U.S. mone­
tary system, with several important differences. There 
is no central bank in the Euro-dollar system. Rather, the 
reserves of the system are produced and held by another 
monetary system.' Trading of these reserves, creation and 
lending of deposits based on these reserves, and multiple 
credit creation based upon the redeposit of these deposits 
are all parts of the system's operations. Leakages from 
the system have been substantial, unlike the U.S. monetary 
system. The leakages have occurred as a result of low re­
deposit ra.tios and as a result of U.S. bank borrowing.
In both cases, the reserves of the system filter out of it
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and enter another monetary system. But, beyond the 
leakages and the absence of a central bank to provide re­
serves (and to act as a lender of last resort), the dif­
ferences in the basic operation of the Euro-dollar system
and of the U.S. monetary system are minimal. Only the inter­
national character of the system and the consequent lack 
of regulation of the system really set it apart.
Supply and demand factors in the Euro-dollar market,
i.e., those influences operating on or in the system 
which find their expression in the market for Euro-dollar 
funds, were delineated in Chapter 3. These influences 
proved to be quite diverse and the participants in the 
market were motivated by a significant number of factors.
Of particular interest were the causes of U.S. bank Euro­
dollar borrowing. Chapter 4 attempted a determination of 
the major influences on this bank borrowing, concluding 
that, basically, the restriction of reserves by the 
Federal Reserve, as mirrored in CD levels outstanding, 
motivated U.S. banks to enter the Euro-dollar markets. It 
was further concluded that the Euro-dollar system was a 
marginal or alternative source of funds to the banks, and 
one which was abandoned when U.S. fund sources again became 
plentiful. Finally, the regression analysis indicated that 
the availability of Euro-dollars to some U.S. banks did 
create a leakage from the effectiveness of U.S. monetary 
policy.
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Chapters 5 and 6 dealt with credit creation by the 
Euro-dollar system and with the effects of Euro-dollar 
borrowing on U.S. monetary policy. These subjects are 
best summarized in the following section, since they 
involve more tentative analyses and might best be indicated 
as conclusions based on the more institutional arid factual 
coverage of the earlier chapters.
II. Conclusions
The basic conclusions deriving from this study were 
that multiple credit creation by the Euro-dollar system 
was not only theoretically possible but also quite probable 
in a real sense. U.S. bank borrowing of Euro-dollars in­
hibits such creation by draining reserves from the system. 
But various actions taken by the European central banks in 
pursuit of profit and stabilization have funneled large 
amounts of funds into the system and have offset to some 
degree the leakage deriving from U.S. bank borrowing.
The redeposit of Euro-dollar funds into the system, 
either directly or through the agency of central banks, 
gives rise to multiple credit creation by the Euro-dollar 
system. A multiplier can be postulated, taking into 
account the redeposit ratio and, also, the degree of inter­
mediation (and reserve base sterilization) that occurs. 
Should the reserves held to back created deposits rise, or 
intermediation increase, or the redeposit ratio fall, or 
should such factors act in combination, Euro-dollar
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credit creation will be restricted. Should these factors 
operate in the opposite fashion, Euro-dollar credit 
creation may expand. As the Euro-dollar system has 
developed, it appears that the multiplier has increased.
The negative influence of U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing 
has been offset by the deposit by the central banks of 
their dollar reserves, both for stabilization and in­
vestment purposes. Further, the growth of the system and 
of the acceptability of its money has reduced leakages 
from the system. Thus, given the magnitudes reported by 
Friedman, Klopstock, Machlup, and the BIS, one conclusion 
of this study is that multiple credit creation has 
occurred in the Euro-dollar system, despite the significant 
leakages that can occur from the system.
A second conclusion of the study is that the credit 
creation of the system can be affected by coordinated 
central bank action akin to that taken by the Federal 
Reserve in the U.S. money markets. By withholding deposits 
from the Euro-dollar system, or withdrawing already placed 
deposits, Euro-dollar system reserves can be reduced, thus 
affecting a multiple reduction of Euro-dollar deposits (the 
Euro-dollar money supply). As noted, these operations have 
begun to be undertaken.
The goals of this intervention in the Euro-dollar 
market are not exactly similar to those of the Federal 
Reserve. While the Federal Reserve attempts through open
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market operations (and other actions) to influence the 
U.S. economy, the operations of the central banks in the 
Euro-dollar market are aimed more at controlling flows of 
funds into and out of their systems from the Euro-dollar 
system. These flows have had the effect of offsetting to 
a serious degree the monetary policies being pursued in 
some of the countries. In addition, these flows have 
tended to put pressure on exchange rates which then re­
quired central bank intervention. While the ultimate 
goals of the European central banks and of the Federal 
Reserve are the same, i.e., influencing the course of the 
domestic economy, the operations in the Euro-dollar market 
have as their immediate purpose the reduction of credit 
creation by the system. This reduction will be associated 
with less disruption of domestic credit markets and 
foreign exchange markets and thus domestic monetary policy 
may be more effective.
A third set of conclusions deal with the effects of 
the existence of the Euro-dollar system on the U.S. 
monetary system and on U.S. monetary policy efficiency. 
Generally, the Euro-dollar system can affect the U.S. 
system and the effectiveness of U.S. monetary policy only 
through U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing. While the Euro­
dollar system's emergence has introduced a greater degree 
of competition into the lending of dollar denominated funds, 
the only major effect on the U.S. has been through this 
borrowing. As noted in Chapter 6, it appears that loan
264
creation by the banks has been facilitated by Euro-dollar 
borrowing. Equity among banks, interest rate structures, 
and the international aspects of U.S. monetary policy 
have not been adversely affected to any great degree. 
However, prior to September 1969, U.S. bank Euro-dollar 
borrowing freed reserves (through the cash items vehicle), 
allowed a rise in loans by banks and some expansion of the 
money supply, and created a leakage in the impact of tight 
money policies of the Federal Reserve, at least as they 
impinged on the New York banks. In addition, this borrowing 
broadened the variability of impact of a given degree of 
monetary policy. The Federal Reserve, thus, faced an 
additional destabilizing factor that increased its area 
of uncertainty with respect to the magnitude of impact of 
a particular policy action. However, the imposition of 
marginal reserve requirements on Euro-dollar borrowing 
has reduced the leakage from monetary policy and the 
variability of its impact. Indeed, it appears that should 
Euro-dollar borrowing reoccur in the next tight money 
period, such borrowing will actually augment rather than 
offset the impact of tight money.
The equity among banks issue has been of some con­
cern to Andrew Brimmer, among others. As Chapter 6 indi­
cated, this issue is not as significant as it first appeared 
to be. Whether the view that Euro-dollar borrowing merely 
represented a reshuffling of reserves among the large
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money market banks or whether it implied some transfer of 
reserves from smaller to large banks, the force with 
which monetary policy strikes each class of bank is not 
really important (with respect to Euro-dollars). If 
there is some transfer of reserves, Euro-dollar borrowing 
merely transmits monetary pressures more quickly to all 
banks and, in addition, offsets the greater impact of 
open market operations on the large banks.
To conclude, the development of the Euro-dollar 
system has involved credit creation on a fairly sizable 
scale. It has brought interferences to the implementation 
of monetary policy both in the U.S. and abroad. However, 
it may have made more equitable the incidence of U.S. 
monetary policy. Further, with the new reserve requirements, 
such borrowing may reinforce U.S. monetary policy.
The future of the Euro-dollar system has been brought 
into question by recent U.S. actions designed to cope with 
the undervaluation of several other countries' currencies. 
These actions have, however, merely reaffirmed a fact 
which has been obscured -in the last decade. That is, the 
U.S. dollar represents purchasing power in the most powerful 
economy of the world. When persuasion fails, U.S. action 
can obtain by force the desired goals. There is only one 
major currency, as the London Times is reported to have 
said, and that is the dollar. Given this situation, the 
vehicle currency status of the dollar may have been reduced
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over the short terra by the recent actions. But/ in the 
longer term, based on the power of the dollar, the vehicle 
currency status of the dollar will be generally undiminished. 
As a component of the dollar payments system, the Euro­
dollar system will undoubtedly survive the present period 
of uncertainty, barring extensive capital controls and 
the like.
While Euro-dollars may never again play a major role 
in U.S. bank liquidity, it seems certain that, in the ab­
sence of the complete collapse of the international finan- 
cial system, the Euro-dollar system will continue to play 
a central and perhaps disruptive role in the financial 
relations of the nations of the world. The system's 
existence presents the possibility of good as well as ill.
The development of open market operations in the system 
by the central banks presents opportunities similar to 
those that result from Federal Reserve operations in the 
U.S. money markets. Properly executed, such operations may 
solve many problems currently besetting the international 
financial system while, at the same time, allowing the con­
tinued flow of capital between countries. The Euro-dollar 
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